Cable: "U.S.-UK interoperability"

[birther truther tenther]

http://213.251.145.96/cable/2009/12/09LONDON2768.html

Viewing cable 09LONDON2768, SHADOW DEFENSE MINISTER FOX PLEDGES CLOSE U.S.-UK

VZCZCXYZ0000
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHLO #2768/01 3441648
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 101648Z DEC 09
FM AMEMBASSY LONDON
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4287
INFO RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO PRIORITY 1304
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L LONDON 002768

NOFORN
SIPDIS

EO 12958 DECL: 12/09/2019
TAGS PGOV, PREL, MOPS, MARR, AF, UK, PK, IR, IN, CH, RS,
SA, NATO
SUBJECT: SHADOW DEFENSE MINISTER FOX PLEDGES CLOSE U.S.-UK
COOPERATION IF TORIES GAIN POWER

Classified By: Ambassador Louis Susman for reasons 1.4 b and d

¶1. (C/NF) Summary. During a December 9 meeting with the Ambassador, Shadow Secretary of State for Defense Liam Fox affirmed his desire to work closely with the U.S. if the Conservative Party wins power in next year’s general election. He highlighted the importance of the U.S.-UK Defense Trade and Cooperation Treaty insofar as it advances the goal of U.S.-UK interoperability. The Treaty “means a lot to us,” Fox emphasized, adding that “we (Conservatives) intend to follow a much more pro-American profile in procurement.” Fox, who accompanied Conservative Party leader David Cameron on a December 4-6 visit to Afghanistan, (septel) expressed confidence regarding U.S. leadership in Afghanistan and optimism about the way forward. (Note: In a December 8 Chatham House speech, Fox affirmed the importance of the Afghanistan mission and analyzed challenges facing NATO.) Fox predicted that negotiations with Iran would fail; he stated that the U.S. and UK should work together to prevent a nuclear arms race in the Middle East. He faulted the Labour government for policies which reinforce the Indian government’s long-held view that HMG’s foreign relations on the subcontinent are “skewed to Pakistan.” End Summary.

U.S.-UK Interoperability
------------------------

¶2. (C/NF) Ambassador Susman met December 9 with Liam Fox, Shadow Secretary of State for Defense. (Mike Threadgold, Head of Fox’s Private Office, and U.S. Embassy Political Officer Chris Palmer attended the meeting as notetakers.) Fox, a committed Atlanticist, underscored his desire to work closely with the U.S. if the Conservative Party wins power in next year’s general election. He affirmed that when Winston Churchill first raised the notion of the “special relationship” it was as a wartime leader. The special relationship will remain strategically central to UK foreign policy regardless of which party is in power in the UK, Fox underlined. However, the relationship will be especially close in the defense sphere under Tory leadership, Fox stated. He affirmed his desire to increase joint defense procurement with the United States. Increasing U.S.-UK “interoperability is the key” since the U.S. and UK will continue to fight together in the future.

¶3. (C/NF) Fox stressed that the U.S.-UK Defense Trade and Cooperation Treaty (Note: SFRL hearings on the Treaty were to be held December 10) is extremely important insofar as it advances the goal of interoperability. Fox expressed appreciation for the Ambassador’s update regarding the likelihood of Senate approval of the Treaty soon. The Treaty “means a lot to us,” Fox emphasized, adding that “we (Conservatives) intend to follow a much more pro-American profile in procurement. The key is interoperability.” Fox asserted that some within the Conservative Party are less enthusiastic, asserting that “we’re supposed to be partners with, not supplicants to, the United States.” Fox said he rebuffed these assertions, and he welcomed the Ambassador’s reassurance that senior U.S. leaders value the UK as an equal partner.

Afghanistan
-----------

¶4. (C/NF) Fox, who accompanied Conservative Party leader David Cameron on a December 4-6 visit to Afghanistan (septel), expressed confidence regarding U.S. leadership in Afghanistan and optimism about the way forward. He noted that he hoped to meet with NSA Jones, Ambassador Eikenberry, and General Petraeus during the December 11-13 Regional Security Summit in Bahrain. Fox also stated that he planned to meet DASD Flournoy in Washington December 18; Fox will visit Washington and New York December 17-20. (Note: In a December 8 Chatham House speech (see paragraph 9), Fox affirmed the importance of the Afghanistan mission to the NATO Alliance and the importance of explaining to the British people with “clarity, conviction, and consistency” “what the national security threats are that compel us to be in Afghanistan.” End Note.)

