ANTHONY H. CORDESMAN
Senior Fellow and Codirector
Middle East Studies
Expertise: Middle East and South Asian security issues; national security; lessons of modern War; defense budgets; defense intelligence; military balance. Anthony Cordesman joined CSIS from Senator John McCain's office], where he served as assistant for national security. He is also an adjunct professor of national security studies at Georgetown University and a military analyst for ABC-TV. Mr. Cordesman was recently a Wilson Fellow at the Woodrow Wilson Center for Scholars at the Smithsonian. He has had numerous awards, including the Distinguished Service Medal and has previously held senior positions in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the State Department, the Department of Energy, and the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency. His overseas posts were on the U.S. delegation to NATO and as a director in the NATO International Staff, working on Middle Eastern security issues. Professor Cordesman has written and lectured extensively on the Middle East and the Gulf, the U.S. and Soviet military balance, U.S. forces and defense budgets, and the lessons of war. He has written many books, most recently, The Gulf War (Westview, 1995) and the Arab-Israeli Military Balance and the Middle East Peace Process (Westview, 1996). He has also written numerous magazine and newspaper articles and has often appeared on radio and television. He was formerly the international editor of the Armed Forces Journal and U.S. editor of Armed Forces (UK).
The following are excerpts from Cordesman's report. Please read the full report at the link below.Retrieved from:
http://web.archive.org/web/19970708152302/www.csis.org/mideast/terror.htmlTerrorism and the Threat From
Weapons of Mass Destruction
in the Middle East
The Problem of Paradigm Shifts
Working Draft
Anthony H. Cordesman
Senior Fellow and Co-Director
Middle East Studies Program
October 22, 1996EXCERPTS
The literature on terrorism tends to have an unfortunate ritual character. First, there are the "alarmists" who make every incident into a megatrend, every possible scenario into a cause for immediate action, every contact and liaison between extremists into a network, and every hostile political faction into a super-intelligent nest of demons. These "alarmists" are supported by "techno-alarmists" who exaggerate the ease of weaponizing and using new terrorist devices and the vulnerabilities of modern societies by several orders of magnitude. Finally, they are supported by the "totalitarian solutionists" who support the alarmists by advocating solutions that would force the restructuring of modern societies -- often in ways whose consequences would be worse than the real-world problem -- and who often advocate unproven and extremely expensive technologies.
This terrorizing approach to terrorism may well have begun with Aesop's fable about the "boy who cried wolf" -- the boy being the world's first counter-terrorist. The eventual triumph of the wolf may also have led to the first counter-terrorism conspiracy theorist. There are equally strong indications that many writers about terrorism trace their intellectual roots to the story of "Chicken Little," the first counter-terrorism expert to turn a minor incident into an announcement that the sky was falling.
In all seriousness, these tendencies to exaggerate the threat do much to explain why many politicians and officials tend to ignore warnings about terrorism. They also help explain why governments tend to work on the basis of bureaucratic momentum and focus on the terrorist threats they already know. The flood of warnings about possible threats, technologies, and vulnerabilities creates a "noise level" of potential demands that is impossible for governments to deal with. The end result is that bureaucracies often deal with possible threats by focusing on clich‚s like strengthening coordination, by sub-optimizing on solutions that can only deal with a narrow range of threats, and by focusing only on those types of threats that have already been proven to exist.
At the same time, any one who has spent any time working on the problems posed by terrorism is struck by the fact that even paranoids face real terrorists. It is impossible to ignore the growing vulnerability of modern society, and the fact that major risks do exist. Similarly, it is impossible to study the subject without being struck by the gap that exists between the past failure of most terrorists to go beyond routine acts of violence and relatively minor attempts to use new techniques and technologies and the potential damage more effective forms of terrorism could do.
Ridiculous as most novels and screenplays about super-terrorists may be, they conceal the same kernel of truth as exaggerated warnings from experts on counter-terrorism. The impact of terrorism is currently far more limited by the failure or unwillingness of terrorists to exploit new technologies and complex vulnerabilities than by the inherent difficulty in conducting much more lethal attacks. The problem is not a lack of credible means to an end, but rather the lack of a real-world "Dr. No" or "Professor Moriarity."
