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81  Health, Family & Eugenics / Eugenics / Depopulation / War On Family / Re: Sterilization camps EXPOSED! on: December 02, 2010, 03:52:54 am
http://www.pop.org/content/post-documents-indian-horror-1597#endnote_anchor-1

Post documents Indian horror

    * 1997 (v7, n5) September/October

A front page Washington Post story in 1994 provides additional evidence of the miserable conditions under which India’s female sterilization camps are operated.1

Observing the day’s activities at one sterilization camp in Sarsawa, India — held in a schoolhouse which had been cleared of its desks — the Post reporter wrote that prior to their surgeries, the women received a local anesthesia and were left “heaped in a pile of tangled arms and legs on a damp floor outside the operating room.”

During the sterilization procedure the women lie on “makeshift operating tables where a doctor dedicates a total of 45 seconds to each patient — slitting open the belly, inserting a laparoscope, tying the fallopian tubes, dipping the laparoscope into a pail of lukewarm water and then moving on to the next patient.”

The recovery room was a “dim ward where dozens of women lie side by side on the concrete floor, filling the room with the low moans and quavering wails of excruciating pain.” “Inside the operating room, family members milled about without masks during the procedures…Dust blew into the operating room the through a window.”

Prizes
In the yard outside the sterilization center were “tables of prizes for the government workers who had brought in the most women. Three patients won the worker a wall clock, 5 a transistor radio, 10 a bicycle and 25 a black-and-white television.”


At another camp in neighboring Saharanpur, the reporter noted that prior to the sterilization, blood samples were taken by a medical assistant who “pricked each woman’s finger — using the same needle on all the women .…”

The women were given a “cursory pelvic examination” and those “found to be pregnant were offered an abortion before sterilization.” As one doctor attending the women explained, “It saves on drug consumption. You only have to use one dose of anesthesia.”

Inside the operating room, “one doctor worked three tables in conveyor belt fashion, moving from women to woman. His instruments were not sterilized between operations, and the sheets covering the tables were never changed.”

How voluntary is it?
To the Indian government and U.S. population controllers, the women lying on the schoolroom floor represent a success of the country’s population control program; in 1993 alone, 4.1 million Indian women were sterilized and through the years tens of millions of women {and men) have been similarly neutered.

But how voluntary have been the individual decisions made by these millions to submit to being sterilized? During the 1970s, several million Indian men were forcibly vasectomized. Now, critics of India’s sterilization program say it is still “inhuman because it relies on quotas, targets, bribes and frequently coercion…”

These critics note that most of the women who are sterilized are poor and illiterate, and have been “lured to the government sterilization clinics and camps with promises of houses, land or loans by government officials under intense pressure to meet sterilization quotas.”

V.M. Singh, a legislator from the State of Uttar Paradesh, declared that “[e]very single thing in my district leads to one wretched thing: Will the woman be sterilized?” Singh explained that “[p]eople are told if they want electricity, they will have to be sterilized. If they want a loan, they have to be sterilized.”


Singh, who has complained about the situation to the state government, said that officials in his district and others along the border with Nepal, in order to meet their quotas, often “resort to bribing Nepalese woman to travel to India for sterilizations.”

The Post noted that the pressure for sterilization is especially acute in India’s poor northern states, which “impose sterilization quotas on virtually every government employee in the district, from tax collectors to schoolteachers. If they don’t meet the quota, they don’t get paid,” explained V.M. Singh.

Singh said that in his district, “teachers routinely abandon their posts for weeks at a time as the fiscal-year budget deadline approaches so they can round up women to be sterilized.” At the end of the year you are judged on how many sterilizations you have gotten: nothing else is considered,” said Prem C. Varma, a health education officer working in the Saharanpur district. “If it’s a voluntary program, there should not be targets,” Varma said.

For most village women, months of negotiation precede the trip from their simple mud huts to the stained sheets of the makeshift operating table. The discussions do not begin with medical personnel, however. Rather, it usually begins with a local government bureaucrat, the “motivator” who will be paid for each woman he can deliver, telling the husband that “if his wife undergoes a sterilization she will receive 145 rupees (about $4.60) and the family may qualify for materials for a new house, or a loan for a cow, or a small piece of land.” And so another woman is off to a sterilization camp where she too can wind up on the “recovery room” floor.

Endnotes
1 “Teeming India Engulfed by Soaring Birthrates: Sterilization Quotas Blasted as Inhuman and Coercive,” The Washington Post, 21 August 1994, A1, 32. All quotes in this piece are taken from that Washington Post article.
82  Health, Family & Eugenics / Eugenics / Depopulation / War On Family / Re: Sterilization camps EXPOSED! on: December 02, 2010, 03:52:27 am
http://apps.who.int/rhl/fertility/contraception/smguide2/en/index.html



Techniques for the interruption of tubal patency for female sterilisation
RHL practical aspects by Mittal S


FIRST CONTACT (PRIMARY CARE) LEVEL

In India most couples use sterilization as their only method of contraception, after having achieved the desired family size. Thus, health care personnel at primary care level in India usually refer the woman to a hospital to undergo sterilization after delivery. Sometimes sterilization camps are conducted at village level, where health care workers screen the women and an operating team from the referral hospital visits the site and conducts sterilizations on a day care basis. At this level most the important task for primary health care staff is to do proper patient selection prior to surgical procedure so as to minimize the complications. The Ministry of Health and Family Welfare in India has laid down standard eligibility criteria and standards for sterilization (1). The findings of this review are unlikely to have any relevance to care at this level.

REFERRAL HOSPITAL (SECONDARY CARE) LEVEL

Most tubal sterilizations are performed at this level. The technique employed is influenced by the skill and training of the operator and available infrastructure and facilities. In India, as per standards of sterilization (1), graduate doctors are permitted to carry out sterilization by minilaparotomy using the Pomeroy technique. To perform laparoscopic sterilization, surgeons are required to undergo specialized training. In tubal interruption using laparoscopy, the choice of the occlusion method is again influenced by the availability of suitably trained staff in a particular technique. The evidence from this review has shown electrocoagulation to be a better method than tubal rings. To implement this finding, it would have to be ensured that not only trained staff are available, but there are also suitably equipped facilities with uninterrupted electricity supply. . In experienced trained hands, tubal sterilization is safe and highly effective, regardless of the approach or occlusive method.

AT HOME OR IN THE COMMUNITY

The decision to undergo sterilization must always be taken after careful thinking. In this regard it is important to educate and counsel couples on the pros and cons of sterilization.

Acknowledgement: Nil

References

    * Standards of sterilization. New Delhi, Ministry of Health and Family Welfare. Government of India 1999.

This document should be cited as: Mittal S. Techniques for the interruption of tubal patency for female sterilization: RHL practical aspects (last revised: 21 June 2003). The WHO Reproductive Health Library; Geneva: World Health Organization.
83  Health, Family & Eugenics / Eugenics / Depopulation / War On Family / Re: Sterilization camps EXPOSED! on: December 02, 2010, 03:51:56 am
You couldn't make this up...

A sterilization technique mastered at "Mehta’s rural 'sterilization camps'" is now being used on army soldiers at the US Army OB/GYN residency program.  Read about it here:

http://www.mamc.amedd.army.mil/obgyn/Papers%20Published/microlap.htm


Figure 1. Pomeroy tubal ligation performed using a 2-mm laparoscope, 4 French grasper, and 0-plain endosuture placed through a 5-mm port.
84  Health, Family & Eugenics / Eugenics / Depopulation / War On Family / Re: Sterilization camps EXPOSED! on: December 02, 2010, 03:51:33 am
Standard Operating Procedures for Sterilization Services in Camps

Family Planning Division
Ministry of Health and Family Welfare
Government of India
March 2008


READ FULL 59 PAGE REPORT HERE:
http://www.mohfw.nic.in/NRHM/FP/SOP_Book.pdf



Excerpts:

[table of] Contents:

Introduction and the scope of the manual....................... ............................. ............................. ...... 1
1. Range of services in a camp ... 3
1. Counselling ... 3
2. Clinical Services ... 3
3. Lab Tests ... 4
2. Pre-requisites for sterilization camps ............................. ............................. ............................ 5
1. Site ... 5
2. Probable Client Load ... 5
3. Camp Timings ... 5
4. Staff ... 6
5. Equipment/Instruments and Supplies ............................. ............................. ............................ 7
3. Roles and responsibilities of programme managers and service providers ........................... 9
I. Pre-camp Activities (beginning of the year) ............................. ............................. ................... 9
II. During Camp ... 10
4. Conduction of camps ... 15
1. Pre-camp Activities ... 15
2. Camp Activities ... 15
3. Post-camp Activities ... 17
5. Prevention of infection: asepsis and antisepsis ............................. ............................. ........... 19
1. Maintenance of Asepsis in OT ............................. ............................. ............................. ......... 19
2. Processing of Equipment, Instruments and other Reusable Items ............................. ................ 20
3. Sterilization or High-Level Disinfections (HLD) ............................. ............................. ............. 21
4. Disposal of Waste, Needles, and Other Materials ............................. ............................. .......... 23
6. Assurance of quality in camp setting ............................. ............................. ............................ 25
7. Annexures ... 27
Annexure 1: Equipment for Male/Female Sterilization: ............................. ............................. . 29
Annexure 2: Management of Emergencies in Sterilization Services ............................. ........... 34
Annexure 3: Common Emergency Drugs ............................. ............................. ....................... 38
8. List of experts for formulating the Standard Operating Procedures on
Family Planning Services ... 40

page 11

1. Range of services in a camp
What is a “camp”?
A sterilization camp is defined as alternate service delivery mechanism, when “operating team located
at a remote facility (District HQs/Medical colleges/FRUs) conducts sterilization operations at a sub
district health facility, where these services are not routinely available.”
Service package for camp services should include following:
1. Counselling
Counselling is the process of helping clients make informed and voluntary decisions about their
fertility. Method specific counselling should be done whenever a client is unable to take a decision
or has a doubt regarding the type of contraceptive method to be used. In the case of clients found
eligible for sterilization the following steps should be taken before she/he signs the consent form for
sterilization:
* Clients must be informed of all the available methods of family planning and should be made
aware that for all practical purposes, sterilization is a permanent one.
* Clients must make an informed decision for sterilization voluntarily.
* Clients must be counseled in the language that they clearly understand.
* Clients should be made to understand what will happen before, during, and after the surgery,
its side effects, and potential complications, including failure
In situations where the camp is providing other FP methods, method specific counseling should also
be provided
2. Clinical Services
(a) Permanent methods
Vasectomy t Screening and clinical assessment
 Pre-procedure instructions/preparation
and/or Procedure
Post-operative examination & instructions
Tubectomy  Follow-up

Page 13:

2. Pre-requisites for sterilization camps
The camp should be organized exclusively for sterilization services. Additional services can also be
offered depending on the existing service provision for additional services.
1. Site
All Sterilization Camps must be organized only at established health care facilities as laid down in the
Standards by GOI.
For IUCD insertion, a clean separate room with adequate lighting arrangement and privacy will be
sufficient.
Oral Pills, Emergency Contraceptive Pills and Condoms can be dispensed at the counselling area.
Under no circumstances should Sterilization Camps be organized in a school building/Panchayat
Bhavan or any other such set up. Camps should be always organised either at CHCs or PHCs.
2. Probable Client Load
Estimation of likely number of clients to turn up for accessing services will help in determining number
of teams. For maintaining quality service, each surgeon should restrict to conducting a maximum of:
* 30 laparoscopic tubectomy (for 1 team with 3 laparoscopes) or
* 30 vasectomy (NSV or conventional) or
* 30 minilap tubectomy cases.
* With additional surgeons, support staff, instruments, equipment and supplies, the number of
procedures per team may increase proportionately. However, the maximum number of procedures
that are performed by a team in a day should not exceed 50.
Depending upon the expected client load, requisite number of teams should be mobilized by the
camp manager.
3. Camp Timings
Camp timings should preferably be between 9 a.m. and 4 p.m.



For those idiots out there who think that sterilization camps can't exist because it's some chicken s**t "conspiracy theory", well they are already doing it in India, and that Nazi eugenics bulls**t will come to America soon, so man up and face it.  This s**t has been going on since at least the 1950s, and gained serious steam as early as 1972.  Then when the "conspiracy theory" denial stage passes, then it becomes "a good thing".  How is Rockefeller Foundation sterilizing men and women in systematic fashion "a good thing"?  If the Rockefellers were as philanthropic as they claim to be, then why not fix India's horrible highway system, instead of paying US$2.80 per n*t snip?
85  Health, Family & Eugenics / Eugenics / Depopulation / War On Family / Re: Sterilization camps EXPOSED! on: December 02, 2010, 03:51:04 am
The Quality of Care in Sterilization Camps:
Evidence from Gujarat
DILEEP MAVALANKAR & BHARTI SHARMA


Sterilization is the most popular method of contraception in India. The 1992-93 National Family Health Survey found that of the 36.2 percent of eligible couples using any modem method, most (30.7 per cent) had been sterilized and only 5.5 percent were using temporary methods (IIPS 1995, p. 143). Sterilization is thus six times more common than all the other modem methods combined. Although the Family Welfare Programme has begun to give higher priority to spacing methods than to permanent methods, sterilization is expected to remain the most popular method for the foreseeable future. Unfortunately, the government of India has paid little attention to the quality of sterilization services, and has tended instead to emphasize achieving targeted numbers of cases. A great deal of demographic research has been conducted in India, but few studies have focused on the quality of care in family planning, in particular the quality of sterilization services (see Shariff and Visaria 1991; Verma, Roy, and Saxena 1994).

History of the Camp Approach to Sterilizations
Although sterilization has been an important component of the Family Welfare Programme since the 1960s, the camp approach was not introduced until the Fourth Five-Year Plan (1969-74). Sterilization received a strong push in the early 1970s with mass vasectomy camps. The chief district administrator (called collector or district magistrate in India) of Emakulam District in Kerala successfully brought large numbers of villagers to camps for vasectomies, thus setting an example for other regions in the country (Agarwala and Sinha 1983). This approach spread rapidly, and the prevalence of sterilization rose by two percent per year. Doctors at the camps tried to outdo one another in the number of operations they performed each day, with the result that there were high rates of failure and other complications.

The Emakulam camps were models of organizational efficiency, but their methods were not always duplicated elsewhere. Handling large numbers of cases placed a strain on the camps' organizational capacity, making follow-up difficult. The number of sterilizations fell as problems associated with this hurried approach came to light (Soni 1983). The number of vasectomy cases declined further after 1976, when the government declared a national emergency during which thousands of men were coerced to accept vasectomies. Since 1977 female sterilization has been the most commonly used method (Figure 14.1). Among the 31 percent of couples sterilized as of 1992-93, female sterilization accounted for 27 percent and male sterilization accounted for a mere 4 percent.

READ THE REST OF THIS 16 PAGE STUDY HERE:
http://www.iimahd.ernet.in/~dileep/PDF%20Files/Sterilization.pdf
86  Health, Family & Eugenics / Eugenics / Depopulation / War On Family / Re: Sterilization camps EXPOSED! on: December 02, 2010, 03:50:38 am
Here are images of a sterilization camp in India in 2003.

Retrieved from:
http://reducetheburden.org/?p=1331
http://www.flickr.com/search/?w=30664003%40N00&q=sterilization
PICTURES BY NICK RAIN



In a remote part of India on the border with Nepal a local clinic managed to convince the local tribal women to come on mass to undergo sterilization to combat poverty. The women however were not aware how the crude operation would be carried out.




In a remote part of India on the border with Nepal a local clinic managed to convince the local tribal women to come en mass to undergo sterilization to combat poverty. The women however were not aware how the crude operation would be carried out. The operation took place inside the dirty clinic with hundreds of women waiting like cattle to be operated on.




One by one the women were put on the operating table, the instrument used looked like a twelve inch metal tube with a sharp edge at one end. It was then forced into the womans stomach and the physician looked through the instrument and made what looked like a twist and a snip, a quick stich and a plaster and the women were dragged outside to recover on the grass.




The instrument was then pulled out and a nurse quickly stitched up the wound, placed a plaster and the woman was carried out and left on the grass outside the clinic to recover.




After the operation this young woman is helped outside.
87  Health, Family & Eugenics / Eugenics / Depopulation / War On Family / Re: Sterilization camps EXPOSED! on: December 02, 2010, 03:49:50 am


READ FULL REPORT HERE:
http://www.popcouncil.org/pdfs/wp/050.pdf


Excerpt
PAGE 32-33


88  Health, Family & Eugenics / Eugenics / Depopulation / War On Family / Re: Sterilization camps EXPOSED! on: December 02, 2010, 03:49:23 am
This book also calls for "family planning festivals":

Click here to read it on Google Books

89  Health, Family & Eugenics / Eugenics / Depopulation / War On Family / Sterilization camps EXPOSED! on: December 02, 2010, 03:48:54 am

John P Holdren called for "family planning festivals" on pg 768 of ECOSCIENCE

I own a physical copy of the book and scanned in these pages that Zomblog missed.




90  Science & Technology / Big Brother / Police State Tech / Re: INSLAW Affair/PROMIS/Riconosciuto/"Octopus"/Casolaro MASTER ARCHIVE on: December 02, 2010, 03:44:59 am
Rockefeller funded INSLAW-PROMIS-Police State Technocracy-Mind Control

Institute for Law and Social Research = INSLAW

http://www.rockarch.org/collections/nonrockorgs/commonwealth.php#

Excerpt from above link:

COMMONWEALTH FUND ARCHIVES, 1918-1988 

I

Illinois, State of (Board of Higher Education), 1966-1977
Illinois, University of, 1956-1975
Independent Sector, 1979-1982
Independent Sector, 1982-1989 (Series 18.3)
Indiana University, 1951-1972
Industrial Personnel Problem, 1919-1921
Institute for Crippled and Disabled Men, 1922-1925
Institute for Law and Social Research, 1979-1983 (Series 18.2)
Institute for Muscle Research, 1953-1965
Institute for Policy Studies, 1964-1967
Institute for the Study of Humanistic Medicine, 1977-1978
Institute of International Education, 1948-1981
Institute of International Education, 1980-1982 (Series 18.2)
Institute of International Education, 1982-1986 (Series 18.3)
Institute of Latin
American Studies, 1979-1980
Institute of Society, Ethics and Life Sciences, 1972-1983
Institute of Society, Ethics and Life Sciences, 1980-1983 (Series 18.3)
International Association for Child Psychiatry and Allied Professions, 1971-1981
International Association for Child and Adolescent Psychiatry and Allied Professions, International Study Group of, 1980-1983 (Series 18.3)
International Center for Integrative Studies, 1980-1984 (Series 18.3)
International Committee of the Red Cross, 1975-1977
International Congress on Mental Health, 1947-1949
International Council of English, 1927
International Council on the Future of the University, 1979-1981
International Epidemiological Association, 1967-1981
International Hospital Convention, 1928
International Mass Education Movement
International Women's Health Coalition, 1984-1986 (Series 18.3)
Inter-Racial Committee, 1919-1922
Iowa, University of, 1979-1983 (Series 18.2)
University of Iowa, 1982-1987 (Series 18.3)
Irvington House, 1936-1943
Ittleson (Henry) Center for Child Research, 1950-1962
_____________________________ _____________________________ ______________


http://www.fordfound.org/archives/item/0188/text/29

The Rockefeller Foundation contributed to the support for the Office of Environmental Mediation, but its emphasis is on the international context. Most of the other major foundations are not active in this area, except for this Foundation's involvement, described below.

