CSIS rolled out NWO agenda on 9/12/2001

[birther truther tenther]

James Lewis was excited and got a "hard on" on 9/12!

While most Americans are grieving, CSIS scumbag James Lewis is ready to roll out the NWO agenda in no time!

Read this $h1t.

Retrieved from:
http://web.archive.org/web/20010914203646/www.csis.org/features/nyterror_lewis.htm


 Dr. James Lewis
Contact: jlewis@csis.org
Director
CSIS Technology Program

The Impact of the Terrorist Attack
on Cyber-Security & Technology

September 12, 2001

Yesterday's tragedy may shift the terms of the public debate for issues like privacy, internet surveillance and even the allocation of '3G' radio spectrum. Security, law enforcement and homeland defense will be a higher priority than in the past. Privacy advocates are concerned that the fear and anger generated by the tragedy will sweep away opposition to intrusive technologies, such as the FBI's 'Carnivore' Internet traffic monitoring system. Greater use of law enforcement monitoring tools need not be a cause for concern if the appropriate legal safeguards (warrant requirements, judicial oversight) remain in place.

Americans may now also tolerate other intrusive new technologies to improve security. Automatic face monitoring at airports for anti-terrorist purposes will seem like a much better idea. However, either the legislative process or the courts will need to sort through some of the knottier problems that will arise from the use of new automated scanning and identification technologies: what locations are appropriate for scanning; if public and private personal information databases can be linked, how long data collected at airports can be stored and under what safeguards, and what uses are appropriate for face monitoring data. Americans will support automatic face screening for terrorists at airports but they may be displeased if the screening is also used to identify those with outstanding parking tickets. Technology has shifted the dividing line between what is public and what is private and our laws have not kept up.

The emphasis given to cybersecurity in the past may deflate somewhat in light of yesterday's events. The "cyber-risk" has always been overstated - a digital Pearl Harbor is preferable to a real one, and terrorist groups like Al-Qaeda have emphasized that explosions are preferable to hacking. Critical Infrastructure Protection is necessary, but an adequate homeland defense must do more than protect infrastructure. Physical protection remains as important or more important than cybersecurity.

If there is a political shift among Americans toward greater support for domestic security, it may make it more difficult to reallocate radio spectrum from the government to the private sector. Industry and some in Congress have argued that valuable radio spectrum now used by the Department of Defense should be reallocated to the private sector for use in 3rd Generation wireless communications systems (3G). DOD opposes this move. One dilemma is how to decide which use of the radio spectrum is more valuable - 3G or national defense. The value of defense has gone up in the public estimation over the last 24 hours. Whether this will have a lasting effect on the spectrum debate will depend on what other countries do (some are already taking spectrum used by DOD for 3G services) and whether an adequate replacement and compensation scheme for DOD can be devised.

[birther truther tenther]

John Hamre was elected president and CEO of CSIS in January 2000. Before joining CSIS, he served as the 26th U.S. deputy secretary of defense. Prior to holding that position, he was under secretary of defense (comptroller) from 1993 to 1997. As comptroller, he was the principal assistant to the secretary of defense for the preparation, presentation, and execution of the defense budget and management improvement programs. Before serving in the Department of Defense, Dr. Hamre worked for 10 years as a professional staff member of the Senate Armed Services Committee. During that time, he was primarily responsible for the oversight and evaluation of procurement, research and development programs, defense budget issues, and relations with the Senate Appropriations Committee. From 1978 to 1984, he served in the Congressional Budget Office, where he became its deputy assistant director for national security and international affairs. In that position, he oversaw analysis and other support for committees in both the House of Representatives and the Senate. Dr. Hamre received his Ph.D., with distinction, in 1978 from the School of Advanced International Studies at the Johns Hopkins University, where his studies focused on international politics and economics and U.S. foreign policy. In 1972, he received a B.A., with high distinction, from Augustana College, emphasizing political science and economics. The following year he studied as a Rockefeller fellow at Harvard Divinity School.


STATEMENT ON 9/12:

http://web.archive.org/web/20010914203636/www.csis.org/features/nyterror_hamre.htm

 Dr. John J. Hamre
President and CEO
CSIS

Terrorist incidents in New York and Washington, D.C.

September 12, 2001

Tuesday, September 11, was a dark day for America, but not for America alone. It was a dark day for civilization as well. Frankly, America is lucky to have been spared tragedies that the rest of the world sees all too often. On September 11, however, terror came home. The physical tragedy is inescapable, and our hearts go out to the injured and to all those who lost their loved-ones. But there is another cost -- the potential loss of hope. Our innate hope in a larger good was shattered by an unexplainable evil.