Weapons of Mass Destruction and the Problem of Paradigm Shifts
Even a real-world "Dr. No" or "Professor Moriarity," however, would normally have a limited impact. As long as the emergence of a "super terrorist" was tied to conventional means of attack, the resulting threat or damage would not have strategic importance. The cost and casualties of such attacks might be much higher than those of conventional terrorism, but they would not pose an existential threat to the state under attack or force that state to make dramatic changes in its policies.
This is why governments can normally accept the cost of taking a reactive approach to potential new terrorist threats. It may be unpleasant to face the fact that accepting moderate casualties as the result of a new form of terrorist activity is more cost-effective than attempting to prevent all new forms of terrorism. The fact is, however, that people do die and many die violently. Every activity in government -- whether it is counter-terrorism, road repair, or medical treatment -- involves a tacit or explicit acceptance of actuarial trade-offs in cost-effectiveness in which a government accepts the death of its citizens in order to save money, preserve personal freedom, or concentrate on higher priority problems. It is scarcely important to the dead whether they have been killed by government choices regarding counter-terrorism or the funding of kidney transplants, and killed as a result of deliberate bureaucratic choices or a decision to ignore the actuarial consequences of public policy.
Accepting "Unacceptable" Risks
Given these realities, scenarios dealing with "super terrorism" must be kept in careful perspective. It is possible to postulate relatively high levels of casualties from terrorism using conventional weapons and technologies. Exploding a jumbo jet, blowing up a crowded office building, destroying an isolated urban water supply, and destroying a key tunnel or bridge during peak traffic periods are typical cases in point. It is equally possible to postulate serious economic costs from new forms of terrorism like cyberterrorism and successful attacks on governmental data systems, national financial systems, and controls of key utility, energy processing and export facilities. Attacks on key leaders can destabilize or paralyze some governments, and attacks on religious or highly sensitive political symbols can trigger levels of political disorder and violence out of any proportion to the casualties and physical damage involved.
Nevertheless, it may be necessary to accept the cost of "unacceptable" risks. Bad as the consequences of such attacks may be, they will normally equate to the impact of the natural disasters that most societies can face and adapt to. Governments can afford to wait until they either must deal with an actual contingency, or have clear evidence and strategic warning of the need to make major shifts in their counter-terrorist activities.
Weapons of Mass Destruction and the "Paradigm Shift"
Weapons of mass destruction, however, present a different problem. Under many conditions, a single act of terrorism can kill thousands of people and/or induce levels of panic and political reaction that governments cannot easily deal with. Under some conditions, the use of weapons of mass destruction can pose an existential threat to the existing social and political structure of a small country -- particularly one where much of the population and governing elite is concentrated in a single urban area.
The comparative seriousness of these risks are illustrated in Table One, which summarizes the potential casualties resulting from the use of a weapon of mass destruction in an urban area similar to the capital or major urban center of most Middle Eastern countries.
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The Problem of Terrorism and Unconventional Warfare
Existing and projected detection and control technologies, arms control proposals, and concepts for missile defense assume that the primary threats are organized states and that relatively large efforts must be used.
Conventional structures of deterrence assume identifiable and limited sets of opponents and similar values in dealing with issues like mutual destruction. Terrorist movements may be willing to take catastrophic risks, as may leaders who identify themselves with the state and/or see martyrdom as a valid alternative to victory.
War may not be between states or fought for limited strategic objectives. It may be a war of proxies or terrorists. It may be fought to destroy peoples or with minimal regard for collateral damage and risks.
The target of unconventional uses of weapons of mass destruction may not be military in the normal sense of the term. It may be a peace process, US commitment to the defense of a given region, a peacekeeping force, an election or ruling elite, or growing cooperation between formerly hostile groups.
Terrorist organizations have already attempted to use crude chemical weapons. The development and use of chemical and biological weapons is well within the capability of many extremist and terrorist movements, and states can transfer weapons or aid such movements indirectly or with plausible deniability.
Covert or unconventional delivery means may be preferable to both states and non-state organizations. Cargo ships, passenger aircraft, commercial vehicles, dhows, or commercial cargo shipments can all be used, and routed through multiple destinations. A well established series of covert transport and smuggling networks exist throughout the region. Biological weapons can be manufactured in situ.
The Marine Corps Barracks incident has already shown the potential value of "mass terrorism," as has the media impact of the Oklahoma City bombing and the disruptive effect of far more limited events like the suicide bombings by Hamas and the assassination of Yitzak Rabin.