As a consequence of the 1976 National Conference on the Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration of Justice, the American Bar Association (ABA) and the American Bar Foundation (ABF) have initiated several projects. The ABF is engaged in studies and projects involving class-action litigation. The ABA has established a Special Committee on Minor Disputes; the ABA Commission on Law and the Economy, which is assisted by the Foundation, is discussed below.

The Institute for Judicial Administration is chiefly concerned with studies of the structure of state and federal courts, educational programs for judges and court administrators, and publication of research on the administration of justice. The National Center for State Courts has been concerned with encouraging and collecting better data on state courts, a study of judicial diversion, and mechanisms for creating more effective small claims courts. A relatively new organization, the Institute for Law and Social Research (a Foundation grantee), is working on a systems approach to the criminal justice system.

The American Enterprise Institute is exploring the role of information and incentives in regulation. The Center for Administrative Justice, an organization concerned with training and research in administrative law, has completed a large study of Social Security hearings. Other projects are under way at the Urban Institute, the Rand Corporation, the Stanford Research Institute, and Abt Associates.
_____________________________ _____________________________ ______________
http://w2.eff.org/legal/cases/INSLAW/inslaw_hr.report

Excerpt from:  Union Calendar No. 491
102d Congress, 2d session -------------------------------- House Report 102-857 THE INSLAW AFFAIR


I. SUMMARY

The Department of Justice has long recognized the need for a standardized management information system to assist law enforcement offices across the  country in the recordkeeping and tracking of criminal cases. During the 1970's, the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA) funded the development by INSLAW1 of a computer software system called the Prosecutor's Management Information System or PROMIS.  This system was designed to meet the criminal prosecutor workloads of  largeurban jurisdictions; and by 1980, several large U.S. attorneys offices were using the PROMIS software.  At this time, INSLAW (formerly called the Institute for Law and Social  Research) was a nonprofit corporation funded almost entirely through Government grants and contracts.  When President Carter terminated the LEAA, INSLAW converted the company to a for-profit corporation in 1981 to commercially  market  PROMIS.

The new corporation made several significant improvements to the original PROMIS software and the resulting product came to be known as INSLAW's proprietary Enhanced PROMIS.  The original PROMIS was funded entirely with Government funds and was in the public domain.
91  Science & Technology / Big Brother / Police State Tech / INSLAW Affair/PROMIS/Riconosciuto/"Octopus"/Casolaro MASTER ARCHIVE on: December 02, 2010, 03:43:14 am

PROMIS (Prosecutor's Management Information System)

The Prosecutor's Management Information System (PROMIS) is a database system developed by Inslaw Inc., a Washington, D.C.-based, information technology company.

PROMIS was first developed by Inslaw during the 1970s under contracts and grants from the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA). These guarantees gave the government licenses to use the early versions of PROMIS but not to modify them, or to create derivative works, or to distribute PROMIS outside the federal government. By 1982, because of strong disagreements over a fee-incentive, Modification 12 Agreement to the original contract, the United States Department of Justice and Inslaw Inc. became involved in a widely-publicized and protracted lawsuit ( Inslaw Inc. v. United States Government)

Designed as a case-management system for prosecutors, PROMIS has the ability to track people. "Every use of PROMIS in the court system is tracking people," said Inslaw President Bill Hamilton. "You can rotate the file by case, defendant, arresting officer, judge, defense lawyer, and it's tracking all the names of all the people in all the cases."

What this means is that PROMIS can provide a complete rundown of all federal cases in which a lawyer has been involved, or all the cases in which a lawyer has represented defendant A, or all the cases in which a lawyer has represented white-collar criminals, at which stage in each of the cases the lawyer agreed to a plea bargain, and so on. Based on this information, PROMIS can help a prosecutor determine when a plea will be taken in a particular type of case.

But the real power of PROMIS, according to Hamilton, is that with a staggering 570,000 lines of computer code, PROMIS can integrate innumerable databases without requiring any reprogramming. In essence, PROMIS can turn blind data into information. And anyone in government will tell you that information, when wielded with finesse, begets power. Converted to use by intelligence agencies, as has been alleged in interviews by ex-CIA and Israeli Mossad agents, PROMIS can be a powerful tracking device capable of monitoring intelligence operations, agents and targets, instead of legal cases.

PROMIS has the ability to combine disparate databases, and to track people by their involvement with the legal system.

Imagine you are in charge of the legal arm of the most powerful government on the face of the globe, but your internal information systems are mired in the archaic technology of the 1960s. There's a Department of Justice database, a CIA database, an Attorney's General database, an IRS database, and so on, but none of them can share information. That makes tracking multiple offenders pretty darn difficult, and building cases against them a long and bureaucratic task.  Along comes a computer program that can integrate all these databases.  Working from either huge mainframe computer systems or smaller networks powered by the progenitors of today's PCs, PROMIS, from its first "test drive" in the late 1970's, was able to do one thing that no other program had ever been able to do. It was able to simultaneously read and integrate any number of different computer programs or data bases simultaneously, regardless of the language in which the original programs had been written or the operating system or platforms on which that data base was then currently installed.





Inslaw, Inc. was a small, Washington, D.C.-based, information technology company. In the mid-1970s, Inslaw developed for the United States Department of Justice a highly efficient, people-tracking, software program known as: Prosecutor's Management Information System (PROMIS). Inslaw's principal owners, William Anthony Hamilton and his wife, Nancy Burke Hamilton, later sued the United States Government  (acting as principal to the Department of Justice) for not complying with the terms of the PROMIS contract and for refusing to pay for an enhanced version of PROMIS once delivered. This allegation of software piracy led to three trials in separate federal courts and two congressional hearings.

During ensuing investigations, the Department of Justice was accused of deliberately attempting to drive Inslaw into Chapter 7 liquidation; and of distributing and selling stolen software for covert intelligence operations of foreign governments such as Canada, Israel, Singapore, Iraq, Egypt, and Jordan; and of becoming directly involved in murder.

Later developments implied that derivative versions of Enhanced PROMIS sold on the black market may have become the high-tech tools of worldwide terrorists such as Osama Bin Laden and international money launderers and thieves.

Inslaw, once called the Institute for Law and Social Research, was a non-profit business created in 1974 by William Anthony Hamilton, a former analyst with the National Security Agency and onetime contract employee of the CIA. Inslaw's original software product, PROMIS, was a database designed to handle papers and documents generated by law enforcement agencies and courts. PROMIS was a people-tracking program which had the power to integrate innumerable databases regardless of their languages, or regardless of their operating platforms. "Every use of PROMIS in the court system is tracking people," explained Hamilton. "You can rotate the file by case, defendant, arresting officer, judge, defense lawyer, and it's tracking all the names of all the people in all the cases."

PROMIS was funded almost entirely by government funds; therefore versions created prior to January 1978 were in the public domain. On January 1, 1978, amendments to the Copyright Act of 1976 took effect, automatically conferring upon Inslaw as the author of PROMIS five exclusive software copyright rights, none of which could be waived except by explicit, written waiver. The federal government negotiated licenses to use but not to modify or to distribute outside the federal government some but not all versions of PROMIS created after the January 1978 effective-date of the copyright amendments. In 1981, after Congress liquidated the Justice Department's Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA) (which had been the primary source of funds for Inslaw's development of Promis), the company became known as Inslaw, Inc., a for-profit corporation created to further develop and market PROMIS and other PROMIS-derivative software product(s).

The newly created corporation made significant improvements to the original software. The resulting product came to be known alternately as PROMIS '82 or Enhanced PROMIS, a 32-bit architecture VAX 11/780 version.

In 1981, Edwin Meese, then an adviser to President Ronald Reagan, announced an $800 million budget in an effort to overhaul the computer systems of the Justice Department, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and other law enforcement agencies.  The following year, the Department of Justice awarded Inslaw a $9.6 million, three-year, cost-plus-incentive-fee contract to implement a pilot program in 22 of the largest Offices of the United States Attorneys using the older 16-bit architecture Prime version (as in Wang, or IBM), which the government had a license to use.

While PROMIS could have gone a long way toward correcting the Department's longstanding need for a standardized case-management system, the contract between Inslaw and Justice quickly became embroiled for over two decades in bitter controversy. The conflict centered on whether or not the Justice Department owed Inslaw license fees for the new, 32-bit architecture VAX version if the government substituted that version for the older 16-bit Prime version which had been the subject of the original contract.

In February 1983, an Israeli government official scheduled a meeting with Inslaw through the Justice Department's contract agent, Peter Videnieks. The purpose of that meeting was for a PROMIS briefing and demonstration; the Israeli Ministry of Justice intended to computerize its own prosecution offices. Although it was believed that the Israeli government official was a prosecuting attorney, it was later discovered upon closer examination that the official was really Rafi Eitan, "Director of LAKAM, a super-secret agency within the Israeli Ministry of Defense responsible for collecting scientific and technical intelligence information from other countries through espionage."  Herein is where Inslaw's case becomes convoluted.

Following the Israeli meeting, the Justice Department obtained Inslaw's new, 32-bit, Enhanced PROMIS from Inslaw at the start of the second year of their implementation contract by modifying that contract and by promising to negotiate the payment of license fees. One month later, the U.S. government began to find fault with some of Inslaw's services, and with negotiated billing rates. The government then began to withhold unilaterally each month increasing amounts of payments due Inslaw for implementation services. The Justice Department agent responsible for making payments was a former, fired Inslaw employee, C. Madison Brewer. Brewer would later claim in federal court that everything he did regarding Inslaw was approved by Deputy Attorney General D. Lowell Jensen. Brewer was aided in his new DoJ job by Peter Videnieks.  Videnieks was fresh from the Customs Service where he oversaw contracts between that agency and Hadron, Inc., a company controlled by Edwin Meese and Reagan-crony Earl Brian. Hadron, a closely held government systems consulting firm, was to figure prominently in the forthcoming scandal.  Both Brewer and Videnieks had obtained their positions under suspicious circumstances.   Furthermore, before moving over to the Justice Department and taking charge of the PROMIS program in September 1981, Videnieks had administered three contracts between the Customs Service and Hadron.  Hadron was in the business of integrating information-managing systems such as PROMIS into federal agencies.

Simultaneously with the withholding of payments in the 1983 Modification 12 agreement, the government then substituted the enhanced VAX version of PROMIS for the old Prime version originally specified in the contract. However, the government failed to negotiate the payment of license fees as promised, claiming that Inslaw had failed to prove to the government's satisfaction that Inslaw had developed the enhanced version with private, non-government funds and that the enhanced version was not otherwise required to be delivered to the government under any of its contracts with Inslaw—that is, Inslaw had provided it voluntarily.

Yet beneath the surface of this background was a belief that the primary focus of certain top-level individuals within the DoJ was to perpetuate international, covert intelligence operations—for example, to enable Israeli signal intelligence to surreptitiously access the computerized Jordanian dossiers on Palestinians.

Enhanced PROMIS was eventually installed in a total of forty-four federal prosecutors' offices following the Modification 12 agreement.

According to affidavits filed by William Hamilton, as the contract details were modified, Hamilton then received a phone call from Dominic Laiti, chief executive of Hadron. Laiti wanted to buy Inslaw. Hamilton refused. According to Hamilton's affidavits, Laiti then warned him that Hadron had friends in government and if Inslaw did not want to sell willingly, Inslaw could be coerced.

By February 1985, the government had withheld payment of almost $1.8 million for Inslaw's implementation services, plus millions of dollars in Old PROMIS license fees. Inslaw filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection. Meanwhile, the government began highly suspicious activities to force Inslaw into Chapter 7 liquidation

In his court cases, William Hamilton was represented by several attorneys, one of whom was lawyer Elliot Richardson, formerly the United States Attorney General under President Richard Nixon.

Two different federal bankruptcy courts made fully litigated findings of fact in the late-eighties ruling that the Justice Department "took, converted, and stole" the PROMIS installed in U.S. Attorneys' Offices "through trickery, fraud, and deceit," and then attempted "unlawfully and without justification"  to force Inslaw out of business so that it would be unable to seek restitution through the courts.

Three months after the initial verdict, George F. Bason, Jr., the federal judge presiding over the Bankruptcy Court for the District of Columbia, was denied reappointment to a new 14-year term on the bench by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, the appointing authority. His replacement, S. Martin Teel, took over shortly after Judge Bason announced his oral findings of malfeasance against Inslaw by the Justice Department; Teel had been the Justice Department Tax Division attorney who had argued unsuccessfully before Judge Bason for the forced liquidation of Inslaw. Leigh Ratiner (of Dickstein, Shapiro and Morin, which was the 10th largest firm in Washington at the time) was fired in October 1986; he had been the lead counsel for Inslaw and had filed the suit against the Justice Department in federal bankruptcy court. His firing came reportedly amidst "back channel" discussions involving: the DoJ, his law firm's senior partner, and the Government of Israel; moreover, there were rumors that the Mossad had arranged a payment of $600,000 to Ratiner's former firm as a separation settlement.

Then, in September 1991, the House Judiciary Committee issued the result of a three-year investigation. House Report 102-857 Inslaw: Investigative Report confirmed the Justice Department's theft of PROMIS. The report was issued after the Justice Department convinced the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals on a jurisdictional technicality to set aside the decisions of the first two federal bankruptcy courts. The House Committee also reported investigative leads indicating that friends of the Reagan White House  had been allowed to sell and to distribute Enhanced PROMIS both domestically and overseas for their personal financial gain and in support of the intelligence and foreign policy objectives of the United States. The report even went so far as to recommend specifically further investigations of both former-Attorney General Edwin Meese and businessman, Earl Brian, for their possible involvement in illegally providing or selling PROMIS "to foreign governments including Canada, Israel, Singapore, Iraq, Egypt, and Jordan." The Democratic Majority called upon the Attorney General Dick Thornburgh  to compensate Inslaw immediately for the harm that the government had "egregiously" inflicted on Inslaw. The Republican Minority dissented. The Committee was divided along party lines 21–13. Attorney General Thornburgh ignored the recommendations, and reneged on agreements made with the committee.

On November 13, 1991, newly appointed, Attorney General William Barr, appointed a retired federal judge, Nicholas J. Bua, as Special Counsel to advise him on the allegations that high-ranking officials had acted improperly for personal gain to bankrupt Inslaw.

By June 1993, a 267-page Bua Report was released, clearing Justice officials of any impropriety.  Inslaw's attorney, Elliot Richardson immediately wrote Inslaw's 130-page Rebuttal with evidence suggesting Bua's report was riddled with errors and falsehoods. On September 27, 1994, Attorney General Janet Reno  released a 187-page review concluding "that there is no credible evidence that Department officials conspired to steal computer software developed by Inslaw, Inc. or that the company is entitled to additional government payments."  Yet, according to Wired Magazine, "Reno's report was released the same day [that] the House Judiciary Committee passed HR 4862[28], a bill which would have bound the U.S. Court of Federal Claims legally to independently investigate the Inslaw case—thus circumventing the Department of Justice's claims of innocence;" however, HR 4862 was defeated by a partisan committee-vote later that night before it was set to go before the full House.

The following May, the United States Senate asked the U.S. Court of Federal Claims   to determine if the United States owed Inslaw compensation for the government's use of PROMIS. On July 31, 1997, Judge Christine Miller, the hearing officer for the U.S. Court of Federal Claims ruled that all of the versions of PROMIS were in the public domain and that the government had therefore always been free to do whatever it wished with PROMIS.  The following year, the appellate authority, a three-judge Review Panel of the same court, upheld Miller's ruling; yet, it also determined that Inslaw had never granted the government a license to "modify PROMIS to create derivative software" although Inslaw was automatically vested with the exclusive copyright rights  to PROMIS. The Review Panel then held that the United States would be liable to Inslaw for copyright infringement damages if the government had created any unauthorized derivatives from PROMIS, but noted that Inslaw "had failed to prove in court that the government had done so;" moreover, the Board held that the issue of "derivative works" was "of no consequence."  Inslaw challenged this interpretation but the Review Panel refused Inslaw's request to reopen discovery. In August 1998, Chief Judge Lorin Smith of the U.S. Court of Federal Claims sent an Advisory Report to the Senate, noting that the court had not found that the United States owes Inslaw compensation for the government's use of PROMIS, and enclosing the decision of the hearing officer and the decision of the Review Panel.

On the other hand, according to William Hamilton, the government flatly denied during all court proceedings what it later admitted, i.e. that agencies such as the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and other U.S. intelligence agencies used a PROMIS-derivative to keep track of their classified information.

In early 1999, the British journalist and author, Gordon Thomas, published an authorized history of the Israeli Mossad titled Gideon's Spies: The Secret History of the Mossad. The book quotes detailed admissions by the former long-time deputy-director of the Mossad, Rafi Eitan, about the partnership between Israeli and U.S. intelligence in selling to foreign intelligence agencies in excess of $500 million worth of licenses to a trojan horse version of PROMIS, in order to spy on them.

In 2001, the Washington Times and Fox News each quoted federal law enforcement officials familiar with debriefing former FBI Agent Robert Hanssen as claiming that the convicted spy had stolen copies of a PROMIS-derivative for his Soviet KGB handlers.

They further alleged that the software was used within the FBI and other U.S. intelligence agencies to track internal intelligence, and was used by intelligence operatives to track international interbank transactions. These reports further stated that Osama bin Laden later bought copies of the same Promis-derivative on the Russian black market (blat) for $2 million. It was believed then that al-Qaeda  used the software to penetrate database systems to move funds throughout the banking system, and to evade detection by U.S. law enforcement.

In May 2006, a former aide in the Office of the Vice President of the United States pleaded guilty to passing top-secret classified information to plotters trying to overthrow the president of the Philippines. Leandro Aragoncillo, an FBI intelligence analyst at the time of his arrest, was believed to have operated his deception using archaic database software manipulated by the FBI in order to evade the 1995 finding of the U.S. Court of Federal Claims with regard to Inslaw's rights to derivative works.