We must now start to draw lessons about the broader meaning of these tragic events. My first hope is that this tragedy breaks the rhythm of the popular drumbeat around the world that "proud America" needs to be taken down a notch. Our grief is great, and we have all been enormously consoled by the flood of thoughtful messages from friends around the world. These words of encouragement demonstrate the depth of support that America can count on in a time of crisis. Our friends are standing with us and they are many.

I also hope that through this tragedy we can overcome the growing divide between America and the rest of the world about American "unilateralism." I do not personally believe that America has turned down a unilateralist path, although I hear the argument made often. What is clear from the events of September 11 is that, in a global age, national security depends on extensive collaboration with other countries. We have no hope of stopping terrorists in the United States if we try to manage the problem alone. In fact, these events prove we must have strong collaboration with other countries not just to knock down hateful extremists, but to tackle the range of problems that transcend the sovereign control of any one country.

This tragedy opens an opportunity for a new partnership in the world. The nature of our global age is such that we cannot solve problems in America that spring from causes in other countries without the partnership of those countries in the shared challenge. That is the nature of governance in the twenty-first century. We need two things to navigate safely and successfully the dangerous waters of globalization: strong and competent governments around the world and a shared consensus on problems and solutions. We cannot handle the dark side of globalization, or really benefit from its opportunities either, without both of these conditions.

It was this cooperative spirit that drove us to work with other countries fifty years ago to create the global institutions that so successfully managed the challenges that we have since faced. We need to rediscover this spirit at the start of this decade. I hope that this is the phoenix that rises from the terrible rubble in New York and Washington.

[birther truther tenther]

Simon Serfaty is the first holder of the Zbigniew Brzezinski Chair in Global Security and Geostrategy at CSIS. He was the director of the CSIS Europe Program for more than 10 years and remains a senior adviser to the program. Dr. Serfaty is also a senior professor of U.S. foreign policy with the Graduate Programs in International Studies at Old Dominion University in Norfolk, Virginia. From 1972 to 1993, he was a research professor at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies in Washington, D.C., serving as director of the Johns Hopkins Center of European Studies in Bologna, Italy (1972–1976), director of the Washington Center of Foreign Policy Research (1978–1980), and executive director of the Johns Hopkins Foreign Policy Institute (1984–1991).

      Dr. Serfaty is the author of many books, including Architects of Delusion: Europe, America, and the Iraq War (2007), The Vital Partnership: Power and Order (2005), La tentation impériale (2004), Memories of Europe’s Future: Farewell to Yesteryear (1999), Stay the Course: European Unity and Atlantic Solidarity (1997), and Taking Europe Seriously (1992). Books edited by Dr. Serfaty include A Recast Partnership? Institutional Dimensions of Transatlantic Relations (2008), Visions of the Atlantic Alliance (2005), Visions of America and Europe (2004), The European Finality Debate and its National Dimensions (2003), and The Media and Foreign Policy (1990). Dr. Serfaty’s articles have appeared in most leading professional journals in the United States and Europe, and he has been a guest lecturer in over 40 different countries in Europe, Africa, and Asia. He has been a frequent expert witness for the U.S. Congress and an occasional witness for other national legislatures in Europe. A naturalized U.S. citizen since 1965, Dr. Serfaty holds a Ph.D. in political science from the Johns Hopkins University. In May 2001, Old Dominion University designated him as eminent scholar of the university. Dr. Serfaty was made a Chevalier de la Légion d'Honneur (Knight of the French Legion of Honor) in July 2008.



This scumbag calls for a NEW WORLD ORDER AFTER 9/11!

Read this garbage here:
http://web.archive.org/web/20010914221404/www.csis.org/features/nyterror_serfaty.htm

Dr. Simon Serfaty
Director
CSIS Europe Program

On the Terrorist Attack of the World Trade Center
and the Pentagon on September 11, 2001

September 12, 2001

Following yesterday's brutal attack, the solidarity shown by allies and friends, as well as some adversaries has been widespread. It provides an opportunity for rebuilding the Grand Coalition that, 10 years ago, was to shape a new world order.