Iran
----

¶5. (C/NF) Turning to Iran, Fox observed that there are three possible outcomes in Iran: regime change, behavioral change for the regime’s leaders, and “a change of leadership within
the regime.” The first two options “won’t happen” soon, although we could be “in the beginning of the end game.” When regime change comes it will likely be a “bloody end,” Fox stated. The regime’s strong hold on power, its implacable hatred of the U.S. and Israel, and the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps stranglehold on the economy make it extremely unlikely that the regime will change from within, he said. He predicted that international negotiations with Iran would fail. He said that Iran’s Independence Day in February would provide the next opportunity for the international community to evaluate the strength of Iran’s internal opposition, based on the size of demonstrations. Fox stated that he had recently met with a group of wealthy, Iranian expatriates, most of whom expressed support for Iran’s obtaining a nuclear bomb. “Persian nationalism” more than Islamic fundamentalism is the basis of Iranian popular support for a nuclear weapons program.

¶6. (C/NF) The U.S. and UK need to work together to prevent a nuclear arms race in the Middle East, Fox said. He expressed support for the establishment of a U.S. nuclear umbrella in the Middle East. Russia would play a more constructive role in regard to Iran if it began to fear “encirclement” by China and Iran. China could be more helpful under the right circumstances, Fox said. (Note: Shadow Foreign Secretary William Hague told the Ambassador in a subsequent meeting (septel) that in his view China would probably not be more helpful in regard to Iran in the foreseeable future, although Russia would likely play a more constructive role. End Note.)

India-Pakistan
--------------

¶7. (C/NF) Turning to India, Fox criticized the Labour government for policies which reinforce the Indian government’s long-held view that HMG’s foreign relations on the subcontinent are “skewed to Pakistan.” Fox predicted this would not be a factor under a Conservative government, since the Conservatives are “less dependent” than the Labour Party on votes from the British-Pakistani community.

NATO
----

¶8. (SBU/NF) During his meeting with the Ambassador, Fox touched on the future of the NATO Alliance, affirming the importance of the ongoing strategic transformation debate and the future of NATO. Fox focused on NATO in a December 8 Chatham House speech on “The Way Forward for NATO.” In those remarks, Fox asserted that “NATO’s mission in Afghanistan has created further debate on NATO’s role and even of NATO’s survival as a defense alliance.” The speech highlights that “neither the financial burden nor the fighting burden is properly shared between NATO allies” and that the pending Strategic Concept should address collective responsibilities.  Fox’s speech affirms the importance of strategic nuclear forces to the Alliance, as stated in the 1999 Strategic Concept; the speech commits a future Conservative government to “maintaining Britain’s round-the-clock, independent, submarine-based, and strategic nuclear deterrent.” The speech concludes that, despite its shortcomings, NATO is a “necessity” and “in order to successfully face the threats of the 21st century, NATO is the only way forward.” (Note: The full text of the speech is available at www.chathamhouse.org.uk End Note.)
Visit London’s Classified Website: http://www.intelink.sgov.gov/wiki/Portal:Unit ed_Kingdom
Susman

[birther truther tenther]

From Joint Vision 2020
http://globalgulag.freesmfhosting.com/index.php/topic,711.0.html

Interoperability—the ability of systems,
units, or forces to provide services from
other systems, units, or forces and to use the
services so exchanged to enable them to operate
effectively together (Joint Pub 1-02).

Interoperability
Interoperability is the foundation of effective
joint, multinational, and interagency operations.
The joint force has made significant progress
toward achieving an optimum level of interoperability,
but there must be a concerted effort toward
continued improvement. Further improvements
will include the refinement of joint
doctrine as well as further development of common
technologies and processes. Exercises, personnel
exchanges, agreement on standardized operating
procedures, individual training and
education, and planning will further enhance
and institutionalize these capabilities. Interoperability
is a mandate for the joint force of 2020—
especially in terms of communications, common
logistics items, and information sharing. Information
systems and equipment that enable a common
relevant operational picture must work from
shared networks that can be accessed by any appropriately
cleared participant.