Biological and chemical weapons present special problems because they can be used in so many ways. Chemical poisons have been used to contaminate Israeli fruit and Chilean food exports. Infectious biological agents could be used to mirror image local diseases, as well as agents with long gestation times. Persistent nerve agents could be used in subways, large buildings, shopping malls/bazaars, etc. to create both immediate casualties and long term risks. Mixes of biological and chemical agents could be used to defeat detection, protection gear or vaccines.
Arms control efforts assume large state efforts with detectable manufacturing and weaponization programs in peacetime. The development of a capability to suddenly manufacture several hundred biological and chemical weapons with little or no warning is well within the state of the art using nothing but commercial supplies and equipment, and much of the R&D effort could be conducted as civil or defensive research.
Unconventional and terrorist uses of weapons can involve the use of extremely high risk biological weapons transmitted by human carriers, commercial cargoes, etc.
The incentives for the unconventional use of weapons of mass destruction increase in proportion to the lack of parity in conventional weapons, the feelings of hopelessness of alienated or extremist groups, or the prospect of catastrophic defeat.
Similarly, the incentive for the unconventional use of weapons of mass destruction will increase in direct proportion to the perceived effectiveness of theater missile and other regular military defense systems.
Rogue operations will be a constant temptation for state intelligence groups, militant wings of extremist groups, revolutionary forces. etc.
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Weapons of Mass Destruction and the Middle East
Many of the previous comments apply to any region in the world, but the Middle East is not any region. It is a region with a unique level of violence and a well established history of terrorism. It is also a region where Table Three shows that a process of creeping proliferation is becoming heavily institutionalized in nations such as Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Libya, Syria, and Yemen.
The Middle East is also a region where the lines between state activity and terrorism have long been blurred. Admittedly, the term "terrorist state" has become little more than an irritating strategic clich‚, and there is no axiomatic correlation between state efforts at proliferation and terrorist access to weapons of mass destruction. At the same time, it would be naive to assume that states like Iran, Iraq, Libya, and Syria have no elements that would take the risk of supporting terrorists -- or "freedom fighters" -- that could be used as direct or indirect proxies and would never use the existence of such terrorists as covers for covert attacks.
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Israel
Delivery Systems
New IRBM/ICBM range high payload booster developed with South Africa.
Up to 50 "Jericho I" missiles deployed in shelters on mobile launchers with up to 400 miles range with a 2,200 pound payload, and with possible nuclear warhead storage nearby. Unverified claims that up to 100 missiles are deployed west of Jerusalem.
Jericho II missiles now deployed, and some were brought to readiness for firing during the Gulf War. These missiles seem to include a single stage follow-on to the Jericho I and a multistage longer range missile. The latter missile seems to have a range of up to 900 miles with a 2,200 pound payload, and may be a cooperative development with South Africa. (Extensive reporting of such cooperation was in the press during October 25 and 26, 1989).
Jericho II missile production facility at Be'er Yakov.
A major missile test took place on September 14, 1989. It was either a missile test or failure of Ofeq-2 satellite.
Work on development of TERCOM type smart warheads. Possible cruise missile guidance developments using GPS navigation systems.
F-15, F-16, F-4E, and Phantom 2000 fighter-bombers capable of long range refueling and of carrying nuclear and chemical bombs.
Lance missile launchers and 160 Lance missiles with 130 kilometers range.
MAR-290 rocket with 30 kilometers range believed to be deployed.
Popeye air-to-surface missile may have nuclear variant.
MAR-350 surface-to-surface missile with range of 56 miles and 735 lb. payload believed to have completed development or to be in early deployment.
Israel seeking super computers for Technion Institute (designing ballistic missile RVs), Hebrew University (may be engaged in hydrogen bomb research), and Israeli Military Industries (maker of "Jericho II" and Shavit booster).
Chemical Weapons
Reports that mustard and nerve gas production facility was established in 1982 in the restricted area in the Sinai near Dimona do not seem correct. May have some facilities. May have capacity to produce other gases. Probable stocks of bombs, rockets, and artillery.
Extensive laboratory research into gas warfare and defense.
Development of defensive systems includes Shalon Chemical Industries protection gear, Elbit Computer gas detectors, and Bezal R&D air crew protection system.
Extensive field exercises in chemical defense.
Gas masks stockpiled, and distributed to population with other civil defense instructions during Gulf War.
Warhead delivery capability for bombs, rockets, and missiles, but none now believed to be equipped with chemical agents.