The 9-11 Commission called attention to the fact that the FBI did not install the current version of its case management software, called the ACS (Automated Case Support) system, until October 1995 and to the fact that ACS was obsolete from the time the FBI developed it in the mid-1990s because it was based on "1980s technology". Although the 9-11 Commission offered no explanation for why the FBI used obsolete technology to develop its ACS case management software in 1995, the apparent explanation is that the FBI simply renamed its 1980s technology case management software, which was called FOIMS and was based on PROMIS, and translated it in October 1995 into a different computer programming language in order to obstruct a court hearing that the U.S. Senate had ordered earlier that year. The Senate had ordered the court in May 1995 to determine whether the United States owes Inslaw compensation for the government's use of PROMIS, and the court, in turn, ordered outside software experts to compare the FBI's software with PROMIS, but the FBI modified its software and told the court that it no longer retained the unmodified first 11 years (1985 through 1995) of its own case management software.

In 2006, there were further allegations of the misuse of PROMIS. Writing in the Canada Free Press, the former Polish CIA operative and now international journalist, David Dastych alleged that "Chinese Military Intelligence (PLA-2) organized their own hackers department, which [exploited] PROMIS [database systems] [in the] Los Alamos and Sandia national laboratories to steal U.S. nuclear secrets"; however, the prima facie value of that allegation was lost in a realization that the U.S. Government could not convict the suspected 2001 spy.

The U.S. Government has never paid Inslaw Inc. for any of these unauthorized uses of PROMIS.


"Inslaw deserves to be compensated," wrote nationally syndicated columnist, Michelle Malkin, in The Washington Times. "More importantly, the American people deserve to know the truth: Did government greed and bureaucratic hubris lead to a wholesale sellout of our national security?"

While investigating elements of this story, journalist Danny Casolaro died in what was twice ruled a suicide. Prior to his death, Casolaro had warned friends if they were ever told he had committed suicide not to believe it, and to know he had been murdered.  Many have argued that his death was suspicious, deserving closer scrutiny; some have argued further, believing his death was a murder, committed to hide whatever Casolaro had uncovered. "I believe he was murdered," wrote former Attorney General Elliot Richardson in the New York Times, " but even if that is no more than a possibility, it is a possibility with such sinister implications as to demand a serious effort to discover the truth." Kenn Thomas and Jim Keith discuss this in their book, The Octopus: Secret Government and the Death of Danny Casolaro.   Writing on behalf of a majority opinion in House Report 102-857, Committee Chairman, Jack Brooks  (D-TX) wrote, "As long as the possibility exists that Danny Casolaro died as a result of his investigation into the INSLAW matter, it is imperative that further investigation be conducted."






Michael Riconosciuto

Michael Riconoscuito was a gifted child: When he was just 10 years old, Michael wired his parents' neighborhood with a working private telephone system that undercut Ma Bell; in the eighth grade, he won a science fair with a model for a three-dimensional sonar system. By the time he was a teenager, he had won so many science fairs with exhibits of laser technology that he was invited to be a summer research assistant at Stanford University's prestigious Cooper Vapor Laser Laboratory. Dr. Arthur Schalow , a Nobel laureate, remembers him — "You don't forget a 16-year-old youngster who shows up with his own argon laser."

Riconosciuto is an electronics, computer expert who was convicted on seven drug-related charges in early 1992.  He is not set to be released until 2017.   Riconosciuto professed a defense centered on the Inslaw Affair (a legal case in which the U.S. Government was charged with illegal use of computer software). Riconosciuto claimed to have reprogrammed Inslaw's case-management program (PROMIS) with a secret "back-door" to allow clandestine tracking of individuals. Riconosciuto stated that had been threatened by a justice department official. Riconosciuto provided an Affidavit detailing threats to a House Select Committee investigating the Inslaw Affair.

On March 21, 1991, Riconosciuto filed an affidavit before a House judiciary committee investigating the bankruptcy case of Inslaw Inc. v. United States Government. Riconosciuto was under suspicion at the time for illegally modifying a people-tracking, case-management, software program that had been developed for the Department of Justice by Washington, D.C.-based Inslaw Inc.. Riconosciuto declared that he had been under the direction of Earl Brian, who was then a controlling shareholder and director of Hadron, Inc..

Hadron was a competitor to Inslaw and was also a government consulting firm with several contracts with the Department of Defense and the CIA.

Riconosciuto further declared that Peter Videnieks, the contract manager overseeing the Inslaw contract for the management division of the DoJ, had stolen the PROMIS software and had given it to Earl Brian who "spearheaded" a plan for the "implementation of PROMIS in law enforcement and intelligence agencies worldwide."

Riconosciuto claimed that Videnieks during a telephone conversation threatened Riconosciuto with DoJ reprisals if Riconosciuto should testify before the House Investigating Committee. According to Riconosciuto's claims, Videnieks said that there would be indictments brought against Riconosciuto and his father in connection with a criminal operation of a savings and loan institution in California; furthermore, Riconosciuto's wife would immediately loose a long and protracted child custody case against her former husband; and lastly, Riconosciuto would be prosecuted for perjury. Riconosciuto claimed to have made a tape recording of that conversation.

Within eight days of this declaration, Riconosciuto was arrested for conspiracy to manufacture, conspiracy to distribute, possession with intent to distribute, and with distribution—a total of ten counts related to methamphetamine and methadone.

During his trial, Riconosciuto accused the Drug Enforcement Agency of stealing two copies of his tape. Then later he claimed a third was tossed by him into a Washington State swamp.

In addition to his claims of a government "frame up" related to Inslaw, Riconosciuto maintained that the chemical laboratory on his property was in use for the extraction of precious metals such as platinum in a highly-specialized mining operation.

READ MORE ABOUT RICONOSCIUTO HERE:
http://forum.prisonplanet.com/index.php?topic=163620.0






Danny Casolaro

Danny Casolaro, an aspiring novelist, freelance writer and investigative reporter looking into the theft of Project PROMIS software, a program capable of tracking down anyone anywhere in the world, died in August 1991, a reported suicide. Casolaro was also investigating Pine Gap, Area 51 and governmental bioengineering. His manuscript – tentatively entitled The Octopus and which would reveal a web of conspiracy involving everything from PROMIS to BCCI to Iran-Contra to the JFK assassination to the October Surprise – was missing from his room and has never been found.

For Casolaro, the Octopus presented a complex web of intrigue involving PROMIS; the inter-connection of various police services, intelligence agencies and organised criminal groups; and a large number of parapolitical operators, weapons brokers and deal-makers. All of this continues to have an impact on the post-9/11 world, with PROMIS figuring in many contemporary stories.

From a well-to-do family (his father, a doctor, had invested well in Northern Virginia real estate), he was 44 years old, divorced, and living comfortably on a five-acre estate in Fairfax County, Virginia – home to the CIA.

In the first week of August, Casolaro told friends and acquaintances that he was going to West Virginia too meet a source who would provide a key piece of evidence he needed to complete his investigation. He drove to Martinsburg, West Virginia, on Thursday, August 8, and checked into room 517 of the Sheraton Hotel. Two days later, at 12:51 p.m., hotel employees found his naked body in a bathtub full of bloody water. The time of death has been estimated at about 9.00 am. Both arms and wrists had been slashed a total of at least 12 times; one of the cuts went so deep that it had severed a tendon.

The hotel management called the Martinsburg police who brought along the local coroner, Sandra Brining, a registered nurse. Ms. Brining ruled the death a suicide, took small blood and urine samples, and released the body to the Brown Funeral Home. Without authorization from officials or Casolaro's next of kin, the funeral home embalmed the body as a "courtesy to the family", according to Brining's statement at an August 15 press conference in Martinsburg.

Martinsburg police notified the next of kin, Dr. Anthony Casolaro, also of Fairfax, of his brother's death on Monday, August 12. Casolaro says that police explanations for the delay, like the hasty, unauthorized and illegal embalming, seemed either extraordinarily inefficient or highly suspicious.


READ MORE HERE About Casolaro:
http://lukeford.net/profiles/profiles/danny_casolaro.htm






All about PROMIS
http://www.fromthewilderness.com/free/pandora/052401_promis.html

The Inslaw "Octupus" article from Wired back in 1993
http://www.wired.com/wired/archive/1.01/inslaw.html?topic=&topic_set=

"The INSLAW Affair" Part 1
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Y41J-T0N-C0

"The INSLAW Affair" Part 2
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IDH9MReekLM

"The INSLAW Affair" Part 3
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=x1gNCGwP_fo

CNN 1992 Newsclip of INSLAW
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xyJsycSZL9M

KESQ News Channel 3 Coachella Valley covers PROMIS Murders
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=x3kbikyxrpg

Danny Casolaro-Unsolved Mysteries part 1
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RNdW2V5V8W4

Danny Casolaro-Unsolved Mysteries part 2
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=G3O7u9JYVgs

Youtube Channel of the daughter of one of the INSLAW affair victims:
http://www.youtube.com/user/desertfae

CasolaroProject YouTube Channel
http://www.youtube.com/user/CasolaroProject


INSLAW Website, not updated since 1999
http://www.inslawinc.com/

Video about PROMIS:
http://www.veoh.com/browse/videos/category/news/watch/v18306205z7h3wKwQ


The Octopus: Secret Government and the Death of Danny Casolaro PAPERBACK BOOK:
http://www.amazon.com/Octopus-Secret-Government-Death-Casolaro/dp/0922915911




I reposted the Wikipedia entries of INSLAW and PROMIS, up above, in case they ever get deleted.
92  The War Room / 9/11 Material & Research / Secretive CIA Site in New York Was Destroyed on Sept. 11 on: December 02, 2010, 03:37:02 am
Secretive CIA Site in New York Was Destroyed on Sept. 11
http://www.wtc7.net/lcache/wtc7.htm



Drudge Report 11-02-2001

Secret C.I.A. Site in New York Was Destroyed on Sept. 11..

Undercover New York station was in 47-story building
at 7 World Trade Center, one of the
smaller office towers destroyed in the aftermath of
the collapse...
93  The War Room / 9/11 Material & Research / Re: ANSER Institute for Homeland Security post-911 plans before 911 happened EXPOSED on: December 02, 2010, 03:34:59 am

http://web.archive.org/web/19970708140853/www.csis.org/mideast/

Overview
The Middle East remains a region in crisis. Several of the Arab states of North Africa are moving towards political and economic reform, but progress is slow and erratic. Algeria is now caught up in a major civil conflict. Libya's stability is deteriorating, and Islamic extremist elements challenge the stability of Tunisia. The Arab-Israeli peace process is proving anything but irreversible, and a continuing low level war is now taking place between Israeli forces and the Iranian/Syrian-backed Hezbollah. Lebanon remains an occupied state. Iraq remains under Saddam Hussein and is still a military threat to its neighbors, in spite of the Gulf War and six years of UN sanctions. Iran remains under the rule of an Islamic revolution that may still have ambitions for regional hegemony, which seeks to export its ideology, which is hostile to the US, and which opposes the Arab-Israeli peace process. The Southern Gulf lacks unity, and Bahrain and Saudi Arabia demonstrate that there are growing challenges in terms of internal security. Peripheral states -- such as Afghanistan, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Somalia, the Sudan Turkey, Yemen -- create further potential challenges to the stability of the region, while raising strategic and humanitarian concerns in their own right.

The CSIS Middle East Program, under the co-direction of Anthony H. Cordesman and Judith Kipper, addresses these challenges through a wide range of programs. It has developed broad net assessments of regional political, economic, demographic, water, energy, and security trends. These assessments are supported by detailed analyses of sub-regions like the Mahgreb, the Arab-Israeli "ring states," the Gulf, and the Red Sea area. They are also supported by analysis and briefings on individual problem areas, and studies of potential solutions to such security problems.

These studies strongly suggest that the true causes of instability in the region go far beyond a narrow focus on the Arab-Israeli conflict, the threats posed by Iran and Iraq, and the threat posed by various extremist groups. They suggest that the Middle East and North Africa face growing problems because of a failure to address the need for economic reform, to encourage the private sector, and attract and make effective use of foreign investment. They also suggest that the region is experiencing extraordinarily rapid population growth that is creating a potential crisis in sustaining increase per capita incomes and development. There is already a "youth explosion" in terms of large populations of unemployment workers under the age of 25, and a growing crisis in the quality and relevance of education. The program conducts on-going studies of military and security trends in the region. These include detailed assessments of the military balance, and have produced two major books: Perilous Prospects: The Arab-Israeli Military Balance and the Peace Process (Westview 1996), and The Gulf War: Lessons of Modern War, Volume IV. (Westview 1996). A four volume CSIS report has also been completed on the military balance in the Gulf, and detailed country studies are underway of the military forces of each Gulf country, Iranian and Iraqi weapons of mass destruction, and US forces in the Gulf. Assessments are also available of the military balances in the Mahgreb, the Arab-Israeli "ring states," and Red Sea areas.

The program works with other elements of CSIS to analyze energy trends and trade patterns in the region, and US strategic and commercial interests in the Middle East. It has produced analysis of the energy trends in the region through 2015, the impact of Middle Eastern oil and gas exports on world energy balances, energy risks, and the Asia's growing dependence on Middle Eastern energy exports.

In addition, the CSIS Middle East Program maintains programs to ensure a dialogue on many of these issues, through a series of meetings, briefings, and conferences. These include such activities as the International Consultative Group on the Middle East, and a series of high level meetings on key Middle East organized by Judith Kipper.

Projects
The main activities of the Middle East program include:

    * International Consultative Group on the Middle East. The International Consultative Group brings together a select group from the Middle East, the United States, and Europe (from the policy community, the business world, and academia) for a continuing dialogue. The ICG focuses on the fundamental trends—global and regional, economic, political, and security—confronting the Middle East. A meeting is planned for Washington, D.C., in June 1997. (Richard Fairbanks, Managing Director, Domestic and International Issues; Arnaud de Borchgrave, Senior Adviser; Anthony H. Cordesman and Judith Kipper, Codirectors, Middle East Studies Program)

    * Middle East: Dynamic Net Assessment. This project has produced a six-volume, comprehensive look at the strategic environment in the Middle East, which takes account of the most recent political and military developments in the region. This series of books has been copublished by CSIS and Westview Press includes: Iraq: Sanctions and Beyond; Bahrain, Oman, Qatar, and the UAE: Challenges of Security; Kuwait: Recovery and Security After the Gulf War; Iran: Dilemmas of Dual Containment; Saudi Arabia: Guarding the Desert Kingdom; and U.S. Forces in the Middle East: Resources and Capabilities. It is available from the CSIS bookstore, from Westview Press by calling 1-800-456-1995, or at bookstores.

      The project is now exploring new options for Gulf cooperation and developing an economic, political, and strategic model of the possible future of the Gulf through the year 2020 in regional security, particularly the security of U.S. allies and of U.S. strategic interests. Other studies include the demographics and sources of ethnic and sectarian conflict, patterns in arms transfers, and the nuclear, chemical, and biological forces of Middle Eastern states. (Anthony H. Cordesman, Senior Fellow and Codirector, Middle East Studies Program)

    * The New Middle East: Long-Term Trends and Developments. This series of seminars, lectures, and working groups focuses on political, economic, and strategic developments in the region, in which Iran and Iraq are of particular importance. The implications for energy security, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and the Western democracies' increasingly divergent policies toward Iran and Iraq are major areas of study, along with the Arab-Israeli peace process. Socioeconomic and political issues, which are often the true causes of instability, as well as economic restructuring and experiments in democratization are topics being examined in the light of new realities in the Middle East. (Anthony H. Cordesman and Judith Kipper, Codirectors, Middle East Studies Program) Middle East Program

Middle East Program Publications
Full Reports, Analyses, and Databases On-line

Note: These are large files, and may take some time to load

The United States, Japan, Europe and the Gulf

Terrorism and the Threat From Weapons of Mass Destruction in the Middle East

The Quadrennial Defense Review: the American Threat to the United States

Books and Major Publications
The Middle East Studies Program has issued several books on developments in the Middle East. These are available through the CSIS bookstore, or directly from Westview.

Iraq: Sanctions and Beyond
Anthony H. Cordesman and Ahmed Hashim

This volume provides analysis of the state of Iraq's security and of current Western policy toward the country in the wake of the Gulf War. It also examines the political, economic, and security impact of sanctions, Iraq's future role as an oil exporter, the U.S. policy of dual containment in relation to Iraq, and options for dealing with Iraq in the future.

February, 1997; 400 pages;
Hardbound: 0-8133-3235-4, $78.00
Paperback: 0-8133-3236, $35.00

Iran: Dilemmas of Dual Containment
Anthony H. Cordesman and Ahmed Hashim

This volume provides a detailed analysis of Iran's politics, economics, energy exports, security and military forces, as well as an examination of current Western policy toward Iran and its regional activities and support of Islamic extremists. The impact of sanctions and the U.S. policy of dual containment are examined in detail along with different strategies for dealing with Iran and Iran's efforts to acquire weapons of mass destruction.

January, 1997, 384 pages
Hardbound: 0-8133-3237-0, $75.00
Paperback: 0-8133-3238-9, $30.00

Bahrain, Oman, Qatar, and the UAE: Challenges of Security
Anthony H. Cordesman

This volume examines the changing economic and internal security challenges faced by the Gulf countries and the problems they face with Iran, Iraq, and other Gulf states. The special military and security needs of Bahrain, Oman, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates are analyzed here in detail, as are their growing demographic problems and export plans.

February, 1997; 288 pages
Hardbound: 0-8133-3239-7, $75.00,
Paperback: 0-8133-3240-0, $30.00

Saudi Arabia: Guarding the Desert Kingdom
Anthony H. Cordesman

Since the Gulf War, Saudi Arabia's tenuous security situation has been altered by an ongoing U.S. presence. This volume provides detailed analysis of the state of the Saudi economy and military forces, its growing internal security problems and the stability of its regime, and its reliability as an energy exporter.

January, 1997; 256 pages
Hardbound: 0-8133-3241-9, $65.00,
Paperback: 0-8133-3242-7, $27.00

Kuwait: Recovery and Security After the Gulf War
Anthony H. Cordesman

With the thoroughness that this recently spotlighted nation requires, this volume examines Kuwait's internal and external security situation after the turbulent days of the Gulf War and investigates continued Western involvement in its safekeeping. It also examines Kuwait's changing role as an energy exporter.

February 1997; 144 pages
Hardbound: 0-8133-3243-5, $60.00,
Paperback: 0-8133-3244-3, $23.00

U.S. Forces in the Middle East: Resources and Capabilities
Anthony H. Cordesman

This volume provides the first detailed analysis of the trends in U.S. contingency capabilities since the end of the Gulf War, the impact of the Bush administration's "Base Force" policy, and the Clinton administration's bottom-up review of current U.S. contingency capabilities. It examines U.S. capabilities in the Gulf through the year 2001, the impact of current force improvement plans and defense budgets, and the new problems created by the need for counter-proliferation strategy.