Although technical interoperability is essential,
it is not sufficient to ensure effective operations.
There must be a suitable focus on procedural
and organizational elements, and decisionmakers
at all levels must understand each other’s capabilities
and constraints. Training and education, experience
and exercises, cooperative planning, and
skilled liaison at all levels of the joint force will not
only overcome the barriers of organizational culture
and differing priorities, but will teach members
of the joint team to appreciate the full range
of service capabilities available to them.
The future joint force will have the embedded
technologies and adaptive organizational
structures that will allow trained and experienced
people to develop compatible processes and procedures,
engage in collaborative planning, and
adapt as necessary to specific crisis situations.
These features are not only vital to the joint
force, but to multinational and interagency operations
as well.


Multinational operations—a
collective term used to describe
military actions conducted by
forces of two or more nations usually
undertaken within the structure
of a coalition or alliance (Joint
Pub 1-02).

Multinational Operations
Since our potential multinational partners
will have varying levels of technology, a tailored
approach to interoperability that accommodates
a wide range of needs and capabilities is necessary.
Our more technically advanced allies will
have systems and equipment that are essentially
compatible, enabling them
to interface and share information
in order to operate
effectively with U.S. forces
at all levels. However, we
must also be capable of operating
with allies and coalition
partners who may be
technologically incompatible—
especially at the tactical
level. Additionally, many
of our future partners will have significant specialized
capabilities that may be integrated into a
common operating scheme. At the same time, the
existence of these relationships does not imply
access to information without constraints. We
and our multinational partners will continue to
use suitable judgment regarding the protection of
sensitive information and information sources.
In all cases, effective command and control is
the primary means of successfully extending the
joint vision to multinational operations. Technological
developments that connect the information
systems of partners will provide the links that
lead to a common relevant operational picture
and improve command and control. However, the
sharing of information needed to maintain the
tempo of integrated multinational operations also
relies heavily on a shared understanding of operational
procedures and compatible organizations.
The commander must have the ability to evaluate
information in its multinational context. That
context can only be appreciated if sufficient regional
expertise and liaison capability are available
on the commander’s staff. A deep understanding
of the cultural, political, military, and
economic characteristics of a region must be established
and maintained. Developing this understanding
is dependent upon shared training and
education, especially with key partners, and may
require organizational change as well. The overall
effectiveness of multinational operations is therefore
dependent on interoperability between organizations,
processes, and technologies.

Interagency coordination—the coordination
that occurs between elements of the
Department of Defense and engaged U.S.
Government agencies, nongovernmental organizations,
private voluntary organizations,
and regional and international organizations
for the purpose of accomplishing an objective
(Joint Pub 1-02).

Interagency Operations
The primary challenge of interagency operations
is to achieve unity of effort despite the diverse
cultures, competing interests, and differing
priorities of the participating organizations, many
of whom guard their relative independence, freedom
of action, and impartiality. Additionally,
these organizations may lack the structure and resources
to support extensive liaison cells or integrative
technology. In this environment and in
the absence of formal command relationships,
the future joint force must be proactive in improving
communications, planning, interoperability,
and liaison with potential interagency
participants. These factors are important in all aspects
of interagency operations, but particularly
in the context of direct threats to citizens and facilities
in the U.S. homeland. Cohesive interagency
action is vital to deterring, defending
against, and responding to such attacks. The joint
force must be prepared to support civilian authorities
in a fully integrated effort to meet the needs
of U.S. citizens and accomplish the objectives
specified by the National Command Authorities.
All organizations have unique information
assets that can contribute to the common relevant
operational picture and support unified action.
They also have unique information requirements.
Sharing information with appropriately cleared
participants and integration of information from
all sources are essential. Understanding each
other’s requirements and assets is also crucial.
More importantly, through training with potential
interagency partners, experienced liaisons must be
developed to support long-term relationships, collaborative
planning in advance of crises, and compatible
processes and procedures. As with our
multinational partners, interoperability in all
areas of interaction is essential to effective interagency
operations.

READ MORE OF JOINT VISION 2020 HERE:  http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/jfq_pubs/1225.pdf

AND HERE:
Anti_Illuminati for dummies. The ultimate study guide for the layman.
http://globalgulag.freesmfhosting.com/index.php/topic,711.0.html