Biological Weapons
Extensive research into weapons and defense.
Ready to quickly produce biological weapons, but no reports of active production effort.
Nuclear Weapons
Director of CIA indicated in May 1989 that Israel might be seeking to construct a thermonuclear weapon.
Estimates of numbers and types of weapons differ sharply.
At least a stockpile of 60-80 plutonium weapons. May have well over 100 nuclear weapons assemblies, with some weapons with yields over 100 Kilotons, and some with possible ER variants or variable yields.
Stockpile of up to 200-300 weapons is possible.
Possible facilities include production of weapons grade Plutonium at Dimona, nuclear weapons design facility at Soreq (south of Tel Aviv), missile test facility at Palmikim, nuclear armed missile storage facility at Kefar Zekharya, nuclear weapons assembly facility at Yodefat, and tactical nuclear weapons storage facility at Eilabun in eastern Galilee.
Missile Defenses
Patriot missiles with future PAC-3 upgrade to reflect lessons of the Gulf War.
Arrow 2 two-stage ATBM with slant intercept ranges at altitudes of 8-10 and 50 kilometers speeds of up to Mach 9, plus possible development of the Rafale AB-10 close in defense missile with ranges of 10-20 kilometers and speeds of up to Mach 4.5. Tadiran BM/C4I system and "Music" phased array radar. Israel plans to deploy two batteries of the Arrow to cover Israel, each with four launchers, to protect up to 85% of its population.(5)
Advanced Intelligence Systems
The Shavit I launched Israel's satellite payload on September 19, 1989. It used a three stage booster system capable of launching a 4,000 pound payload over 1,200 miles or a 2,000 pound payload over 1,800 miles.
Ofeq 2 launched in April, 1990 -- one day after Saddam Hussein threatened to destroy Israel with chemical weapons if it should attack Baghdad. Launched first intelligence satellite on April 5, 1995, covering Syria, Iran, and Iraq in orbit every 90 minutes.
The Ofeq 3 satellite is a 495 pound system launched using the Shavit launch rocket, and is believed to carry an imagery system. Its orbit passes over or near Damascus, Tehran, and Baghdad.(6)
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Iran
Delivery Systems
Has new long range North Korean Scuds - with ranges near 500 kilometers. May manufacture missiles in Iran in future, possibly as cooperative effort with Syria.
Probably has ordered North Korean No Dong missile which can carry nuclear and biological missile ranges of up to 900 kilometers. Can reach virtually any target in Gulf, Turkey, and Israel, although CIA now estimates deliveries will only begin in 1997-1999.(7)
Su-24 long-range strike fighters with range-payloads roughly equivalent to US F-111 and superior to older Soviet medium bombers.
Reports of North Korean delveries of 100 Scud Bs and 100 Scud C between 1990 and 1996.
Bought CSS-8 surface-to-surface missiles from China with ranges of 130-150 kilometers.
Used regular Scud extensively during Iran-Iraq War. Has 6-12 Scud launchers and up to 200 Scud B (R-17E) missiles with 230-310 KM range. Scud missiles were provided by Libya and North Korea.
May have placed order for PRC-made M-9 missile (280-620 kilometers range). More likely that PRC is giving assistance in missile R&D and production facilities.
Iranian made IRAN 130 rocket with 150+ kilometers range.
Iranian Oghab (Eagle) rocket with 40+ kilometers range.
New SSM with 125 mile range may be in production, but could be modified FROG.
F-4D/E fighter bombers with capability to carry extensive payloads to ranges of 450 miles.
Can modify HY-2 Silkworm missiles and SA-2 surface-to-air missiles to deliver weapons of mass destruction.
Large numbers of multiple rocket launchers and tube artillery for short range delivery of chemical weapons.
Experimenting in cruise missile development.
Chemical Weapons
At least two major research and production facilities.
India is assisting in the construction of a major new plant at Qazvim, near Tehran, to manufacture phosphorous pentasulfide, a major precursor for nerve gas. The plant is front by Meli Agrochemicals, and the program was negotiated by Dr. Mejid Tehrani Abbaspour, a chief security advisor to Rafsanjani.
Made limited use of chemical weapons at end of the Iran-Iraq War.
Began to create stockpiles of cyanide (cyanogen chloride), phosgene, and mustard gas weapons after 1985.
Include bombs and artillery.