In Europe, the allies understand that the feasibility of such an attack on the United States reveals their own exposure as well. That is why the NATO members have hardly objected to stating their solidarity in the context of the alliance's Article 5. In Russia, Vladimir Putin sees this as an opportunity to bare the soul the president gave him, as well as to get some credit for the internal problems he may fear in and beyond Chechnya. In the Middle East, the Arab states are growing increasingly concerned over a conflict that is getting out of hand, first between Israelis and Palestinians in the streets, and now between Islamist radicals and America (and others). Even under enormous time pressure - with retaliation possible sooner rather than later - allied support for U.S. military action should be sought and can, in fact, be expected.

For this act of war to not be repeatable we must avoid treating it as an unrepeatable terrorist action. Under conditions of urban terror, the alternative to deterrence is not defense (i.e., damage limitation) but preemption at the source. Few groups are able to launch such acts of war - know-how, capabilities, resources, network, etc. - and they must be hunted until they are so disrupted as to be no longer operational.

In the aftermath of this historically traumatic experience, however, an America that acts alone, or one whose (re)actions are questioned by allies and friends, would find it difficult to take allies and friends seriously. If it feels isolated in a mostly hostile world, America may act unilaterally - meaning, not alone, but on the basis of one alliance per crisis, one crisis per alliance. That would hardly create a new world order generally, and, no less significantly, it might not end or contain any specific disorder, either.

The events of September 11 also serve as a reminder that the Middle East conflict cannot be neglected for long without dangerous impact elsewhere. Accordingly, U.S. military retaliation, whatever its form, will be most effective, and allied support mostly likely, if it is accompanied, in its immediate aftermath, by a renewed U.S. engagement in the peace process, including the nomination of a high-level special envoy who would restore U.S. leadership in making peace after it has been established that its power can wage war. That, too, is, after all, what happened in the context of the Gulf War 10 years ago.

My commentary:
We truthers aren't f**king around when we talk about 9/11 and the "new world order".  There's the "new world order" mentioned TWICE on 9/12/2001 from a scumbag who sits in Zbig's old chair at CSIS.

[birther truther tenther]

Anthony H. Cordesman holds the Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy at CSIS and also acts as a national security analyst for ABC News. He is a recipient of the Department of Defense Distinguished Service Medal. During his time at CSIS, he has completed a wide variety of studies on energy, U.S. strategy and defense plans, defense programming and budgeting, NATO modernization, Chinese military power, the lessons of modern warfare, proliferation, counterterrorism, armed nation building, the security of the Middle East, and the Afghan and Iraq conflicts. Many of these studies can be downloaded from the Burke Chair section of the CSIS Web site at http://www.csis.org/program/burke-chair-strategy. At CSIS, Cordesman has been director of the Gulf Net Assessment Project, the Gulf in Transition study, and principle investigator of the Homeland Defense Project. He directed the Middle East Net Assessment Project, acted as codirector of the Strategic Energy Initiative, and directed the project on Saudi Arabia in the 21st century.

Professor Cordesman has served as director of intelligence assessment in the Office of the Secretary of Defense and as civilian assistant to the deputy secretary of defense. He directed the analysis of the lessons of the October War for the secretary of defense in 1974, coordinating the U.S. military, intelligence, and civilian analysis of the conflict. He has also served in numerous other government positions, including in the State Department and on NATO International Staff. In addition, he served as director of policy and planning for resource applications in the Department of Energy and as national security assistant to Senator John McCain. He has had numerous foreign assignments, including posts in the United Kingdom, Lebanon, Egypt, and Iran, as well as with NATO in Brussels and Paris. He has worked extensively in Saudi Arabia and the Gulf. He is the author of a wide range of studies on energy policy, national security, and the Middle East, and his most recent publications include Saudi Arabia: National Security in a Troubled Region (Praeger, 2009), Iranian Weapons of Mass Destruction: The Birth of a Regional Nuclear Arms Race? (Praeger, 2009), Withdrawal from Iraq: Assessing the Readiness of Iraqi Security Forces (CSIS, 2009), Winning in Afghanistan: Creating Effective Afghan Security Forces (CSIS, 2009), and The North African Military Balance: Force Developments in the Maghreb (CSIS, 2009).

This was one of the very few CSIS guys who was level-headed.

Retrieved from:
http://web.archive.org/web/20010914221700/www.csis.org/features/nyterror_cordesman.htm

Dr. Anthony Cordesman
CSIS Burke Chair in Strategy

U.S. Response

September 12, 2001

We are now in a period where there is a real risk that we can overreact and use the wrong words. We face a new level of terrorism, an attack on our homeland tantamount to war. We need to act decisively. But we also need to fully understand who is responsible and not simply blame Osama bin Laden or Iraq or whoever else is convenient.