January, 1997: 128 pages
Hardbound: 0-8133-3245-1, $62.00,
Paperback: 0-8133-3246-x, $24.00

Perilous Prospects: The Peace-Process and the Arab-Israeli Military Balance
Anthony H. Cordesman

This book provides a detailed analysis of the delicate and dangerous balance of power in the Middle East. It provides a comprehensive account of the military and security concerns arising out of the Israeli-Palestinian peace process and the recent assassination of Prime Minister Rabin. Cordesman considers a number of possible futures for the region, and their effects on the peace process, ranging the outbreak of a new Intifada, to war between Israel and Syria over the Golan Heights. It also provides an analysis of the internal security requirements of both Israel and a new Palestinian state, which are the key to any lasting settlement.

May, 1996: 336 pages
Hardbound: 0-8133-2939-6, $60.00,
Paperback: 0-8133-3074-2, $25.00

The Gulf War: Lessons of Modern War, Volume IV
Anthony H. Cordesman and Abraham R. Wagner

This new volume in the acclaimed: "Lessons of Modern War" series provides what must be considered the definitive study of the Gulf War. The authors draw careful conclusions based on extensive research from a wide variety of sources, including newly declassified documents, official military reports, interviews: field research in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and southern Iraq: and Anthony Cordesman's own firsthand observations of the unfolding battle.

The book examines in unprecedented detail the efforts of all members of the coalition, not just the United States. The authors are careful to distinguish between the general lessons about warfare that can be drawn from the Gulf War and those that are unique to this conflict. The many lessons presented in this book cover the whole range of political, strategic, tactical, technical, and human elements of this conflict.

The authors' analysis is based on the dynamic interaction of all these factors. The central lesson is that this highly complex web of human and technological developments has resulted in a new "military revolution" of profound significance for the history of modern war. The Gulf War explodes many myths and is essential reading for anyone concerned about the new, but still dangerous, world in which we live in.

February, 1996: 1048 pages
Hardbound: 0-8133-8601-2, $98.00.

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94  The War Room / 9/11 Material & Research / Re: ANSER Institute for Homeland Security post-911 plans before 911 happened EXPOSED on: December 02, 2010, 03:33:44 am
Quote
Terrorism and Weapons of Mass Destruction in the Middle East

It should be stressed that the risks of terrorism using weapons of mass destruction are now largely theoretical. There are few actual indicators of Middle Eastern terrorist activity involving weapons of mass destruction. A few crude devices have been detected using explosives and chemical agents (grenades with a small canister of mustard gas). The Iranian Republic Guards, which are a key source of Iranian support to extremists, do operate many of Iran's chemical and biological weapons and missiles. Highly political elements of Iraq's armed forces, intelligence branches, and military procurement offices have purchased dual-use items or managed missile and WMD programs. There have been some scattered efforts by extremist movements to examine biological technology, and some crude efforts to modify insecticides, and poison fruit and vegetable exports. However, there have been no "Dr. Ben Nos" and "Professor Abu Moriarities", and there only have been hints that states are considering direct or proxy support of terrorism and unconventional warfare using weapons of mass destruction.

At the same time, the question arises as to whether Middle Eastern states can rely on effective strategic warning or a reactive approach to this problem. Most new terrorist groups get at least one "free ride" or attack before their existence and/or true character is detected. An effective "super terrorist" would also have a number of major advantages over any state or conventional enemy. Virtually any means of delivery could be used. The weapon would not have to be stable, reliable, or safe This would allow the use of chemical weapons that would not be safe to militarize, and even infectious biological agents. Damage effects could be highly unpredictable since the objective would often be terror, and not predictable tactical and/or strategic effects.

Delayed effects and prolonged contamination would often be desirable. Martyrdom and/or lack of attribution would sometimes be acceptable. States supporting proxy efforts could afford to work slowly and indirectly -- potentially preserving a high degree of deniability. Massive civilian casualties would often be desirable and many terrorist movements could act without fear of retaliation or any retribution greater than for a minor act of conventional terrorism that involved much more limited casualties.
Scenarios for Terrorism Using Weapons of Mass Destruction

Table Four provides a more tangible illustration of this point. It may seem to borrow from bad spy novels and science fiction, but it lists a group of scenarios that are at least technically possible and which illustrate the difference between the options open to terrorists and the carefully structured military efforts summarized in Table Three. These scenarios also illustrate the fact that terrorists do not need sophisticated military delivery systems, do not need highly lethal weapons, can use terrorism to pose existential threats, can use complex mixes of weapons of mass destruction, and can mix terrorism with elements of covert action and deniability.

Much again depends on the human dimension and the real-world difference between actual terrorist groups and the super-terrorist that would have to execute such scenarios. The danger of such scenarios is that they tend to overstate the willingness of terrorists to turn to extreme forms of terror, their willingness to risk dying, and their ability to undetectably engage in complex scenarios. They also depend heavily on the technical ability of terrorists to obtain and control weapons of mass destruction.

There are many hostile and extremist groups in the Middle East, and many governments that are led by proven risk-takers. What is less clear is that there are efficient and willing mass murders. The low-level efforts of Middle Eastern terrorists to use chemical and biological weapons that have been reported to date have not been particularly threatening. The principal case of actual acts of terrorism consists of a limited effort to poison Israeli agricultural exports, direct attempts at poisoning such as lacing champagne with cyanide at a Russian military New Year's day celebration in Takjikistan in January 1995, and PKK attempts to poison Turkish water supplies with cyanide.(Cool Such efforts make a sharp contrast to the massive national efforts Iran, Iraq, Libya, and Syria are making to acquire weapons of a mass destruction.

There is nothing admirable about Middle Eastern extremists of any persuasion, but an examination of the groups so far described in US reporting indicates that most are likely to set clear limits to their actions.(9) Regardless of how one may feel about Islamic extremists, secular terrorists, and radical governments like Iran and Libya, there is little evidence that any known group would easily turn to mass murder. While terrorists are often stereotyped as acting without moral limits and as willing martyrs, few actually conform with such stereotypes. Most "terrorists" are someone else's "freedom fighters" and operate within significant self or group-imposed constraints. Similarly, it is far from clear that most regional states are willing to take the kind of risks inherent in the scenarios postulated in Table Four.

At the same time, the steady escalation of car and truck bombings is a clear demonstration of the willingness to indulge in indiscriminate killing. The rhetoric and ideology of a number of terrorist movements like the Palestine Islamic Jihad and Combatant Partisans of God scarcely rules out mass murder. Most of the scenarios in Table Four are not all that complex, and only a few require large numbers of people and complex technical activity. The actions of Aum Shinrikyo illustrate the fact that it can be extremely difficult to characterize the level of extremism and capability for sophisticated action within a group until it has committed at least one action of terror. The cell structure used by the violent elements of most Middle Eastern extremist groups also tends to encourage the creation of compartmented groups with different and unpredictable commitments to violence while the loose and informal chain of contacts between extremist movements, known terrorist groups, and radical governments creates the possibly of random or unpredictable transfers of technology or weapons.

The institutionalization of state violence in the Middle East also creates a cumulative risk that opposition elements will be provoked into such forms of terrorism. The interactions between secular governmental repression and Islamic extremists, and the widespread repression of ethnic and religious groups create a climate which may lead to new forms of terrorism. Endemic conflicts like the Arab-Israeli struggle and Iranian-Iraqi search for hegemony in the Gulf are also breeding grounds for extremism in areas with growing technical sophistication.

Put differently, there are many possibilities and no clear probabilities. Table Four shows that there are many credible scenarios for the first regional "Dr. Ben No" or "Professor Abu Moriarity," but that there are no groups or nations that can be singled out. In fact, the cumulative probability of the first terrorist use of weapons of mass destruction being carried out by an unknown or unsuspected group is almost certainly higher than the cumulative probability it will be committed by some group already identified as a terrorist.

Quote
Terrorism and Biological Weapons

Biological weapons represent the most dangerous risk of a "paradigm shift" in Middle Eastern terrorism. They offer a far more devastating option than chemical weapons at costs far lower than those of both chemical and nuclear weapons. The costs of biological weapons are much smaller per casualty than those of any other form of terrorism. A UN report estimated in 1969 that military-scale biological weapons only cost $1 per square kilometer of coverage of a civilian target versus $600 for chemical weapons, $800 for nuclear, and $2,000 for advanced conventional weapons. While terrorists can scarcely expect similar production efficiencies and economies of scale, the savings would be roughly proportionate.(19)

Biological weapons do present the problem of uncertainty. They have never been used successfully in combat. At the same time, advances in commercial chemical and food processing equipment, and in biotechnology and medical equipment, are making it steadily easier and cheaper to produce effective weapons. Table Three shows that Middle Eastern states are steadily improving their capability to help proxies or conduct state terrorism, and the fact that at least some controls exist on chemical and nuclear technologies will tend to push terrorists towards biological weapons.

The technology of biological weapons also presents serious problems for detection and defense. One of the greatest problems in dealing with biological terrorism is that there is such a long list of possible weapons with so many different characteristics and effects. Table Seven illustrates this point by listing the biological weapons that might be used in the Middle East. It is clear from this table that a wide range of weapons exist, even though it only includes a selected list of traditional biological weapons and does not list any weapons which are contagious enough to create a self-sustaining epidemic.

Table Seven also does not portray the fact that biological weapons have radically different lethalities and area effects, and that the lethality of a weapon does not necessarily correspond to its area coverage. For example, if one assumes that a crop spraying helicopter, an RPV, or small aircraft released 50 kilograms of a Rift Valley Fever agent along a two kilometer line upwind of a city of around 500,000, the resulting agent would be heavy enough so that it would only reach about one kilometer downwind. It also would probably only kill 400, and incapacitate 35,000.

Consider, however, the following examples of area coverage and lethality using a wider range of weapons:

Agent                       Downwind Reach
                                 (kilometers)     Casualties
                                                        Dead     Incapacitated
Rift Valley Fever                1                  400        35,000
Tick-Borne Encephelistis     1                   9,500     35,000
Typhus                            5                 19,000     85,000
Brucellosis                       10                  500       100,000
Q Fever                           20+                150       125,000
Tularemia                       20+               30,000     125,000
Anthrax                          20++            95,000      125,000

Quote
In theory, a terrorist could credibly produce and use any of these weapons -- particularly if a state granted the terrorist group sanctuary, a secure facility, and/or state support. US studies and exercises have shown that the open literature and commercial equipment is adequate for such purposes -- particularly if the agent does not have to be stored in a stable form or weaponized.

The terrorist would also have the advantage that laboratory or pilot scale production of 50-500 liters of agent would be adequate for many types of terrorist attacks, and would involve far less detectable purchases of equipment and production efforts than commercial scale production of weapons using equipment with a capacity of over 500 liters. While there some guidelines of identifying dual-use biological equipment and related technology, there also are literally hundreds of suppliers scattered all over the world, and existing guidelines emphasize large scale or highly specialized equipment that terrorists either would not need or could buy with little fear of detection using different covers and suppliers.(21)

The need for a special facility would vary sharply according to the agent used. Anthrax and Botulin, for example, could be produced safely in a comparatively unsophisticated level 2 facility with only limited special containment equipment. A terrorist might also use a university or small company laboratory as a cover to produce a more pathogenic agent, or accept the risk of relatively low levels of protection against accident. Both approaches would be less detectable than the level 3 or level 4 production in a secure military facility that a government might insist upon.

A wide range of different fermentation equipment might be used, and standard commercial fermenters could be adapted for either batch or continuous fermentation. Anthrax, for example, might be produced on a one batch process from a commercial fermenter, and the facility might then be abandoned. Some of the largest fermenters are used for the production of microbial products for animal feeds. Controls are only beginning to be applied to the international sale of type cultures and most such controls offer little real security. A number of organisms can also be isolated from the environment in the Middle East, stolen or traded, or obtained in exchanges from a variety of laboratories other than type culture centers. The technology and equipment for genetic engineering is becoming commercially available, and a terrorist might lease such facilities in Europe or the US.(22)

A terrorist might also steal a virus from a government facility. Such facilities sometimes offer immediate access to very dangerous agents. For example, an Ebola virus incident occurred by accident in Reston Virginia in December 1989. Fortunately, the Ebola turned out to be a strain which was only fatal to monkeys. However, there is no guarantee that a targeted attack on a medical research facility would not give a terrorist access to a far more lethal weapon. Ebola outbreaks involving human beings have a history of 53% to 92% mortality, and there are at least five other viruses with similar lethality that might be stolen or cultured to produce a weapon.(23)

Once again, however, such potential threats must be placed in a real-world context. It must be stressed that are few cases where biological terrorist activity has been attempted, and none which make it possible to know whether a terrorist can actually achieve high lethalities. There are also significant technical difficulties in weaponizing biological agents to achieve high casualties. It is difficult for terrorists to develop dry agents that can be scattered in the air, kill through inhalation, and which have just the right size and weight to ensure both proper concentration and proper lethality. Effective weapons use droplets smaller than 10 microns, and the effectiveness of most weapons is measured in terms of the number of infectious units that can be released of 1-5 micron size. The production of lethal agents also usually requires a significant amount of equipment and time, although the processing equipment involved is becoming steadily cheaper. The only way to be certain of lethality is through experimentation with live subjects -- although this might be done with limited risk of detection by "mini-attacks" on selected individuals.

The question also arises as to how many people real-world terrorists are willing to kill with what risks. A terrorist or "freedom fighter" attacking a regime is unlikely to use biological agents that end up attacking an entire people. Terrorists willing to attack enemy military targets and regimes may be willing to kill some civilians but may not be willing to indulge in mass murder. At the same time, there are a number of key enclave targets in the Middle East.

Israel, for example, has expelled many of its Palestinian workers and regularly closes its borders. An attack on Tel Aviv and many of Israel's coastal cities might involve Israeli Arabs, but a terrorist might find this to be an acceptable price to pay. Similarly, isolated exercises and reserve mobilization areas might be targeted from well outside normal perimeter defenses. US military enclaves in Saudi Arabia are another example of such a target as are key forces securing the regime, like the Saudi National Guard. Key districts of a Middle Eastern city may form an enclave target like the royal residences and embassy quarter of Riyadh. Isolated Egyptian and Algerian military and security force casernes are other examples of such targets, as are foreign compounds, oil facilities, etc. So are ethnic and sectarian areas where the geographic divisions in the population are clear enough so that an attack could be containable. This might actually ease the problems terrorists face in deploying weapons with particles small enough to be efficient aerosols. A large particle with predictable limits to its area coverage might prove to be an advantage.

One thing is clear. If terrorists are successful in producing or obtaining a highly lethal biological agent, the payload involved could be so small that it would be easy to deliver much larger amounts than the 50 kilograms discussed in Table Seven, or to deliver a mix of agents with radically different effects and treatments and do so in a relatively small delivery system. Many agents listed would be equally effective if scattered from a ship, from a truck, or off the top of several tall buildings. The US Army, for example, has tested the scattering of Anthrax like particles from a ship off of Atlantic City, on commuters in Grand Central station, from the back of trains, and in a covert attack on Egland Air Base. All four simulated attacks were conducted without any questions or challenges, and gathering of particles from test subjects showed that they would have had high lethality.

Line source delivery does not require an aircraft or platform detectable by radar, and the urban sprawl of cities like Tel Aviv and Cairo now means that sufficient high rise buildings exist so that a terrorist could select three or four buildings, take a suitcase or trunk to the roof, release the agent an optimal distance from the main area of attack and leave. Alternatively, a wet agent and nebulizer/fogger could be moved to the roof disguised as cleaning equipment or some other service device. Further, security against this form of attack would not affect using a truck or vehicle in a more open area and no current detection device could prevent exposure. Even the new US Interim Biological Agent Detector (IBAD), for example, takes at least 45 minutes to detect and analyze an agent -- provided it is set to recognize the agent used. The first real field tests of this system are being funded in South Korea in 1997.(24)

Terrorists could also use much less ambitious forms of biological warfare. One American in Fairfax, Virginia, for example, exploited the fear of biological weapons by spraying liquid over his neighbors and telling them they had been infected with anthrax. While this case borders on the absurd, a terrorist could cause a great deal more fear by using an actual agent in non-lethal amounts or inserting detectable amounts of agents into a water system and making the action public. While most agents are ineffective once sent through water purification systems, this fact is not known to most physicians and the announcement could cause considerable disruption. Similarly, agricultural exports can be disrupted by contamination of food with toxins or pathogenic agents (this was done with Chilean grape exports to the US). Medical and other widely used consumer goods could also be tampered with in the target country (done with Tylenol in the US, and threatened against Pepsi Cola).(25)

In short, the problems of detection, defense, and response would be even more difficult than in dealing with chemical weapons and the risk of a breakdown or collapse of national emergency and medical services would be much greater. Effective surveillance of known potential facilities would be extremely difficult for all of the Middle Eastern states with modern research and food processing facilities, and tracking all relevant imports would be almost impossible. Detection and warning systems would be even more prone to false alarms, the use of "cocktails," and gaps in coverage. Even effective systems would at best provide medical and emergency response teams with warning of the protection methods they should use and the need for immediate treatment. As a result, more might depend on the willingness of the terrorist to kill than on a Middle Eastern government's effort to detect and defend.

PLEASE READ THE FULL REPORT HERE:
http://web.archive.org/web/19970708152302/www.csis.org/mideast/terror.html
95  The War Room / 9/11 Material & Research / Re: ANSER Institute for Homeland Security post-911 plans before 911 happened EXPOSED on: December 02, 2010, 03:33:04 am
ANTHONY H. CORDESMAN

Senior Fellow and Codirector
Middle East Studies

Expertise: Middle East and South Asian security issues; national security; lessons of modern War; defense budgets; defense intelligence; military balance. Anthony Cordesman joined CSIS from Senator John McCain's office], where he served as assistant for national security. He is also an adjunct professor of national security studies at Georgetown University and a military analyst for ABC-TV. Mr. Cordesman was recently a Wilson Fellow at the Woodrow Wilson Center for Scholars at the Smithsonian. He has had numerous awards, including the Distinguished Service Medal and has previously held senior positions in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the State Department, the Department of Energy, and the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency. His overseas posts were on the U.S. delegation to NATO and as a director in the NATO International Staff, working on Middle Eastern security issues. Professor Cordesman has written and lectured extensively on the Middle East and the Gulf, the U.S. and Soviet military balance, U.S. forces and defense budgets, and the lessons of war. He has written many books, most recently, The Gulf War (Westview, 1995) and the Arab-Israeli Military Balance and the Middle East Peace Process (Westview, 1996). He has also written numerous magazine and newspaper articles and has often appeared on radio and television. He was formerly the international editor of the Armed Forces Journal and U.S. editor of Armed Forces (UK).


The following are excerpts from Cordesman's report.   Please read the full report at the link below.