Production of nerve gas weapons started no later than 1994.
Biological Weapons
Extensive laboratory and research capability.
Weapons effort documented as early as 1992.
Bioresearch effort sophisticated enough to produce biological weapons as lethal as small nuclear weapons.
Seems to have the production facilities to make dry storable weapons. This would allow it to develop suitable missile warheads and bombs and covert devices.
May be involved in active weapons production, but no evidence to date that this is the case.
Nuclear Weapons
In 1984, revived nuclear weapons program begun under Shah.
Received significant West German and Argentine corporate support in some aspects of nuclear technology during the Iran-Iraq War..
Limited transfers of centrifuge and other weapons related technology from PRC, possibly Pakistan.
Stockpiles of uranium and mines in Yazd area.
Seems to have attempted to buy fissile material from Khazakstan.
Russian agreement to build up to four reactors, beginning with a complex at Bushehr -- with two 1,000-1,200 megawatt reactors and two 465 megawatt reactors, and provide significant nuclear technology.
Chinese agreement to provide significant nuclear technology transfer and possible sale of two 300 megawatt pressurized water reactors.
No way to tell when current efforts will produce a weapon, and unclassified lists of potential facilities have little credibility. We simply do not know where Iran is developing its weapons. IAEA has found no indications of weapons effort, but found no efforts in Iraq in spring of 1990. IAEA only formally inspects Iran's small research reactors. Its visits to other Iranian sites are not thorough enough to confirm or deny whether Iran has such activities.
Timing of weapons acquisition depends heavily on whether Iran can buy fissile material -- if so it has the design capability and can produce weapons in 1-2 years -- or must develop the capability to process Plutonium or enrich Uranium -- in which case, it is likely to be 5-10 years.
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Iraq
Delivery Systems
Prior to the Gulf War, Iraq had extensive delivery systems incorporating long-range strike aircraft with refueling capabilities and several hundred regular and improved, longer-range Scud missiles, some with chemical warheads. These systems included:
Tu-16 and Tu-22 bombers.
MiG-29 fighters.
Mirage F-1, MiG-23BM, and Su-22 fighter attack aircraft.
A Scud force with a minimum of 819 missiles.
Extended range Al-Hussein Scud variants (600 kilometer range) extensively deployed throughout Iraq, and at three fixed sites in northern, western, and southern Iraq..
Developing Al-Abbas missiles (900 kilometer range) Al-Abbas which could reach targets in Iran, the Persian Gulf, Israel, Turkey, and Cyprus.
Long-range super guns with ranges of up to 600 kilometers.
Iraq also engaged in efforts aimed at developing the Tamuz liquid fuel led missile with a range of over 2,000 kilometers, and a solid fueled missile with a similar range. Clear evidence that at least one design was to have a nuclear warhead.
Iraq attempted to conceal a plant making missile engines from the UN inspectors. It only admitted this plant existed in 1995, raising new questions about how many of its missiles have been destroyed.
Iraq produced or assembled 80 Scud missiles it its own factories. Some 53 seem to have been unusable, but 10 are still unaccounted for.
Had designed work underway for a nuclear warhead for its long range missiles.
The Gulf War deprived Iraq of some of its MiG-29s, Mirage F-1s, MiG-23BMs, and Su-22s.
Since the end of the war, the UN inspection regime has also destroyed many of Iraq's long-range missiles. Iraq, however, maintains a significant delivery capability consisting of:
HY-2, SS-N-2, and C-601 cruise missiles, which are unaffected by UN cease-fire terms.
FROG-7 rockets with 70 kilometer ranges, also allowed under UN resolutions.
Multiple rocket launchers and tube artillery.
Several Scud launchers
Iraq claims to have manufactured only 80 missile assemblies, 53 of which were unusable.
UNSCOM claims that 10 are unaccounted for.
US experts believe Iraq may still have components for several dozen extended-range Scud missiles.
In addition, Iraq has admitted to:
Hiding its capability to manufacturing its own Scuds.
Developing an extended range variant of the FROG-7 called the Laith. The UN claims to have tagged all existing FROG-7s to prevent any extension of their range beyond the UN imposed limit of 150 kilometers for Iraqi missiles.
Experimenting with cruise missile technology and ballistic missile designs with ranges up to 3,000 kilometers.
Flight testing Al-Hussein missiles with chemical warheads in April 1990.