We need to prepare. We cannot achieve anything in terms of deterrence if we simply strike at low-level perpetrators. If we are to succeed, we must attack and kill the leaders of the movements responsible. At the same time, we must know that full chain of responsibility, whether governments are really involved and who in those governments is involved.

We cannot simply lash out at another country like Afghanistan. We have to strike precisely. This means we have to rethink retaliation in our military operations and do so calmly and objectively.

Similarly, we cannot throw money at homeland defense or counterterrorism or simply try to defend against one type of attack. We need to have a comprehensive reassessment of how we budget and plan for homeland defense. We obviously need to change our priorities, but to do so, we need careful planning, and we need to be very, very sure that what we do is effective and is worth the cost both in dollars and out civil liberties. It is this need for careful evolution, which should be our response, not seeking some sudden fix or finding a scapegoat and attacking the wrong target.

[birther truther tenther]

Michèle Flournoy was confirmed by the U.S. Senate as the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy on February 9, 2009.  She serves as the principal staff assistant and advisor to the Secretary of Defense and the Deputy Secretary of Defense for all matters on the formulation of national security and defense policy and the integration and oversight of DoD policy and plans to achieve national security objectives.
Prior to her confirmation, Ms. Flournoy was appointed President of the Center for a New American Security (CNAS) in January 2007.  Before co-founding CNAS, she was a senior adviser at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, where she worked on a broad range of defense policy and international security issues.
Ms. Flournoy previously served as a distinguished research professor at the Institute for National Strategic Studies at the National Defense University (NDU), where she founded and led the university’s Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) working group, which was chartered by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to develop intellectual capital in preparation for the Department of Defense’s 2001 QDR.
Prior to joining NDU, Ms. Flournoy was dual-hatted as Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy and Threat Reduction and Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy.  In that capacity, she oversaw three Policy offices in the Office of the Secretary of Defense: Strategy; Requirements, Plans and Counterproliferation; and Russia, Ukraine and Eurasian Affairs.
Ms. Flournoy was awarded the Secretary of Defense Medal for Outstanding Public Service in 1996, the Department of Defense Medal for Distinguished Public Service in 1998 and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff’s Joint Distinguished Civilian Service Award in 2000.  She is a former member of the Defense Policy Board and the Defense Science Board Task Force on Transformation.
Ms. Flournoy earned a bachelor’s degree in social studies from Harvard University and a master’s degree in international relations from Balliol College, Oxford University, where she was a Newton-Tatum scholar.

biography retrieved from:
http://www.defense.gov/bios/biographydetail.aspx?biographyid=172


http://web.archive.org/web/20010914205137/www.csis.org/features/nyterror_flournoy.htm

 Ms. Michèle Flournoy
Senior Fellow
CSIS International Security Program

U.S. Security Implications

September 12, 2001

In the wake of this heinous terrorist attack, the U.S. government needs to take action on several fronts: (1) determining who is responsible for the attack, (2) developing options for an effective response (this should draw on the full range of military and non-military means at our disposal), (3) building an international coalition and strategy to fight terrorism over the long haul, and (4) making it crystal clear that acts of terrorism against the United States will fail to meet their ultimate objective - the United States will not be intimidated into disengaging from the world or shirking its leadership responsibilities. It is also imperative that this administration take the time it needs to develop the most effective retaliatory response possible - one that not only responds decisively to this particular act of terrorism, but that also advances our longer-term strategy to combat international terrorism writ large.

Yesterday, our national security paradigm changed. We no longer have the luxury of thinking about U.S. national security primarily in terms of protecting American allies and interests abroad; we need to give far more serious attention to protecting the U.S. homeland against a range of asymmetric threats, including terrorism. In the weeks and months ahead, it is critical that we conduct a comprehensive interagency assessment of our homeland security requirements. President Bush should direct that this assessment be undertaken; if he does not, Congress will likely demand it. Such an assessment should identify and prioritize shortfalls across the board and should produce a comprehensive plan to address these shortfalls in the upcoming budget cycle. This will mean broadening the discussion of homeland defense beyond missile defense to include everything from airport security, to enhancing our intelligence capabilities, to critical infrastructure protection, to defense against biological and chemical weapons, and more.