Retrieved from:
http://web.archive.org/web/19970708152302/www.csis.org/mideast/terror.html

Terrorism and the Threat From
Weapons of Mass Destruction
in the Middle East

The Problem of Paradigm Shifts

Working Draft

Anthony H. Cordesman
Senior Fellow and Co-Director
Middle East Studies Program
October 22, 1996


EXCERPTS
The literature on terrorism tends to have an unfortunate ritual character. First, there are the "alarmists" who make every incident into a megatrend, every possible scenario into a cause for immediate action, every contact and liaison between extremists into a network, and every hostile political faction into a super-intelligent nest of demons. These "alarmists" are supported by "techno-alarmists" who exaggerate the ease of weaponizing and using new terrorist devices and the vulnerabilities of modern societies by several orders of magnitude. Finally, they are supported by the "totalitarian solutionists" who support the alarmists by advocating solutions that would force the restructuring of modern societies -- often in ways whose consequences would be worse than the real-world problem -- and who often advocate unproven and extremely expensive technologies.

This terrorizing approach to terrorism may well have begun with Aesop's fable about the "boy who cried wolf" -- the boy being the world's first counter-terrorist. The eventual triumph of the wolf may also have led to the first counter-terrorism conspiracy theorist. There are equally strong indications that many writers about terrorism trace their intellectual roots to the story of "Chicken Little," the first counter-terrorism expert to turn a minor incident into an announcement that the sky was falling.

In all seriousness, these tendencies to exaggerate the threat do much to explain why many politicians and officials tend to ignore warnings about terrorism. They also help explain why governments tend to work on the basis of bureaucratic momentum and focus on the terrorist threats they already know. The flood of warnings about possible threats, technologies, and vulnerabilities creates a "noise level" of potential demands that is impossible for governments to deal with. The end result is that bureaucracies often deal with possible threats by focusing on clich‚s like strengthening coordination, by sub-optimizing on solutions that can only deal with a narrow range of threats, and by focusing only on those types of threats that have already been proven to exist.

At the same time, any one who has spent any time working on the problems posed by terrorism is struck by the fact that even paranoids face real terrorists. It is impossible to ignore the growing vulnerability of modern society, and the fact that major risks do exist. Similarly, it is impossible to study the subject without being struck by the gap that exists between the past failure of most terrorists to go beyond routine acts of violence and relatively minor attempts to use new techniques and technologies and the potential damage more effective forms of terrorism could do.

Ridiculous as most novels and screenplays about super-terrorists may be, they conceal the same kernel of truth as exaggerated warnings from experts on counter-terrorism. The impact of terrorism is currently far more limited by the failure or unwillingness of terrorists to exploit new technologies and complex vulnerabilities than by the inherent difficulty in conducting much more lethal attacks. The problem is not a lack of credible means to an end, but rather the lack of a real-world "Dr. No" or "Professor Moriarity."
Weapons of Mass Destruction and the Problem of Paradigm Shifts

Even a real-world "Dr. No" or "Professor Moriarity," however, would normally have a limited impact. As long as the emergence of a "super terrorist" was tied to conventional means of attack, the resulting threat or damage would not have strategic importance. The cost and casualties of such attacks might be much higher than those of conventional terrorism, but they would not pose an existential threat to the state under attack or force that state to make dramatic changes in its policies.

This is why governments can normally accept the cost of taking a reactive approach to potential new terrorist threats. It may be unpleasant to face the fact that accepting moderate casualties as the result of a new form of terrorist activity is more cost-effective than attempting to prevent all new forms of terrorism. The fact is, however, that people do die and many die violently. Every activity in government -- whether it is counter-terrorism, road repair, or medical treatment -- involves a tacit or explicit acceptance of actuarial trade-offs in cost-effectiveness in which a government accepts the death of its citizens in order to save money, preserve personal freedom, or concentrate on higher priority problems. It is scarcely important to the dead whether they have been killed by government choices regarding counter-terrorism or the funding of kidney transplants, and killed as a result of deliberate bureaucratic choices or a decision to ignore the actuarial consequences of public policy.
Accepting "Unacceptable" Risks

Given these realities, scenarios dealing with "super terrorism" must be kept in careful perspective. It is possible to postulate relatively high levels of casualties from terrorism using conventional weapons and technologies. Exploding a jumbo jet, blowing up a crowded office building, destroying an isolated urban water supply, and destroying a key tunnel or bridge during peak traffic periods are typical cases in point. It is equally possible to postulate serious economic costs from new forms of terrorism like cyberterrorism and successful attacks on governmental data systems, national financial systems, and controls of key utility, energy processing and export facilities. Attacks on key leaders can destabilize or paralyze some governments, and attacks on religious or highly sensitive political symbols can trigger levels of political disorder and violence out of any proportion to the casualties and physical damage involved.

Nevertheless, it may be necessary to accept the cost of "unacceptable" risks. Bad as the consequences of such attacks may be, they will normally equate to the impact of the natural disasters that most societies can face and adapt to. Governments can afford to wait until they either must deal with an actual contingency, or have clear evidence and strategic warning of the need to make major shifts in their counter-terrorist activities.
Weapons of Mass Destruction and the "Paradigm Shift"

Weapons of mass destruction, however, present a different problem. Under many conditions, a single act of terrorism can kill thousands of people and/or induce levels of panic and political reaction that governments cannot easily deal with. Under some conditions, the use of weapons of mass destruction can pose an existential threat to the existing social and political structure of a small country -- particularly one where much of the population and governing elite is concentrated in a single urban area.

The comparative seriousness of these risks are illustrated in Table One, which summarizes the potential casualties resulting from the use of a weapon of mass destruction in an urban area similar to the capital or major urban center of most Middle Eastern countries.


Quote
The Problem of Terrorism and Unconventional Warfare

Existing and projected detection and control technologies, arms control proposals, and concepts for missile defense assume that the primary threats are organized states and that relatively large efforts must be used.

Conventional structures of deterrence assume identifiable and limited sets of opponents and similar values in dealing with issues like mutual destruction. Terrorist movements may be willing to take catastrophic risks, as may leaders who identify themselves with the state and/or see martyrdom as a valid alternative to victory.

War may not be between states or fought for limited strategic objectives. It may be a war of proxies or terrorists. It may be fought to destroy peoples or with minimal regard for collateral damage and risks.

The target of unconventional uses of weapons of mass destruction may not be military in the normal sense of the term. It may be a peace process, US commitment to the defense of a given region, a peacekeeping force, an election or ruling elite, or growing cooperation between formerly hostile groups.

Terrorist organizations have already attempted to use crude chemical weapons. The development and use of chemical and biological weapons is well within the capability of many extremist and terrorist movements, and states can transfer weapons or aid such movements indirectly or with plausible deniability.

Covert or unconventional delivery means may be preferable to both states and non-state organizations. Cargo ships, passenger aircraft, commercial vehicles, dhows, or commercial cargo shipments can all be used, and routed through multiple destinations. A well established series of covert transport and smuggling networks exist throughout the region. Biological weapons can be manufactured in situ.

The Marine Corps Barracks incident has already shown the potential value of "mass terrorism," as has the media impact of the Oklahoma City bombing and the disruptive effect of far more limited events like the suicide bombings by Hamas and the assassination of Yitzak Rabin.

Biological and chemical weapons present special problems because they can be used in so many ways. Chemical poisons have been used to contaminate Israeli fruit and Chilean food exports. Infectious biological agents could be used to mirror image local diseases, as well as agents with long gestation times. Persistent nerve agents could be used in subways, large buildings, shopping malls/bazaars, etc. to create both immediate casualties and long term risks. Mixes of biological and chemical agents could be used to defeat detection, protection gear or vaccines.

Arms control efforts assume large state efforts with detectable manufacturing and weaponization programs in peacetime. The development of a capability to suddenly manufacture several hundred biological and chemical weapons with little or no warning is well within the state of the art using nothing but commercial supplies and equipment, and much of the R&D effort could be conducted as civil or defensive research.

Unconventional and terrorist uses of weapons can involve the use of extremely high risk biological weapons transmitted by human carriers, commercial cargoes, etc.

The incentives for the unconventional use of weapons of mass destruction increase in proportion to the lack of parity in conventional weapons, the feelings of hopelessness of alienated or extremist groups, or the prospect of catastrophic defeat.

Similarly, the incentive for the unconventional use of weapons of mass destruction will increase in direct proportion to the perceived effectiveness of theater missile and other regular military defense systems.

Rogue operations will be a constant temptation for state intelligence groups, militant wings of extremist groups, revolutionary forces. etc.

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Weapons of Mass Destruction and the Middle East

Many of the previous comments apply to any region in the world, but the Middle East is not any region. It is a region with a unique level of violence and a well established history of terrorism. It is also a region where Table Three shows that a process of creeping proliferation is becoming heavily institutionalized in nations such as Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Libya, Syria, and Yemen.

The Middle East is also a region where the lines between state activity and terrorism have long been blurred. Admittedly, the term "terrorist state" has become little more than an irritating strategic clich‚, and there is no axiomatic correlation between state efforts at proliferation and terrorist access to weapons of mass destruction. At the same time, it would be naive to assume that states like Iran, Iraq, Libya, and Syria have no elements that would take the risk of supporting terrorists -- or "freedom fighters" -- that could be used as direct or indirect proxies and would never use the existence of such terrorists as covers for covert attacks.

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Israel
Delivery Systems
New IRBM/ICBM range high payload booster developed with South Africa.
Up to 50 "Jericho I" missiles deployed in shelters on mobile launchers with up to 400 miles range with a 2,200 pound payload, and with possible nuclear warhead storage nearby. Unverified claims that up to 100 missiles are deployed west of Jerusalem.
Jericho II missiles now deployed, and some were brought to readiness for firing during the Gulf War. These missiles seem to include a single stage follow-on to the Jericho I and a multistage longer range missile. The latter missile seems to have a range of up to 900 miles with a 2,200 pound payload, and may be a cooperative development with South Africa. (Extensive reporting of such cooperation was in the press during October 25 and 26, 1989).
Jericho II missile production facility at Be'er Yakov.
A major missile test took place on September 14, 1989. It was either a missile test or failure of Ofeq-2 satellite.
Work on development of TERCOM type smart warheads. Possible cruise missile guidance developments using GPS navigation systems.
F-15, F-16, F-4E, and Phantom 2000 fighter-bombers capable of long range refueling and of carrying nuclear and chemical bombs.
Lance missile launchers and 160 Lance missiles with 130 kilometers range.
MAR-290 rocket with 30 kilometers range believed to be deployed.
Popeye air-to-surface missile may have nuclear variant.
MAR-350 surface-to-surface missile with range of 56 miles and 735 lb. payload believed to have completed development or to be in early deployment.
Israel seeking super computers for Technion Institute (designing ballistic missile RVs), Hebrew University (may be engaged in hydrogen bomb research), and Israeli Military Industries (maker of "Jericho II" and Shavit booster).

Chemical Weapons
Reports that mustard and nerve gas production facility was established in 1982 in the restricted area in the Sinai near Dimona do not seem correct. May have some facilities. May have capacity to produce other gases. Probable stocks of bombs, rockets, and artillery.
Extensive laboratory research into gas warfare and defense.
Development of defensive systems includes Shalon Chemical Industries protection gear, Elbit Computer gas detectors, and Bezal R&D air crew protection system.
Extensive field exercises in chemical defense.
Gas masks stockpiled, and distributed to population with other civil defense instructions during Gulf War.
Warhead delivery capability for bombs, rockets, and missiles, but none now believed to be equipped with chemical agents.

Biological Weapons
Extensive research into weapons and defense.
Ready to quickly produce biological weapons, but no reports of active production effort.

Nuclear Weapons
Director of CIA indicated in May 1989 that Israel might be seeking to construct a thermonuclear weapon.
Estimates of numbers and types of weapons differ sharply.
At least a stockpile of 60-80 plutonium weapons. May have well over 100 nuclear weapons assemblies, with some weapons with yields over 100 Kilotons, and some with possible ER variants or variable yields.
Stockpile of up to 200-300 weapons is possible.
Possible facilities include production of weapons grade Plutonium at Dimona, nuclear weapons design facility at Soreq (south of Tel Aviv), missile test facility at Palmikim, nuclear armed missile storage facility at Kefar Zekharya, nuclear weapons assembly facility at Yodefat, and tactical nuclear weapons storage facility at Eilabun in eastern Galilee.

Missile Defenses
Patriot missiles with future PAC-3 upgrade to reflect lessons of the Gulf War.
Arrow 2 two-stage ATBM with slant intercept ranges at altitudes of 8-10 and 50 kilometers speeds of up to Mach 9, plus possible development of the Rafale AB-10 close in defense missile with ranges of 10-20 kilometers and speeds of up to Mach 4.5. Tadiran BM/C4I system and "Music" phased array radar. Israel plans to deploy two batteries of the Arrow to cover Israel, each with four launchers, to protect up to 85% of its population.(5)

Advanced Intelligence Systems
The Shavit I launched Israel's satellite payload on September 19, 1989. It used a three stage booster system capable of launching a 4,000 pound payload over 1,200 miles or a 2,000 pound payload over 1,800 miles.
Ofeq 2 launched in April, 1990 -- one day after Saddam Hussein threatened to destroy Israel with chemical weapons if it should attack Baghdad. Launched first intelligence satellite on April 5, 1995, covering Syria, Iran, and Iraq in orbit every 90 minutes.
The Ofeq 3 satellite is a 495 pound system launched using the Shavit launch rocket, and is believed to carry an imagery system. Its orbit passes over or near Damascus, Tehran, and Baghdad.(6)


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Iran

Delivery Systems
Has new long range North Korean Scuds - with ranges near 500 kilometers. May manufacture missiles in Iran in future, possibly as cooperative effort with Syria.
Probably has ordered North Korean No Dong missile which can carry nuclear and biological missile ranges of up to 900 kilometers. Can reach virtually any target in Gulf, Turkey, and Israel, although CIA now estimates deliveries will only begin in 1997-1999.(7)
Su-24 long-range strike fighters with range-payloads roughly equivalent to US F-111 and superior to older Soviet medium bombers.
Reports of North Korean delveries of 100 Scud Bs and 100 Scud C between 1990 and 1996.
Bought CSS-8 surface-to-surface missiles from China with ranges of 130-150 kilometers.
Used regular Scud extensively during Iran-Iraq War. Has 6-12 Scud launchers and up to 200 Scud B (R-17E) missiles with 230-310 KM range. Scud missiles were provided by Libya and North Korea.
May have placed order for PRC-made M-9 missile (280-620 kilometers range). More likely that PRC is giving assistance in missile R&D and production facilities.
Iranian made IRAN 130 rocket with 150+ kilometers range.
Iranian Oghab (Eagle) rocket with 40+ kilometers range.
New SSM with 125 mile range may be in production, but could be modified FROG.
F-4D/E fighter bombers with capability to carry extensive payloads to ranges of 450 miles.
Can modify HY-2 Silkworm missiles and SA-2 surface-to-air missiles to deliver weapons of mass destruction.
Large numbers of multiple rocket launchers and tube artillery for short range delivery of chemical weapons.
Experimenting in cruise missile development.

Chemical Weapons
At least two major research and production facilities.
India is assisting in the construction of a major new plant at Qazvim, near Tehran, to manufacture phosphorous pentasulfide, a major precursor for nerve gas. The plant is front by Meli Agrochemicals, and the program was negotiated by Dr. Mejid Tehrani Abbaspour, a chief security advisor to Rafsanjani.
Made limited use of chemical weapons at end of the Iran-Iraq War.
Began to create stockpiles of cyanide (cyanogen chloride), phosgene, and mustard gas weapons after 1985.
Include bombs and artillery.
Production of nerve gas weapons started no later than 1994.

Biological Weapons
Extensive laboratory and research capability.
Weapons effort documented as early as 1992.
Bioresearch effort sophisticated enough to produce biological weapons as lethal as small nuclear weapons.
Seems to have the production facilities to make dry storable weapons. This would allow it to develop suitable missile warheads and bombs and covert devices.
May be involved in active weapons production, but no evidence to date that this is the case.

Nuclear Weapons
In 1984, revived nuclear weapons program begun under Shah.
Received significant West German and Argentine corporate support in some aspects of nuclear technology during the Iran-Iraq War..
Limited transfers of centrifuge and other weapons related technology from PRC, possibly Pakistan.
Stockpiles of uranium and mines in Yazd area.
Seems to have attempted to buy fissile material from Khazakstan.
Russian agreement to build up to four reactors, beginning with a complex at Bushehr -- with two 1,000-1,200 megawatt reactors and two 465 megawatt reactors, and provide significant nuclear technology.
Chinese agreement to provide significant nuclear technology transfer and possible sale of two 300 megawatt pressurized water reactors.
No way to tell when current efforts will produce a weapon, and unclassified lists of potential facilities have little credibility. We simply do not know where Iran is developing its weapons. IAEA has found no indications of weapons effort, but found no efforts in Iraq in spring of 1990. IAEA only formally inspects Iran's small research reactors. Its visits to other Iranian sites are not thorough enough to confirm or deny whether Iran has such activities.
Timing of weapons acquisition depends heavily on whether Iran can buy fissile material -- if so it has the design capability and can produce weapons in 1-2 years -- or must develop the capability to process Plutonium or enrich Uranium -- in which case, it is likely to be 5-10 years.