Developing biological warheads for the Al Hussein missile as part of Project 144 at Taji.
Initiating a research and development program for a nuclear warhead missile delivery system.
Successfully developing and testing a warhead separation system.
Indigenously developing, testing, and manufacturing advanced rocket engines to include liquid-propellant designs.
Conducting research into the development of Remotely Piloted Vehicles (RPVs) for the dissemination of biological agents.
Attempting to expand its Ababil-100 program designed to build surface-to-surface missiles with ranges beyond the permitted 100-150 kilometers.
Starting an indigenous 600 mm supergun design effort.
Starting additional long-range missile programs, with ranges of 900, 2000, and 3,000 kilometers. US and UN officials conclude further that:
Iraq is concentrating procurement efforts on rebuilding its ballistic missile program using a clandestine network of front companies to obtain the necessary materials and technology from European and Russian firms.
This equipment is then concealed and stockpiled for assembly concomitant with the end of the UN inspection regime.
The equipment clandestinely sought by Iraq includes advanced missile guidance components, such as accelerometers and gyroscopes, specialty metals, special machine tools, and a high-tech, French-made, million-dollar furnace designed to fabricate engine parts for missiles.
Jordan found that Iraq was smuggling missile components through Jordan in early December, 1995.
US satellite photographs reveal that Iraq has rebuilt its Al-Kindi missile research facility.
Iraq retains the technology it acquired before the war and evidence clearly indicates an ongoing research and development effort, in spite of the UN sanctions regime.
The fact that the agreement allows Iraq to continue producing and testing short range missiles (less than 150 kilometers range) has meant it can retain significant missile efforts.
Chemical Weapons
In revelations to the UN, Iraq admitted that, prior to the Gulf War, it:
Maintained large stockpiles of mustard gas, and the nerve agents Sarin and Tabun.
Produced binary Sarin filled artillery shells, 122 mm rockets, and aerial bombs.
Manufactured enough precursors to produce 490 tons of the nerve agent VX. These precursors included 65 tons of choline and 200 tons of phosphorous pentasulfide and di-isopropylamine Tested Ricin, a deadly nerve agent, for use in artillery shells.
Had three flight tests of long range Scuds with chemical warheads.
Had large VX production effort underway at the time of the Gulf War. The destruction of the related weapons and feedstocks has been claimed by Iraq, but not verified by UNSCOM The majority of Iraq's chemical agents were manufactured at a supposed pesticide plant located at Muthanna.
Various other production facilities were also used, including those at Salman Pak, Samara, and Habbiniyah. Though severely damaged during the war, the physical plant for many of these facilities has been rebuilt.
Iraq possessed the technology to produce a variety of other persistent and non-persistent agents.
The Gulf War and subsequent UN inspection regime may have largely eliminated these stockpiles and reduced production capability.
US experts believe Iraq has concealed significant stocks of precursors. It also appears to retain significant amounts of production equipment dispersed before, or during, Desert Storm and not recovered by the UN.
Iraq has developed basic chemical warhead designs for Scud missiles, rockets, bombs, and shells.
Iraq also has spray dispersal systems.
Iraq maintains extensive stocks of defensive equipment.
The UN maintains that Iraq is not currently producing chemical agents, but the UN is also concerned that Iraq has offered no evidence that it has destroyed its VX production capability and/or stockpile.
Further, Iraq retains the technology it acquired before the war and evidence clearly indicates an ongoing research and development effort, in spite of the UN sanctions regime.
Recent UNSCOM work confirms that Iraq did deploy gas-filled 155 mm artillery and 122 mm multiple rocket rounds into the rear areas of the KTO during the Gulf War.
These weapons had no special visible markings, and were often stored in the same area as conventional weapons.
Now has the technology to produce stable, highly lethal VX gas with long storage times.
Has developed improved binary weapons since the Gulf War.
Biological Weapons
Had highly compartmented "black" program with far tighter security regulations than chemical program.
Had 18 major sites for some aspect of biological weapons effort before the Gulf War. Most were non-descript and have no guards or visible indications they were a military facility.
The US targeted only one site during the Gulf War. It struck two sites, one for other reasons. It also struck at least two targets with no biological facilities that it misidentified.
Systematically lied about biological weapons effort until 1995. First stated that had small defensive efforts, but no offensive effort. In July, 1995, admitted had a major offensive effort. In October, 1995, finally admitted major weaponization effort.