As the meaning of this paradigm shift sinks in, the American public may be willing to trade some civil liberties for enhanced security. They may, for example, be more willing to put up with more extensive and intrusive security checks at airports in exchange for a greater degree of safety. For the U.S. government, this shift should force us to break out of the organizational stovepipes that have constrained our ability to address threats like terrorism in the past. We must have a new level of interagency cooperation and a new way of doing business.

[birther truther tenther]

Shireen Hunter was the director of the Islam Program at CSIS. She previously served as director of the Mediterranean Studies program with the Centre for European Policy Studies in Brussels (1994-1998), deputy director of the Middle East Program CSIS (1983-1993), as a guest scholar at the Brookings Institution, and research fellow at the Harvard Center for International Affairs. Hunter is the author of many books, including Islam in Russia: The Politics of Identity and Security, with Jeffrey Thomas and Alexander Melikishvili (M.E. Sharpe, 2004), Islam: Europe’s Second Religion, ed. (Praeger, 2002), The Future of Islam and the West: Clash of Civilizations or Peaceful Coexistence? (Praeger/CSIS, 1998), Central Asia Since Independence (Praeger/CSIS, 1996), The Transcaucasus in Transition: Nation-Building and Conflict (CSIS, 1994), Iran After Khomeini (CSIS, 1992), Iran and the World: Continuity in a Revolutionary Decade (Indiana University Press, 1990), and The Politics of Revivalism  (Indiana University Press, 1988), as well as numerous chapters in edited volumes. Her articles have appeared in leading journals such as Foreign Affairs, Foreign Policy, Current History, the Middle East Journal, Security Dialogue, the International Spectator, Relazioni Internazionali, the Third World Quarterly, Current History, the Washington Quarterly, the Oxford Journal of Islamic Studies, and SAIS Review, as well as prominent newspapers, including the Los Angeles Times and the Christian Science Monitor. She holds a Ph.D. in political science from the Institut Universitaire des Hautes Études Internationales in Geneva and an M.A. from the London School of Economics and Political Science. She speaks French, Persian, and Azeri Turkish.



Retrieved from:
http://web.archive.org/web/20010914221333/www.csis.org/features/nyterror_hunter.htm

Dr. Shireen Hunter
Director
CSIS Islam Program

New trends in Islamic Extremism

September 12, 2001

The tragic events of September 11, 2001, point to a disturbing trend in the evolution of Islamic extremism and its regional and international networks.

First, the new brand of extremists is both ideologically less sophisticated, more inflexible and more dogmatic. The core of their ideology is a distorted version of the concept of Jihad (Holy War), hence their identification as Jihadists.

Second, this particular brand of Islamic extremists has its roots in the Afghan conflicts, the Russo-Afghan War and the Afghan Civil War. In addition, many members and/or sympathizers of this brand have been hardened by doing battle elsewhere, including recent conflicts such as Bosnia, Chechnya and in the Tajik Civil War (1992-1997).

This type of engagement in warlike situations has provided the new breed of extremists with military training skills, hitherto unavailable to them, including flying sophisticated aircraft.

Third, the Afghan War and other conflicts, notably those in Bosnia and Chechnya, have given rise to a geographically widespread network of extremists who have common experiences.

Fourth, the "Jihadist" trend has found sympathizers among Muslims who have not had direct involvement in any of the above-mentioned conflicts, including a very small section of the Muslim Diaspora in Europe and the United States. Such sympathizers could potentially be very important links in the chain of extremist networks and their ability to perpetrate terrorists acts.

Policy Implications

Dealing with the new breed of extremists and the network they have created requires new policies on the part of the United States beyond the immediate retaliatory measures against the perpetrators once they have been identified. The following components of a long-term strategy especially stand out:

   1. Building a more cohesive multilateral strategy to deal with international terrorism - especially involving U.S. allies but also other countries who face problems of terrorism;
   2. A more active policy of peace-making in trouble spots, notably Afghanistan;
   3. A more stringent policy vis-à-vis countries who in one form or another help terrorist groups, including countries, such as Pakistan, which do not have an openly hostile attitude towards the United States;
   4. Insistence that countries - including some U.S. allies - who help Diaspora organizations with Jihadist tendencies stop such assistance and dissuade their private citizens and/or organizations from doing so;
   5. Discouraging Muslim and other governments from using extremists groups - even if they are not exactly part of terrorist networks - from the advancement of their immediate goals without concern for long-term consequence. Afghanistan should serve as a sobering example of such an approach.