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Iraq
Delivery Systems
Prior to the Gulf War, Iraq had extensive delivery systems incorporating long-range strike aircraft with refueling capabilities and several hundred regular and improved, longer-range Scud missiles, some with chemical warheads. These systems included:
Tu-16 and Tu-22 bombers.
MiG-29 fighters.
Mirage F-1, MiG-23BM, and Su-22 fighter attack aircraft.
A Scud force with a minimum of 819 missiles.
Extended range Al-Hussein Scud variants (600 kilometer range) extensively deployed throughout Iraq, and at three fixed sites in northern, western, and southern Iraq..
Developing Al-Abbas missiles (900 kilometer range) Al-Abbas which could reach targets in Iran, the Persian Gulf, Israel, Turkey, and Cyprus.
Long-range super guns with ranges of up to 600 kilometers.
Iraq also engaged in efforts aimed at developing the Tamuz liquid fuel led missile with a range of over 2,000 kilometers, and a solid fueled missile with a similar range. Clear evidence that at least one design was to have a nuclear warhead.
Iraq attempted to conceal a plant making missile engines from the UN inspectors. It only admitted this plant existed in 1995, raising new questions about how many of its missiles have been destroyed.
Iraq produced or assembled 80 Scud missiles it its own factories. Some 53 seem to have been unusable, but 10 are still unaccounted for.
Had designed work underway for a nuclear warhead for its long range missiles.
The Gulf War deprived Iraq of some of its MiG-29s, Mirage F-1s, MiG-23BMs, and Su-22s.
Since the end of the war, the UN inspection regime has also destroyed many of Iraq's long-range missiles. Iraq, however, maintains a significant delivery capability consisting of:
HY-2, SS-N-2, and C-601 cruise missiles, which are unaffected by UN cease-fire terms.
FROG-7 rockets with 70 kilometer ranges, also allowed under UN resolutions.
Multiple rocket launchers and tube artillery.
Several Scud launchers
Iraq claims to have manufactured only 80 missile assemblies, 53 of which were unusable.
UNSCOM claims that 10 are unaccounted for.
US experts believe Iraq may still have components for several dozen extended-range Scud missiles.
In addition, Iraq has admitted to:
Hiding its capability to manufacturing its own Scuds.
Developing an extended range variant of the FROG-7 called the Laith. The UN claims to have tagged all existing FROG-7s to prevent any extension of their range beyond the UN imposed limit of 150 kilometers for Iraqi missiles.
Experimenting with cruise missile technology and ballistic missile designs with ranges up to 3,000 kilometers.
Flight testing Al-Hussein missiles with chemical warheads in April 1990.
Developing biological warheads for the Al Hussein missile as part of Project 144 at Taji.
Initiating a research and development program for a nuclear warhead missile delivery system.
Successfully developing and testing a warhead separation system.
Indigenously developing, testing, and manufacturing advanced rocket engines to include liquid-propellant designs.
Conducting research into the development of Remotely Piloted Vehicles (RPVs) for the dissemination of biological agents.
Attempting to expand its Ababil-100 program designed to build surface-to-surface missiles with ranges beyond the permitted 100-150 kilometers.
Starting an indigenous 600 mm supergun design effort.
Starting additional long-range missile programs, with ranges of 900, 2000, and 3,000 kilometers. US and UN officials conclude further that:
Iraq is concentrating procurement efforts on rebuilding its ballistic missile program using a clandestine network of front companies to obtain the necessary materials and technology from European and Russian firms.
This equipment is then concealed and stockpiled for assembly concomitant with the end of the UN inspection regime.
The equipment clandestinely sought by Iraq includes advanced missile guidance components, such as accelerometers and gyroscopes, specialty metals, special machine tools, and a high-tech, French-made, million-dollar furnace designed to fabricate engine parts for missiles.
Jordan found that Iraq was smuggling missile components through Jordan in early December, 1995.
US satellite photographs reveal that Iraq has rebuilt its Al-Kindi missile research facility.
Iraq retains the technology it acquired before the war and evidence clearly indicates an ongoing research and development effort, in spite of the UN sanctions regime.
The fact that the agreement allows Iraq to continue producing and testing short range missiles (less than 150 kilometers range) has meant it can retain significant missile efforts.

Chemical Weapons
In revelations to the UN, Iraq admitted that, prior to the Gulf War, it:
Maintained large stockpiles of mustard gas, and the nerve agents Sarin and Tabun.
Produced binary Sarin filled artillery shells, 122 mm rockets, and aerial bombs.
Manufactured enough precursors to produce 490 tons of the nerve agent VX. These precursors included 65 tons of choline and 200 tons of phosphorous pentasulfide and di-isopropylamine Tested Ricin, a deadly nerve agent, for use in artillery shells.
Had three flight tests of long range Scuds with chemical warheads.
Had large VX production effort underway at the time of the Gulf War. The destruction of the related weapons and feedstocks has been claimed by Iraq, but not verified by UNSCOM The majority of Iraq's chemical agents were manufactured at a supposed pesticide plant located at Muthanna.
Various other production facilities were also used, including those at Salman Pak, Samara, and Habbiniyah. Though severely damaged during the war, the physical plant for many of these facilities has been rebuilt.
Iraq possessed the technology to produce a variety of other persistent and non-persistent agents.
The Gulf War and subsequent UN inspection regime may have largely eliminated these stockpiles and reduced production capability.
US experts believe Iraq has concealed significant stocks of precursors. It also appears to retain significant amounts of production equipment dispersed before, or during, Desert Storm and not recovered by the UN.
Iraq has developed basic chemical warhead designs for Scud missiles, rockets, bombs, and shells.
Iraq also has spray dispersal systems.
Iraq maintains extensive stocks of defensive equipment.
The UN maintains that Iraq is not currently producing chemical agents, but the UN is also concerned that Iraq has offered no evidence that it has destroyed its VX production capability and/or stockpile.
Further, Iraq retains the technology it acquired before the war and evidence clearly indicates an ongoing research and development effort, in spite of the UN sanctions regime.
Recent UNSCOM work confirms that Iraq did deploy gas-filled 155 mm artillery and 122 mm multiple rocket rounds into the rear areas of the KTO during the Gulf War.
These weapons had no special visible markings, and were often stored in the same area as conventional weapons.
Now has the technology to produce stable, highly lethal VX gas with long storage times.
Has developed improved binary weapons since the Gulf War.

Biological Weapons
Had highly compartmented "black" program with far tighter security regulations than chemical program.
Had 18 major sites for some aspect of biological weapons effort before the Gulf War. Most were non-descript and have no guards or visible indications they were a military facility.
The US targeted only one site during the Gulf War. It struck two sites, one for other reasons. It also struck at least two targets with no biological facilities that it misidentified.
Systematically lied about biological weapons effort until 1995. First stated that had small defensive efforts, but no offensive effort. In July, 1995, admitted had a major offensive effort. In October, 1995, finally admitted major weaponization effort.
Iraq has continued to lie about its biological weapons effort since October, 1995. It has claimed the effort is head by Dr. Taha, a woman who only headed a subordinate effort. It has not admitted to any help by foreign personnel or contractors. It has claimed to have destroyed its weapons, but the one site UNSCOM inspectors visited showed no signs of such destruction and was later said to be the wrong site. It has claimed only 50 people were employed full time, but the scale of the effort would have required several hundred.
The August 1995 defection of Lieutenant General Hussein Kamel Majid, formerly in charge of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction, revealed the extent of this biological weapons program. Reports indicate that Iraq tested at least 7 principal biological agents for use against humans.
Anthrax, Botulinum, and Aflatoxin known to be weaponized.
Looked at viruses, bacteria, and fungi. Examined the possibility of weaponizing Gas Gangrene and Mycotoxins. Some field trials were held of these agents.
Examined foot and mouth disease, haemorrhagic conjunctivitis virus, rotavirus, and camel pox virus.
Conducted research on a "wheat pathogen" and a Mycotoxin similar to "yellow rain" defoliant. The "wheat smut" was first produced at Al Salman, and then put in major production during 1987-1988 at a plant near Mosul. Iraq claims the program was abandoned.
The defection prompted Iraq to admit that it:
Imported 39 tons of growth media for biological agents obtained from three European firms. According to UNSCOM, 17 tons remains unaccounted for. Each ton can be used to produce 10 tons of bacteriological weapons.
Imported type cultures which can be modified to develop biological weapons from the US.
Had a laboratory- and industrial-scale capability to manufacture various biological agents including the bacteria which cause anthrax and botulism; aflatoxin, a naturally occurring carcinogen; clostridium perfringens, a gangrene-causing agent; the protein toxin ricin; tricothecene mycotoxins, such as T-2 and DAS; and an anti-wheat fungus known as wheat cover smut. Iraq also conducted research into the rotavirus, the camel pox virus and the virus which causes haemorrhagic conjunctivitis.
Created at least seven primary production facilities including the Sepp Institute at Muthanna, the Ghazi Research Institute at Amaria, the Daura Foot and Mouth Disease Institute, and facilities at Al-Hakim, Salman Pak Taji, and Fudaliyah. According to UNSCOM, weaponization occurred primarily at Muthanna through May, 1987 (largely Botulinum), and then moved to Al Salman.
(Anthrax). In March, 1988 a plant was open at Al Hakim, and in 1989 an Aflatoxin plant was set up at Fudaliyah.
Manufactured 6,000 liters of concentrated Botulinum toxin and 8,425 liters of anthrax at Al-Hakim during 1990; 5400 liters of concentrated Botulinum toxin at the Daura Foot and Mouth Disease Institute from November 1990 to January 15, 1991; 400 liters of concentrated Botulinum toxin at Taji; and 150 liters of concentrated anthrax at Salman Pak. Produced 1,850 liters of Aflatoxin in solution at Fudaliyah.
Produced 340 liters of concentrated clostridium perfringens, a gangrene-causing biological agent, beginning in August, 1990.
Produced 10 liters of concentrated Ricin at Al Salam. Claim abandoned work after tests failed. Had at least 79 civilian facilities capable of playing some role in biological weapons production still extent in 1995.
Took fermenters and other equipment from Kuwait to improve effort during the Gulf War.
Extensive weaponization program Had test site about 200 kilometers west of Baghdad, used animals in cages and tested artillery and rocket rounds against live targets at ranges up to 16 kilometers.
Armed 155 mm artillery shells and 122 mm rockets with biological agents.
Conducted field trials, weaponization tests, and live firings of 122 mm rockets armed with anthrax and Botulinum toxin from March 1988 to May 1990.
Tested ricin, a deadly protein toxin, for use in artillery shells.
Iraq produced at least 191 bombs and missile warheads with biological agents.
Developed and deployed 250 pound aluminum bombs coverage in fiberglass. Bombs were designed so they could be mounted on both Soviet and French-made aircraft. They were rigged with parachutes for low altitudes drops to allow efficient slow delivery and aircraft to fly under radar coverage.
Deployed at least 166 R-400 bombs with 85 liters of biological agents each during the Gulf War. Deployed them at two sites, One was near an abandoned runway where it could fly in aircraft, arm them quickly, and disperse with no prior indication of activity and no reason for the UN to target the runway.
Total production reached at least 19,000 liters of concentrated Botulinum (10,000 liters filled into munitions);
8,500 liters of concentrated Anthrax (6,500 liters filled into munitions); and 2,500 liters of concentrated Aflatoxin (1,850 liters filled into munitions).
Weaponized at least three biological agents for use in the Gulf War. The weaponization consisted of at least 100 bombs and 15 missile warheads loaded with Botulinum. There were at least 50 R-400 air-delivered bombs and 10 missile warheads loaded with anthrax; and 16 missile warheads loaded with Aflatoxin, a natural carcinogen. The warheads were designed for operability with the Al-Hussein Scud variant.
Developed and stored drops tanks ready for use for three aircraft or RPV s with the capability of dispersing 2,000 liters of anthrax. Development took place in December 1990. Claimed later that tests showed were ineffective.
Found, however, that Iraqi Mirages were given spray tanks to disperse biological agents. Held trials as late as January 13, 1991. The Mirages were chosen because they have large 2,200 liter belly tanks and could be refueled by air, giving them a long endurance and strike range.
The tanks had electric valves to allow the agent to be released and the system was tested by releasing simulated agent into desert areas with scattered petri dishes to detect the biological agent. UNSCOM has video tapes of the aircraft.
Project 144 at Taji produced at least 25 operational Al Hussein warheads. Ten of these were hidden deep in a railway tunnel, and 15 in holes dug in an unmanned hide site along the Tigris.
Equipped crop spraying helicopters for biological warfare and held exercises and tests simulating the spraying of anthrax spores. Biological weapons were only distinguished from regular weapons by a black stripe.
The UN claims that Iraq has offered no evidence to corroborate its claims that it destroyed its stockpile of biological agents after the Gulf War. Further, Iraq retains the technology it acquired before the war and evidence clearly indicates an ongoing research and development effort, in spite of the UN sanctions regime.
UN currently inspects 79 sites -- 5 used to make weapons before war; 5 vaccine or pharmaceutical sites; 35 research and university sites; thirteen breweries, distilleries, and dairies with dual-purpose capabilities; eight diagnostic laboratories.
Retains laboratory capability to manufacture various biological agents including the bacteria which cause anthrax, botulism, tularemia and typhoid.
Many additional civilian facilities capable of playing some role in biological weapons production.

Nuclear Weapons
Inspections by UN teams have found evidence of two successful weapons designs, a neutron initiator, explosives and triggering technology needed for production of bombs, plutonium processing technology, centrifuge technology, Calutron enrichment technology, and experiments with chemical separation technology.
Iraq used Calutron, centrifuges, plutonium processing, chemical defusion and foreign purchases to create new production capability after Israel destroyed most of Osiraq.
Iraq established a centrifuge enrichment system in Rashidya and conducted research into the nuclear fuel cycle to facilitate development of a nuclear device.
After invading Kuwait, Iraq attempted to accelerate its program to develop a nuclear weapon by using radioactive fuel from French and Russian-built reactors. It made a crash effort in September, 1990 to recover enriched fuel from its supposedly safe-guarded French and Russian reactors, with the goal of producing a nuclear weapon by April, 1991. The program was only halted after Coalition air raid destroyed key facilities on January 17, 1991.
Iraq conducted research into the production of a radiological weapon, which disperses lethal radioactive material without initiating a nuclear explosion.
Orders were given in 1987 to explore the use of radiological weapons for area denial in the Iran-Iraq War.
Three prototype bombs were detonated at test sites -- one as a ground level static test and two others were dropped from aircraft.
Iraq claims the results were disappointing and the project was shelved but has no records or evidence to prove this. UN teams have found and destroyed, or secured, new stockpiles of illegal enriched material, major production and R&D facilities, and equipment-- including Calutron enriching equipment. UNSCOM believes that Iraq's nuclear program has been largely disabled and remains incapacitated, but warns that Iraq retains substantial technology and establish a clandestine purchasing system in 1990 that it has used to import forbidden components since the Gulf War. Iraq still retains the technology developed before the Gulf War and US experts believe an ongoing research and development effort continues, in spite of the UN sanctions regime.
A substantial number of declared nuclear weapons components and research equipment has never been recovered. There is no reason to assume that Iraqi declarations were comprehensive.


Source: Prepared by Anthony H. Cordesman, Co-Director, Middle East Program, CSIS
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Combating Terrorism: In Search of a National Strategy


Testimony of Frank J. Cilluffo
Chairman, Committee on Combating Chemical,
Biological, Radiological and Nuclear Terrorism,

Homeland Defense Initiative
Center for Strategic & International Studies

Before the Subcommittee on National Security, Veterans Affairs and International Relations U.S. House Committee on Government Reform

27 March 2001

Chairman Shays, distinguished members of the committee, I appreciate the opportunity to appear before you today on a matter of critical importance to our nation's security, namely: the formulation of a national strategy to combat terrorism. In holding hearings on this issue, the Subcommittee - and indeed Congress as a whole - should be commended for its foresight in seizing the occasion to identify gaps and shortfalls in our current policies, practices, procedures, and programs. It is only with such an analysis in mind - that is, one that considers and appreciates what has worked, what has not worked, and what has not been adequately addressed - that we can go on to the next step of crafting an effective national counterterrorism strategy.

In considering how best to proceed on this front, we should not be afraid to wipe the slate clean and review the matter afresh. My contribution to this hearing will focus specifically on terrorism using chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) weapons - though, by and large, my comments will also be relevant to counterterrorism more generally.

When critically evaluating our current state of preparedness, it is important to adopt a balanced viewpoint - that is, a perspective which appreciates both how we far we have come already and just how far we have yet to go. In my view, it seems fair to conclude two things in this regard. First, federal, state, and local governments have made impressive strides to prepare for terrorism - specifically, terrorism using CBRN weapons. Second, and more unfortunately, the whole remains less than the sum of the parts. Let me explain.

The United States is now at a crossroads. While credit must be given where it is due, the time has come for cold-eyed assessment and evaluation, and the recognition that we do not presently have - but are in genuine need of - a comprehensive strategy for countering the threat of terrorism and the larger challenges of homeland defense. As things presently stand, however, there is neither assurance (via benchmarking) that we have a clear capital investment strategy nor a clearly defined end-state, let alone a clear sense of the requisite objectives to reach this goal. More generally, and even worse, without a national plan, we leave ourselves at risk.

Although there is no way to predict with certainty the threat to the homeland in the short-term or the long-term, it is widely accepted that unmatched U.S. power (cultural, diplomatic, economic and military) is likely to cause America's adversaries to favor "asymmetric" attacks against undefended targets over direct conventional military confrontations. Indeed, in a recent address to our NATO allies, Defense Secretary Rumsfeld specifically raised the issue of the proliferation of unconventional weapons and technologies to both state and non-state actors, and also flagged our concomitant vulnerability.

Against this background, military superiority in itself is no longer sufficient to ensure our safety. Instead, we need to go further by broadening our concept of national security planning so as to encompass CBRN counterterrorism.


After several years of activity in this arena, progress has been uneven. On the one hand, the past handful of years can be summed up in the phrase "long on nouns but short on verbs." On the other hand, there is still a substantial amount of good news that deserves to be told and built upon.

But pockets of real success, however significant, are not enough. We need to achieve progress across the board and in synergistic fashion, so that positive developments in one area feed further success - exponential, not just incremental success - in another.

Make no mistake, though. The dimensions of the challenge are enormous. The threat of CBRN terrorism by states and non-state actors presents unprecedented planning challenges to American government and society. Notably, no single federal agency owns this strategic mission completely. For the moment, however, many agencies are acting independently in what needs to be a coherent response.

And, importantly, a coherent response is not merely a goal that is out of reach. To the contrary, we now possess the requisite experience and knowledge for ascertaining the contours of a comprehensive strategy, a coherent response, and a future year program and budget to implement the strategy. It bears emphasizing here that strategy must be a precursor to budget. Put differently, dollar figures should only be attached to specific items after the rationale for those items has been carefully thought out as part of a larger, overarching framework for action.

Of course, none of this is to say that we have all the answers. Quite the opposite in fact. Indeed, our recommendations represent just one possible course of action among many, and it is for you, Congress, and the executive branch to decide jointly precisely which of these avenues, or combination thereof, should be pursued.

I would expect - and even hope - that my fellow witnesses (and the insights from the various commissions they represent) would differ with me when it comes to offering prescriptions in this area. After all, the real measure of success here, at least in my eyes, is whether our work has furthered public debate and raised questions that urgently need addressing. And that is something that I think we, taken collectively, have done.

In any case, my vision of a comprehensive counterterrorism strategy would incorporate a full spectrum of activities, from prevention and deterrence to retribution and prosecution to domestic response preparedness. All too often, these elements of strategy are treated in isolation. Such a strategy must incorporate both the marshaling of domestic resources and the engagement of international allies and assets. And it requires monitoring and measuring the effectiveness ("benchmarking") of the many programs that implement this strategy so as to lead to common standards, practices, and procedures.

In our (CSIS) report on CBRN terrorism, we set out a roadmap of near-term and long-term priorities for senior federal officials to marshal federal, state, local, private sector, and non-governmental resources in order to counter the terrorist threat. Our findings and recommendations speak not only to "the usual suspects" at each level of government but also to new actors, both public and private, that have taken on added salience in the current security environment. With your patience, I will elaborate upon the highlights of our blueprint, beginning with a clearer outline of the structure of our suggested national strategy.