Iraq has continued to lie about its biological weapons effort since October, 1995. It has claimed the effort is head by Dr. Taha, a woman who only headed a subordinate effort. It has not admitted to any help by foreign personnel or contractors. It has claimed to have destroyed its weapons, but the one site UNSCOM inspectors visited showed no signs of such destruction and was later said to be the wrong site. It has claimed only 50 people were employed full time, but the scale of the effort would have required several hundred.
The August 1995 defection of Lieutenant General Hussein Kamel Majid, formerly in charge of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction, revealed the extent of this biological weapons program. Reports indicate that Iraq tested at least 7 principal biological agents for use against humans.
Anthrax, Botulinum, and Aflatoxin known to be weaponized.
Looked at viruses, bacteria, and fungi. Examined the possibility of weaponizing Gas Gangrene and Mycotoxins. Some field trials were held of these agents.
Examined foot and mouth disease, haemorrhagic conjunctivitis virus, rotavirus, and camel pox virus.
Conducted research on a "wheat pathogen" and a Mycotoxin similar to "yellow rain" defoliant. The "wheat smut" was first produced at Al Salman, and then put in major production during 1987-1988 at a plant near Mosul. Iraq claims the program was abandoned.
The defection prompted Iraq to admit that it:
Imported 39 tons of growth media for biological agents obtained from three European firms. According to UNSCOM, 17 tons remains unaccounted for. Each ton can be used to produce 10 tons of bacteriological weapons.
Imported type cultures which can be modified to develop biological weapons from the US.
Had a laboratory- and industrial-scale capability to manufacture various biological agents including the bacteria which cause anthrax and botulism; aflatoxin, a naturally occurring carcinogen; clostridium perfringens, a gangrene-causing agent; the protein toxin ricin; tricothecene mycotoxins, such as T-2 and DAS; and an anti-wheat fungus known as wheat cover smut. Iraq also conducted research into the rotavirus, the camel pox virus and the virus which causes haemorrhagic conjunctivitis.
Created at least seven primary production facilities including the Sepp Institute at Muthanna, the Ghazi Research Institute at Amaria, the Daura Foot and Mouth Disease Institute, and facilities at Al-Hakim, Salman Pak Taji, and Fudaliyah. According to UNSCOM, weaponization occurred primarily at Muthanna through May, 1987 (largely Botulinum), and then moved to Al Salman.
(Anthrax). In March, 1988 a plant was open at Al Hakim, and in 1989 an Aflatoxin plant was set up at Fudaliyah.
Manufactured 6,000 liters of concentrated Botulinum toxin and 8,425 liters of anthrax at Al-Hakim during 1990; 5400 liters of concentrated Botulinum toxin at the Daura Foot and Mouth Disease Institute from November 1990 to January 15, 1991; 400 liters of concentrated Botulinum toxin at Taji; and 150 liters of concentrated anthrax at Salman Pak. Produced 1,850 liters of Aflatoxin in solution at Fudaliyah.
Produced 340 liters of concentrated clostridium perfringens, a gangrene-causing biological agent, beginning in August, 1990.
Produced 10 liters of concentrated Ricin at Al Salam. Claim abandoned work after tests failed. Had at least 79 civilian facilities capable of playing some role in biological weapons production still extent in 1995.
Took fermenters and other equipment from Kuwait to improve effort during the Gulf War.
Extensive weaponization program Had test site about 200 kilometers west of Baghdad, used animals in cages and tested artillery and rocket rounds against live targets at ranges up to 16 kilometers.
Armed 155 mm artillery shells and 122 mm rockets with biological agents.
Conducted field trials, weaponization tests, and live firings of 122 mm rockets armed with anthrax and Botulinum toxin from March 1988 to May 1990.
Tested ricin, a deadly protein toxin, for use in artillery shells.
Iraq produced at least 191 bombs and missile warheads with biological agents.
Developed and deployed 250 pound aluminum bombs coverage in fiberglass. Bombs were designed so they could be mounted on both Soviet and French-made aircraft. They were rigged with parachutes for low altitudes drops to allow efficient slow delivery and aircraft to fly under radar coverage.
Deployed at least 166 R-400 bombs with 85 liters of biological agents each during the Gulf War. Deployed them at two sites, One was near an abandoned runway where it could fly in aircraft, arm them quickly, and disperse with no prior indication of activity and no reason for the UN to target the runway.
Total production reached at least 19,000 liters of concentrated Botulinum (10,000 liters filled into munitions);
8,500 liters of concentrated Anthrax (6,500 liters filled into munitions); and 2,500 liters of concentrated Aflatoxin (1,850 liters filled into munitions).
Weaponized at least three biological agents for use in the Gulf War. The weaponization consisted of at least 100 bombs and 15 missile warheads loaded with Botulinum. There were at least 50 R-400 air-delivered bombs and 10 missile warheads loaded with anthrax; and 16 missile warheads loaded with Aflatoxin, a natural carcinogen. The warheads were designed for operability with the Al-Hussein Scud variant.
Developed and stored drops tanks ready for use for three aircraft or RPV s with the capability of dispersing 2,000 liters of anthrax. Development took place in December 1990. Claimed later that tests showed were ineffective.
Found, however, that Iraqi Mirages were given spray tanks to disperse biological agents. Held trials as late as January 13, 1991. The Mirages were chosen because they have large 2,200 liter belly tanks and could be refueled by air, giving them a long endurance and strike range.
The tanks had electric valves to allow the agent to be released and the system was tested by releasing simulated agent into desert areas with scattered petri dishes to detect the biological agent. UNSCOM has video tapes of the aircraft.
Project 144 at Taji produced at least 25 operational Al Hussein warheads. Ten of these were hidden deep in a railway tunnel, and 15 in holes dug in an unmanned hide site along the Tigris.
Equipped crop spraying helicopters for biological warfare and held exercises and tests simulating the spraying of anthrax spores. Biological weapons were only distinguished from regular weapons by a black stripe.
The UN claims that Iraq has offered no evidence to corroborate its claims that it destroyed its stockpile of biological agents after the Gulf War. Further, Iraq retains the technology it acquired before the war and evidence clearly indicates an ongoing research and development effort, in spite of the UN sanctions regime.
UN currently inspects 79 sites -- 5 used to make weapons before war; 5 vaccine or pharmaceutical sites; 35 research and university sites; thirteen breweries, distilleries, and dairies with dual-purpose capabilities; eight diagnostic laboratories.
Retains laboratory capability to manufacture various biological agents including the bacteria which cause anthrax, botulism, tularemia and typhoid.
Many additional civilian facilities capable of playing some role in biological weapons production.
Nuclear Weapons
Inspections by UN teams have found evidence of two successful weapons designs, a neutron initiator, explosives and triggering technology needed for production of bombs, plutonium processing technology, centrifuge technology, Calutron enrichment technology, and experiments with chemical separation technology.
Iraq used Calutron, centrifuges, plutonium processing, chemical defusion and foreign purchases to create new production capability after Israel destroyed most of Osiraq.
Iraq established a centrifuge enrichment system in Rashidya and conducted research into the nuclear fuel cycle to facilitate development of a nuclear device.
After invading Kuwait, Iraq attempted to accelerate its program to develop a nuclear weapon by using radioactive fuel from French and Russian-built reactors. It made a crash effort in September, 1990 to recover enriched fuel from its supposedly safe-guarded French and Russian reactors, with the goal of producing a nuclear weapon by April, 1991. The program was only halted after Coalition air raid destroyed key facilities on January 17, 1991.
Iraq conducted research into the production of a radiological weapon, which disperses lethal radioactive material without initiating a nuclear explosion.
Orders were given in 1987 to explore the use of radiological weapons for area denial in the Iran-Iraq War.
Three prototype bombs were detonated at test sites -- one as a ground level static test and two others were dropped from aircraft.
Iraq claims the results were disappointing and the project was shelved but has no records or evidence to prove this. UN teams have found and destroyed, or secured, new stockpiles of illegal enriched material, major production and R&D facilities, and equipment-- including Calutron enriching equipment. UNSCOM believes that Iraq's nuclear program has been largely disabled and remains incapacitated, but warns that Iraq retains substantial technology and establish a clandestine purchasing system in 1990 that it has used to import forbidden components since the Gulf War. Iraq still retains the technology developed before the Gulf War and US experts believe an ongoing research and development effort continues, in spite of the UN sanctions regime.
A substantial number of declared nuclear weapons components and research equipment has never been recovered. There is no reason to assume that Iraqi declarations were comprehensive.
Source: Prepared by Anthony H. Cordesman, Co-Director, Middle East Program, CSIS