In our view, a complete CBRN counterterrorism strategy involves both (1) preventing an attack from occurring (our first priority should always be to get there before the bomb goes off), which includes deterrence, non-proliferation, counter-proliferation and preemption, and (2) preparing federal, state, local, private sector and non-governmental capabilities to respond to an actual attack. In short, our counterterrorism capabilities and organizations must be strengthened, streamlined, and then synergized so that effective prevention will enhance domestic response preparedness and vice versa.

On the prevention side, a multifaceted strategy (encompassing the constituent elements just enumerated) is in order. The common thread underpinning all of these, however, is the need for a first-rate intelligence capability. More specifically, the breadth, depth and uncertainty of the terrorist threat demands significant investment, coordination and re-tooling of the intelligence process across the board for the pre-attack (warning), trans-attack (preemption) and post-attack ("whodunit") phases.

Our list of recommendations on the intelligence side is extensive. I will not reiterate that list here, though it should be noted that its scope is broad, including everything from enhancing our all-source intelligence and analytical capabilities to "tapping" the scientific and biomedical research communities for their applicable expertise.

Several of the steps that we recommend with a view towards strengthening the intelligence community may require significant changes to intelligence programs and budgets. And, since current intelligence needs exceed available dollars, investments in this area will have to be prioritized. While our report does not attach dollar figures to its recommendations, we do distinguish between first-, second-, and third-order priorities, with the implementation of first-order items being called for immediately (within 180 days).

Before turning to the response preparedness aspect of the equation, two further components of prevention merit comment, namely, non-proliferation and counter-proliferation. We need to think about ways to reassess arms control measures to limit proliferation of CBRN weapons and material. This cannot be monitored like a START agreement, but the United States should take the lead in building international support for multinational activities, while signaling the right to take action, including military actions, against violators.

In so doing, though, it must be kept in mind that traditional arms control measures - which assume large state efforts with detectable weapons production programs - may influence behavior but will be more effective vis-à-vis state-sponsors of terrorism than non-state actors. However, by focusing on state actors, we may also capture non-state actors swimming in their wake.

In the space that remains, I want to focus on domestic response preparedness because that is where the matter of effective organization figures most prominently. And, in my view, effective organization is the concept that not only lies at the very heart of a comprehensive national counterterrorism strategy but also underpins it - from start (meaning pre-event preventive, preemptive and preparedness measures), to finish (meaning post-event crisis and consequence management, and response).

In so far as domestic response preparedness is concerned, the traditional distinction currently operative - which draws an artificial line between crisis management and consequence management - is unworkable in practice. In fact, crisis and consequence management will occur simultaneously, and there will be no hand-off of the baton from the crisis managers (responsible for immediate response, and apprehension of perpetrators), to the consequence managers (responsible for treating mass casualties and restoring essential services). (The caveat, of course, is if we receive advance warning of an event or if the event is "fixed" (such as the presidential inauguration). In these instances, it will indeed be possible to draw a bright line between crisis and consequence management).

I think the "line" was originally intended only to bound certain generic types of activities, for example, crime scene evidence as opposed to searching for survivors. Sadly, it has been bent and distorted over time to support one or another agency's fight for leadership.

This generally artificial distinction, however, distracts us from the more important underlying question of whether we are properly organized in terms of domestic response preparedness and writ large (in terms of meeting the CBRN terrorism challenge as a whole). Are our existing structures, policies, and institutions adequate? CBRN terrorism is inherently a cross-cutting issue, but, to date, the government is organized vertically.

Our report treats the critical - and wide-ranging - question of organization by breaking it down into three different sub-themes: (1) effective organization at the federal level; (2) effective organization at the state and local levels, and the federal interface; and (3) effective organization of the medical, public health, and human services communities. Let me deal with each of these in turn.

First, and in some ways, most importantly, the federal government must lead by example by organizing itself effectively to meet the terrorist challenge. But what does this mean? While I can offer only a barebones outline in the allotted space, such a "skeleton" should still prove useful as a basis for discussion on how to proceed.

As a starting point, effective CBRN counterterrorism requires the coordinated participation of many federal agencies. To ensure that departmental and agency programs, when amalgamated, constitute an integrated and coherent plan, we need a high-level official to serve as the epicenter or "belly button" for our efforts. And that position needs to marry together three criteria: authority, accountability and resources.

One way to achieve this end, and the course that we have suggested, is to establish a Senate-confirmed position of Assistant to the President or Vice-President for Combating Terrorism. The Assistant for Combating Terrorism would be responsible for issuing an annual national counterterrorism strategy and plan. This strategy would serve as the basis to recommend the overall level of counterterrorism spending and how that money should be allocated among the various departments and agencies of the federal government with counterterrorism responsibilities. To be explicit, it is the budgetary role of the Assistant that, at one and the same time, gives the position "teeth" and generates the desirability of, if not the outright need for, Senate-confirmation. Put another way, unless we obey the golden rule (he or she with the gold rules), the Assistant (the counterterrorism coordinator) will not have sway over departmental and agency policies.

Accordingly, we recommend that the Assistant be granted limited direction over departments' and agencies' budgets in the form of certification and passback authority. In practice, this means that the Assistant would possess the authority to certify future-year plans, program budgets and annual budgets. And, where budgetary requests fail to adhere to the President's overall policy and budgetary agenda, the requests would be passed back to departments and agencies for revision. Correlatively, we suggest that the Assistant be given authority to decrement up to ten percent of any "counterterrorism-support" program that does not meet the requirements of the nation's counterterrorism plan.

In conjunction with the above, each federal department and agency with a counterterrorism mission should develop five-year plans and long-term research, development, testing, and evaluation (RDT&E) plans. These would then be coordinated by the Assistant to the President or Vice-President, who should support a holistic effort to use technology to improve domestic response preparedness and tie RDT&E efforts to practical deployment plans.

Before turning to the congressional side of the equation, some comment upon the lead federal agency issue is needed - though I will confine myself to only two points here. First, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) has not been resourced to accomplish its mission as the lead agency for consequence management. Long neglected, FEMA has recently been revitalized and has distinguished itself when responding to a series of natural disasters affecting the continental United States. However, FEMA still lacks the administrative apparatus, logistical tail, and personnel necessary to take a lead role in domestic terrorism response.

Against this background, two steps should be taken. First, we need to empower FEMA. Keeping in mind that FEMA is already well integrated into activity at the state and local levels in the context of natural disasters, we should fully exploit and build on that pre-existing foundation so that FEMA is in a position to credibly assume the lead role in domestic response preparedness. With the latter aim in mind, it will not, of course, be enough simply to draw on channels and capabilities that are already in place. On the contrary, this will have to be accompanied by capitalization of FEMA, including in the form of personnel as well as administrative and logistical support.

Second, and relatedly, FEMA should be assigned the training mission for consequence management. As things presently stand, however, it is the Justice Department (and, before it, the Defense Department) that has been charged with the task. Yet, it makes little sense to hive off training for consequence management with the state and local levels from the very organization that would handle consequence management.

An additional point that I wish to make on the lead federal agency issue concerns the role of the Department of Defense (DOD). DOD's role in domestic preparedness for terrorism involving CBRN weapons has been the subject of much debate. The debate arises due to the concern that only DOD possesses the resources necessary (including transportation assets, basic supplies, communications facilities and so on) to manage the consequences of a CBRN terrorist attack. But, even the mere specter or suggestion of a lead military role raises vocal and widespread opposition on the basis of civil liberties and the damage that could potentially be caused to them if DOD were assigned the lead.

Realistically, only DOD even comes close to having the manpower and resources necessary for high-consequence (yet low-likelihood) events such as a catastrophic CBRN terrorist attack on the homeland. However, this is very different from saying that DOD should always be in charge of domestic response efforts. To the contrary, DOD should be restricted to a supporting role in domestic crises. There are several reasons for this. I will not enumerate all of them but it does bear noting that, beyond intent, perceptions are important; and the clear perception, as well as the reality, of civilian control of the military should be preserved. Indeed, this is particularly true in times of domestic crisis.

That being said, however, it is wholly appropriate for the DOD to maintain a supporting role (i.e., a role in support of the lead federal agency) in domestic crises - though we must grant the Department the resources necessary to assume this responsibility. (If the President decides to turn to the cupboard, we most certainly do not want him to find that it is bare). Perhaps it is just me, but I find it difficult to believe that, in a time of genuine crisis, the American people would take issue with what color uniform the men and women who are saving lives happen to be wearing. Even more starkly, the President should never be in the position of having to step up to the podium and say to the American people what he could have, should have, or would have done - but did not because of.... Explaining to the American people the inside the beltway debates just will not stand up if such an event occurs.

Turning now to Congress, the broad span of counterterrorism programs across federal departments and agencies is mirrored in the broad span of authority to review counterterrorism programs across a host of Congressional committees and subcommittees. Without coordination between these bodies, Members may not know how their votes on a particular budgetary item or policy will affect the overall counterterrorism program.

To remedy this, we recommend the creation of a congressional counterterrorism working group. This group should be chaired and vice-chaired by Members of the majority and minority parties, respectively, and should include senior staff from the various authorization and appropriation committees with jurisdiction over federal agencies concerned with terrorism, crisis and consequence management, and homeland defense. By means of a monthly report, the working group would keep the relevant committees apprised of ongoing legislative initiatives and funding issues in Congress.

Finally, on the international front, and as part of a comprehensive national strategy, we should seek to fortify our own defense by strengthening the consequence management capabilities of our partners worldwide. This should occur through the Department of State's Coordinator for Counterterrorism, who manages the Foreign Emergency Support Team (FEST). The United States Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID) and the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) should be operationally linked to this capacity in the case of bioterrorism and infectious disease emergencies.

Moving now to the state and local levels, efforts to develop a unified and effective domestic response capability are complicated by the fact that emergency responders - who will be first on the scene of a "no warning" event - are state and local (not federal) personnel. The myriad state and local jurisdictions result in "a crazy-quilt" of doctrine, legal authority, equipment, and training for emergency responders. Consider, for example, that there are an estimated 32,000 fire departments across the United States.

Furthermore, for each local and even state jurisdiction (except for prominent targets such as New York City and Washington, D.C.), the probability of an attack in that jurisdiction is perceived to be so low and the cost of training and equipping emergency responders so high that many regions may not be prepared for a high-end terrorist attack involving CBRN weapons. Indeed, federal, state, and local exercises have revealed serious deficiencies in preparedness, including severe lack of coordination.

Yet, if a terrorist event occurs, state and local emergency personnel (police, firefighters, medics) will be the initial responders and time will be of the essence in turning victims into patients. For this reason, state and local governments must continue to develop and expand their capabilities to respond to a terrorist attack, and more resources must reach the state and local level for management and execution. At the same time, however, limited resources dictate that there must be optimal transition from "ordinary" (e.g., heart attacks) to "extraordinary" events.

More broadly, federal, state, and local governments must allocate between and among one another, responsibilities and resources for domestic preparedness. Equally, federal, state, and local governments must also make a concerted effort to ensure the harmonization and interoperability of equipment and incident command structures.

Let me be clear: nothing short of the very essence of federalism is at stake here. Without working relationships of trust and mutual confidence between and among all of the actors that are key to our counterterrorism effort, our national strategy to prevent and prepare for terrorism will be defeated. We must, therefore, build bridges - not only between federal authorities and state and local officials (what we have termed "the federal interface") but also between federal entities, as well as from one state to another.

How best to construct those bridges is, of course, the subject of much debate. A good start, however, would consist, in part, of the following. In addition to expanding training and exercising of state and local emergency responders, we should create a central clearinghouse to synthesize lessons learned from exercises. Doing so, would permit better allocation/appropriation of resources, and would facilitate the emergence nationwide of (common) best practices.


As a corollary, and with a view to formulating and implementing national standards and baselines, we should develop matrices for judging the effectiveness of training (no metric currently exists), and we should strive to make exercises more realistic, robust, and useful (e.g., increase the number of "no-notice" exercises). The value of training and exercising must not be underestimated. Hopefully, it will be the closest we get to the real thing. And if not, it allows us to make the big mistakes on the practice field and not on Main Street, USA.

Successful "bridge-building" requires combining both a bottom-up and a top-down perspective. On the one hand, and for (a bottom-up) example, state and local emergency responders need to have a seat at the intergovernmental table so as to ensure seamless coordination between state and local emergency personnel and later-arriving federal assets. On the other hand, and as a further (top-down) example, federal expertise and capabilities - particularly that which resides in the Department of Defense - are vital and should be shared. Further to this point, the Defense Department has traditionally provided assistance to federal, state, and local officials in neutralizing, dismantling, and disposing of explosive ordinance, as well as radiological, biological, and chemical materials.

Bridge-building also involves reaching out to relative newcomers to the national security field - in particular, the medical, public health, and human services communities - who need to be integrated into our counterterrorist effort and our (comprehensive) national strategy. These actors are especially critical to bioterrorism preparedness as they would play a prominent role in detection and containment of such an event. Here again, however, the need for effective organization stands in marked contrast to the present state of affairs, which is sub-optimal at best.

Put bluntly, the biomedical, public health, and human services communities are under-equipped for a biological attack and for infectious disease in general. Indeed, the core capacity for public health and medical care needs to be greatly enhanced with respect to detection and treatment of infectious disease. Accordingly, our recommendations on the public health/medical side read like a veritable "laundry list."

Even without reiterating our full complement of suggestions, the extensive and sweeping character of what is needed is evident in but a partial list: capitalize the public health structure; develop a national bioterrorism surveillance capacity; develop rapid and more reliable diagnostic capabilities and systems; develop a comprehensive strategy for assuring surge capacity for healthcare; streamline national pharmaceutical stockpiling efforts; and increase research and development for new pharmaceuticals, vaccines and antidotes.

To these (and other) ends, the biomedical, public health and human services communities must work in greater partnership with each other - and must coordinate more effectively with the larger national security community. Instead, however, we currently have a series of "disconnects."

Within the federal government alone, for instance, we have yet to develop (for counterterrorist purposes) smooth channels of inter-agency and intra-agency coordination and cooperation across and within federal agencies that have worked little together in the past (such as the intelligence community and the Departments of Defense, Justice, Health and Human Services, Agriculture, and Energy).

Further, and with specific regard to the private sector, the expertise of the commercial pharmaceutical and biotechnology sectors has yet to be genuinely leveraged. This situation must change, and new funding strategies must be explored to "incentivize" engagement of the private sector as a whole in the task of preparedness planning and capability-building.

It is plain that the challenges that we face are great. But I am confident that we, as a nation, are up to the task. Let me close, now, on a more personal note.

Last year, on 19 April, I had the privilege to attend the dedication of the Oklahoma City National Memorial on the five-year anniversary of the attack on the Alfred P. Murrah Building. Just last week, I was in Oklahoma City and had the opportunity to visit the National Memorial Center, an interactive museum, depicting the story of the largest terrorist attack on U.S. soil. I highly recommend visiting the museum, it was profoundly moving. I was reminded that America is not immune from terrorism and that, if such an act of violence can occur in America's heartland, it can occur anywhere. I was reminded that the consequences of such acts of violence are very real -- in this case 168 innocent lives were lost, and many many more affected. I was reminded that those first on the scene of such a tragedy are "ordinary" citizens, followed up by local emergency responders such as firemen, EMTs, and policemen, all of whom are overwhelmed - except for the desire to save lives.

I was touched by the experience, of course - but, most of all, I left proud. Proud of Oklahoma's elected officials, proud of the survivors, proud of the many thousands of men, women, and children who lost family members, friends, and neighbors. And perhaps most importantly, I left proud to be an American. For, what I saw was the community's strength and resilience. I believe this indomitable spirit; this refusal to be cowed; the will of the people to return, to rebuild, to heal, and to prosper best represents America's attitude towards terrorism.

Put differently, at the end of the day, it all comes down to leadership. And policy without resources is merely rhetoric. But, if the President and Congress set their sights on the careful crafting and comprehensive implementation of a national counterterrorism strategy, it will happen. However, this process of marshaling our wherewithal so as to turn concepts into capabilities will require not only vision but also political will.

Despite the magnitude of the challenge, there is no doubt that we can rise to it. Undoubtedly, this hearing represents a forceful and important step in the direction of a national plan. And it is my hope that our report will provide President Bush and Congress with some of the critical insights necessary to execute a comprehensive counterterrorism plan. Developing, implementing, and sustaining such a strategy and plan must be one of the highest priorities for U.S. national security.

Thank you for the opportunity to share my thoughts with you today. I would be pleased to try to answer any questions you may have.
97  The War Room / 9/11 Material & Research / Re: ANSER Institute for Homeland Security post-911 plans before 911 happened EXPOSED on: December 02, 2010, 03:30:57 am
Dr. Ruth David was one of the traitors to the Constitution that Anti_Illuminati exposed:
http://www.google.com/search?q=%22ruth+david%22+site%3Aforum.prisonplanet.com



FULL TEXT:

Homeland Defense:
Assumptions First, Strategy Second
Col. Randall J. Larsen, USAF-Ret. and Dr. Ruth A. David
October 2000

Previously published in the Fall 2000 edition of Strategic Review


Randy Larsen is the Director of Homeland Defense at ANSER, a not-for-profit public service research institute. He also serves as the editor-in-chief of the Journal of Homeland Defense. He has written and lectured on the subjects of biological warfare, asymmetric warfare, and homeland defense while serving as the Chairman, Department of Military Strategy and Operations, at the National War College. He has an M.A. in National Security Studies from the Naval Post Graduate School and served as research fellow at the Mathew B. Ridgeway Center for International Security at the University of Pittsburgh.


Dr. Ruth David is the President and CEO of ANSER. From 1995 to 1998 she was the Deputy Director for Science and Technology at the Central Intelligence Agency. She had earlier spent 20 years at Sandia National Laboratories. She serves on the Defense Science Board, the National Security Agency Advisory Board, the National Research Council Naval Studies Board, the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Technical Advisory Board, the Securities and Exchange Commission Advisory Committee on Technology, and the DOE Nonproliferation and National Security Advisory Committee. She has a Ph.D. from Stanford University in electrical engineering

 Each new administration brings with it a set of assumptions on national security issues. These assumptions provide the framework for strategy, policy, and resource allocation. It is not clear today what assumptions a new administration will bring to Washington regarding homeland defense. With the possible exception of national missile defense, neither major party has provided details on what may become the most important national security issue America will face in the coming decade.

     What is homeland defense? The North American Air Defense Command (NORAD) states, "Homeland defense is the core of military service." [1] Yet the Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms does not define or even mention the term.[2] Ask foreign military officers what the mission of their nations' armed forces is and most will say, "To defend our homeland." That is not the answer one would hear from most American military officers.

     Homeland defense is something NORAD has been doing since its inception in 1958. But for most other military units and other federal, state and local government organizations, homeland defense is a new concept. That is precisely why homeland defense is arguably the most misunderstood term in the national security vernacular. In fact, there is a raging debate among and within federal agencies whether this mission should be called "homeland defense," "domestic security," or "civil support."

     The new administration can quickly correct this problem. It should state that homeland defense is neither an isolationist, "fortress America" concept, nor a mission primarily focused on managing the consequences of a catastrophic attack on U.S. soil. In the 21st century, the term "homeland defense" is nearly synonymous with how we used the term "national security" in the latter half of the 20th century. There are just two primary differences.

    * Nation-states, large and small, and some non-state actors have the capability to bring a new form of warfare to the American homeland.
    * New types of weapons, primarily cyber and biological, are immune to our superpower status and traditional defenses.

     The homeland defense mission in the 21st century should not be confused with counter-terrorism in the 20th century. This is not about someone driving a truck bomb into the parking garage of a large government building. That would be a tragedy, but homeland defense is about serious threats to national security. This new type of threat, unfortunately, will prove to be the most significant change in national security since the invention of the hydrogen bomb.

     Since the report of the National Defense Panel in 1997 first mentioned the emerging threat to the American homeland, numerous workshops, conferences, and commissions, plus several GAO reports, have identified the requirement to develop a strategy for homeland defense.[3] This should be a high priority for the next President. However, America is not ready to develop this strategy, because there is no consensus on the key assumptions that would underpin any such strategy. Wide disagreements exist on the nature of the threat, the probability of attack, the roles and missions of the federal, state, and local governments, and the role of the private sector. This diversity of opinions and assumptions has added value to the discussion.

     Homeland defense is a new concept for America, requiring new ideas, new partnerships, and vigorous debate. But the true value of these discussions will not be realized until the new administration moves from the academic phase ("we need another commission") to the action phase (statement of assumptions, strategy and policy development, and resource allocation). The first step in the action phase should be a Presidential White Paper on homeland defense. It should contain five key assumptions:

   1.  The threat of asymmetric attacks on the American homeland, either by nation-states or terrorist organizations, is real and will increase during the next decade.
   2. The federal government will play the leading role in deterrence, prevention, preemption, attribution, and retaliation.
   3. State assets (which include the National Guard) and local governments will play the lead role in first response and consequence management.
   4. The private sector will play a critical operational role, particularly in defending against and responding to cyber and biological attacks.
   5. An integrated warning/information/coordination system is required to ensure effective use of resources to mitigate effects during and after large-scale attacks or campaigns.


Whether a new administration agrees with the foregoing assumptions and definitions is far less important than the act of clearly communicating its own assumptions. The homeland defense mission needs a leader, and only one person can provide that leadership. He will take office on January 20, 2001.

The Five Assumptions

     1. The threat of asymmetric attacks on the American homeland, either by nation-states or terrorist organizations, is real and will increase during the next decade. Some disparagingly use the terms "alarmists," "doomsayers," and "worst-case scenarios" to downplay the threat. Yet respected national security leaders such as Secretary of Defense William Cohen, General Colin Powell, and former Senator Sam Nunn tell us otherwise.[4] The fact is that no one can tell us when an event will happen, but a growing field of national security experts and analysts agree that the possibility of occurrence is increasing. Instead of focusing on predictions that we all know are fallacious, a more reliable model is used by Dr. Lani Kass at the National War College:

Vulnerabilities x Intentions x Capabilities = Threat.[5]

     Like any nation, America is vulnerable to nuclear weapons, but due to our rapidly increasing dependence on information technology, America is even more vulnerable than most countries to cyber attacks. We all witnessed what two junior college dropouts can do when they launched the "I Love You" virus on the Internet. In April 1998 a few dozen U.S. government employees assumed the role of the enemy in an exercise called "Eligible Receiver." They quickly demonstrated their ability to shut down America's power grid and seriously disrupt U.S. military forces in the Pacific.[6] Imagine what damage a 21st century adversary could inflict with a team of computer engineers trained in America's best universities.

 

     Biological warfare is another area of increasing concern. Our vulnerability to a large-scale biological event was demonstrated during the winter of 1918-19 when 600,000 Americans died of influenza (naturally occurring) and once again during the recent "Topoff" exercise, in which a simulated attack with pneumonic plague overwhelmed medical facilities in central Colorado.[7] Our friendly neighbors to the north and south, the two oceans that have protected our eastern and western flanks, and our strong military no longer provide protection from threats that modern technologies make possible. America's vulnerability to asymmetric attacks is real and significant.

     While the technology has changed, motivations and intentions have not. More than 2,500 years ago Plato said, "Only the dead have seen the end of war." Unfortunately, these words are just as true today. During the coming decades, nation-states and non-governmental actors will perceive "justifiable reason" to challenge America's leadership. Their intentions may be Clausewitzian in nature - attack our center of gravity (the once impregnable homeland) to obtain political goals - or they may seek only to punish us and reveal our Achilles' heel. Some say no one would dare attack our homeland for fear of massive retaliation. But many threats, especially biological and cyber attacks, can unfold anonymously.

     In this equation, capabilities represent the critical factor that is changing most. The growing cyber threat is obvious. Less obvious is the growing biological threat. While most agree that the chances of a small terrorist group developing a bioweapon capable of killing millions is remote, the fact remains that certain scenarios do pose a serious threat to the American homeland.

 

     One of the problems with the Gilmore Commission's examination of the threat from weapons of mass destruction was that it focused exclusively on current terrorist activities and excluded nation-states as well as future capabilities. Furthermore, it used Aum Shinrikyo as an example of a well-funded terrorist organization that failed to successfully weaponize anthrax, and concluded that BW was not a serious threat.[8] This was the wrong "lesson learned." The cult members charged with developing a biological warfare program were physicians and chemists. There were no microbiologists working on Aum Shinrikyo's biological warfare program. That is why they failed. The fact remains, most nation-states and many well-funded terrorist organizations have the capability to produce sophisticated biological weapons. Future developments, including genetically engineered biological warfare agents, will likely be a reality within the next decade.[9]

     Others, such as Jonathon Tucker, a highly respected scholar from the Monterey Institute of International Studies, "proved" that BW would not likely be a threat because so many attempts have failed in the past. However, he admits that if a terrorist organization obtained high-quality BW agents from the Soviet Union's program (which produced such agents by the tons), it would pose a serious threat.[10] Supposedly, these massive stockpiles have been destroyed. But "seed stock" of these agents (plague, smallpox, Marburg, anthrax, and many others) remain. So do the scientists who produced these weapons. Most are unpaid and underemployed, a fact well known by our adversaries.[11]

     The question is not whether the vast majority of terrorist groups are capable of launching a large-scale BW attack on the American homeland. They are not. The question is: Is it reasonable to assume that no terrorist organization or hostile nation-state could develop the capability to launch a successful BW attack on the American homeland? (How can one assume that, when the U.S., USSR, UK and several other nations built highly sophisticated biological weapons programs with 1960s technology?) The paramount assumption that must come from the new administration is that the current, and more important, the near-term vulnerability x intentions x capability equation produces a serious threat to the American homeland.

     2. The federal government will play the leading role in deterrence, prevention, preemption, attribution and retaliation. One of the most hotly debated issues of homeland defense is, "Who is in charge?" The answer is both simple and complex. According to the U.S. Constitution,[12] the President is in charge of defending the homeland; however, outside the Oval Office the responsibility, authority and accountability become obscure and include federal officials, governors, mayors, fire chiefs, and many others. The Gilmore, Hart-Rudman, and Bremer Commissions have examined these issues, but none has resolved them. A Presidential White Paper should assign responsibility based on mission areas. The federal government should have the lead for deterrence, prevention, preemption, attribution, and retaliation. Of the five assumptions in this paper, this will be the least controversial, with the possible exception of attribution.

     Attribution is a relatively new concept in national security. For the past 200 years, weapons have primarily used blast, heat, and fragmentation. As John Train noted in the Summer issue of Strategic Review, bullets, bombs, and missiles generally come with return addresses. Cyber and biological attacks may not. Swift, accurate forensics is critical to proper response - retaliation - and that may play an important role in preventing or deterring further attacks. To ensure swift, accurate forensics, the federal government will need total cooperation from local officials. America cannot afford a repeat of the confusion that occurred following President Kennedy's assassination about who was in charge of the investigation - the Dallas police, the sheriff's department, the FBI, or the Secret Service.[13] The factors that caused confusion between these law enforcement agencies have been corrected by Congressional legislation. In the case of homeland defense, we must not wait for another confused and uncoordinated response before correcting the problem. America must avoid what former Deputy Secretary of Defense John Hamre refers to as "the fault lines" between federal, state, and local areas of responsibility.

     3. State assets (which include the National Guard) and local governments will play the lead role in first response and consequence management. With the exception of unique skills, such as the Department of Energy's ability to handle nuclear weapons and DoD's technical support following a chemical attack, the vast majority of first response assets will come from state and local governments - particularly following the mass disruption and consequences of a major biological or cyber attack. The federal government can play an important role in providing standards for equipment and training; however, these first responders (fire fighters, police officers and Hazardous Material Teams) will clearly be under the command and control of state and local officials.

     These resources serve the nation best when they can be loaned to other jurisdictions as needed. The National Guard, commanded by state governors (except when federalized), is a superb example of how national standards can be of great benefit to state assets. Moreover, National Guard units often respond in other states following natural disasters. Their national standardization greatly facilitates effective integration with units in other states - a capability needed when responding to weapons that self-replicate like computer and biological viruses.

 

     4. The private sector will play a critical operational role, particularly in defending against and responding to cyber and biological attacks. The need for a new partnership among the federal, state, and local governments for homeland defense is a new concept that some will have difficulty accepting. Even more difficult, perhaps, will be the necessity to include the private sector in this partnership. But it must be included, because most of this nation's critical information infrastructure is privately owned.

 

     The most difficult challenge in forming this new partnership will not be to get the public sector to cooperate; rather, the problem will be the private sector. Today, corporations, large and small, are less-than-enthusiastic partners. Many corporations admit privately they are fearful of reporting computer crimes and attacks because investigations could:

    * disrupt their business (when the FBI confiscates their storage devices to complete its investigation),
    * provide self-incriminating information to law enforcement officials, and/or
    * compromise highly sensitive proprietary information.[14
]

     A critical element in this new partnership will be to require that cyber crimes and cyber attacks be investigated by a new type of organization, or under laws that provide immunity and ironclad security guarantees. The new organization would more closely resemble NASA or a not-for-profit corporation than it would the Department of Justice. Several information-sharing and policy-coordination partnerships exist between the private and public sectors, but the "law enforcement" problems must be resolved.[15] There should be no hesitation to report computer crimes and computer attacks to the appropriate authorities. Rapid reporting - and response - is required to protect America's critical information infrastructures.

     Another important element in the private-public partnership will be the role the private sector plays in responding to a biological attack, either man-made or naturally occurring. The initial indication of such an attack will likely come from doctors, nurses and medical technicians. Today there exists a mature partnership between the public and private health communities.[16] What is lacking is a real-time epidemiological reporting system that will allow rapid analysis and coordination on a national level. This shortfall was apparent in the "Topoff" exercise.

     5. An integrated warning/information/coordination system is required to ensure effective use of resources to mitigate effects during and after large-scale attacks or campaigns. When Ray Downey, Chief of the Fire Department of New York City Special Operations Unit, was asked what system was available to provide information from one municipality to another about the details of an asymmetric campaign on the American homeland, his answer was "None.”[17] In other words, if attacks were underway in cities on the West Coast, no system presently exists to pass critical information to first responders in New York or other cities.

     Nowhere was this more obvious than during a February 2000 tabletop exercise by the Deputy Secretary of Defense, the Attorney General, and their senior staffs. This exercise began with the explosion of a 10-kiloton nuclear weapon in downtown Cincinnati. The lack of an integrated information and coordination system was obvious throughout the exercise.[18] This failure was also witnessed during the "Topoff" exercise in May 2000, in which simultaneous chemical, biological, and radiological attacks occurred in three widely separated metropolitan areas.

    One of the most important roles the federal government should play in preparing America's capability to respond to a serious attack on our homeland is to build an integrated warning/information/coordination system. It would provide the means to monitor activities from a national level. Is the massive disruption of power on the West Coast part of a coordinated attack, or is the simultaneous outbreak of West Nile Virus on the East Coast just a coincidence? How about an oil pipeline break just outside of Houston coupled with air traffic control disruptions in Chicago? Today, the capability for rapid, integrated analysis of such events does not exist.

 

     This system would also provide first responders across the country with "controlled or classified" information during crises, and it would be a great management and coordination tool for governors and FEMA to use, especially in responding to crises that involve bordering states.


     The $40 million federal coordination center built for Y2K has, unfortunately, been dismantled. It would have served as an excellent prototype for a nationwide homeland defense warning/information/coordination system. It should be located in the nation's capital, but also have regional centers for redundancy (backup) and to provide more liaison with state emergency management centers.

 
Recommendations

     During its first 100 days in office, the newly elected administration should issue a White Paper on homeland defense. It should include the aforementioned assumptions and perhaps a few others. One important issue not mentioned above is the problem with reliable warning from the intelligence community. Counting Soviet missile silos, ships and armored divisions was a much easier challenge than it will be to discover biological weapons laboratories and cyber warfare capabilities. The prospect of a bolt out of the blue attack will increase in the 21st century, both against our deployed military forces and on our homeland.

     It is therefore not prudent to assume the threat away just because it has not happened yet. The Vulnerabilities x Intentions x Capabilities = Threat equation provides the requirement for action by the new President. America will face new threats in the 21st century. They may not be imminent, but they are real, and the threat of attack on the American homeland will increase with time. The time to prepare is now, not the day after. The President is the only individual with the clout needed to lead the federal effort and to coordinate and cajole support from state, local, and private organizations. He is the only leader capable of bringing about the structural and organizational changes required. The preparation does not require new big-ticket items, but it does require new thinking, new concepts, and strong leadership.

     As a young nation we defended our homeland with coastal batteries. During the Cold War we defended our homeland from aerial attack with NORAD. Which frontier and what means will protect the American homeland in the 21st century? America expects the next President to provide the answers.
98  The War Room / 9/11 Material & Research / Re: ANSER Institute for Homeland Security post-911 plans before 911 happened EXPOSED on: December 02, 2010, 03:30:26 am
ASK THE EXPERTS:

Q.    What is the actual, U.S. Government definition of "homeland defense"?
(Lt Col USAFRet Louis Walter ; TRW Systems )
02 May 01

A.    Homeland Security Analyst Mark DeMier; ANSER

There is no single, coordinated US Government definition of "homeland defense." It does not even appear in the Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms (Joint Publication 1-02). However, consensus does seem to be emerging on the term "Homeland Security." The Quadrennial Defense Review team, for instance, defines this as the prevention, deterrence, and preemption of, and defense against, aggression targeted at U.S. territory, sovereignty, population, and infrastructure as well as the management of the consequences of such aggression and other domestic emergencies. Homeland Defense -- the prevention, preemption, and deterrence of, and defense against, direct attacks aimed at U.S. territory, population, and infrastructure -- and Civil Support -- DoD support to civilian authorities for natural and manmade domestic emergencies, civil disturbances, and designated law enforcement efforts -- are then defined as subset of Homeland Security.

Similarly, the United States Commission on National Security/21st Century (Hart-Rudman Commission) has called for the creation of a National Homeland Security Agency prompting the introduction of at least two bills in the House of Representatives -- HR 1158 (Thornbery, TX) and HR 1158 (Skelton, MO) -- which, if enacted, would likely codify the term Homeland Security.





Q.     How did "homeland" become part of the name that de
(Why "homeland"? Mark Bower ; Air National Guard )
30 Mar 01

A.    Homeland Security Analyst John Wohlfarth; ANSER

While the concept of “defending the homeland” is an idea dating back through the better part of human history, the term “homeland defense” only recently entered the lexicon of public discourse. To the best of our knowledge, the first American use of the term homeland defense was made in a report submitted by the National Defense Panel in 1997. The report, titled Transforming Defense: National Security in the 21st Century, argued that this new focus on guarding the homeland was essential, due to the changing nature of threats against the American people. They warn,

“…The proliferation of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons and their delivery means will pose a serious threat to our homeland and our forces overseas. Information systems, the vital arteries of the modern political, economic, and social infrastructures, will undoubtedly be targets as well.” (Transforming Defense: Executive Summary)

This document was followed by a series of additional studies, including analyses from the Hart-Rudman Commission, the Gilmore Commission and papers from the Center for Strategic and International Studies. Additionally, some organizations and individuals like Congressman Ike Skelton have adopted variations of the phrase, like “Homeland Security”.

But regardless of the permutations, the idea of the “homeland” has in a brief few years, become almost universally accepted by policy makers and first responders as the most direct method for discussing physical dangers to the American people and US infrastructure.
99  The War Room / 9/11 Material & Research / Re: ANSER Institute for Homeland Security post-911 plans before 911 happened EXPOSED on: December 02, 2010, 03:30:01 am
Hey peasant, if you break a federal law, you will spend 5-20 years in a Supermax-type prison where you are locked in a concrete cage for 23 hours a day.  If you are a treasonous piece of scum, federal laws are just "formalities" that get in the way of the mission to bring down America for the banksters.


FULL TEXT

The Myth of Posse Comitatus

MAJ Craig T. Trebilcock, USAR
October 2000




MAJ Craig Trebilcock is a member of the Judge Advocate General's (JAG) Corps in the U.S. Army Reserve. MAJ Trebilcock is assigned as an operational law attorney with the 153d LSO in Norristown, PA. His area of specialization includes the laws applicable to U.S. forces engaged in operations in both the U.S. and abroad. MAJ Trebilcock is a graduate of the University of Michigan (A.B. with high honors, 1982) and the University of Michigan Law School (J.D. 1985). His military education includes the JAG Basic Course (1988), JAG Advanced Course (1992), U.S. Army Command and General Staff College (1997), and the U.S. Navy War College International Relations Seminar (2000). MAJ Trebilcock is a civilian immigration attorney with the firm of Barley, Snyder, Senft, & Cohen in York, PA.


The Posse Comitatus Act has been traditionally viewed as a major barrier to the use of U.S. military forces in planning for homeland defense.[1] In fact, many in uniform believe the Act precludes the use of U.S. military assets in domestic security operations in any but the most extraordinary situations. As is often the case, reality bears little resemblance to the myth for homeland defense planners. Through a gradual erosion of the Act's prohibitions over the past twenty years, Posse Comitatus today is more of a procedural formality than an actual impediment to the use of U.S. military forces in homeland defense.

HISTORY

     The original 1878 Posse Comitatus Act was indeed passed with the intent of removing the Army from domestic law enforcement. "Posse Comitatus" means the "power of the county," reflecting the inherent power of the old west county sheriff to call upon a posse of able-bodied men to supplement law enforcement assets and thereby maintain the peace. Following the Civil War the Army had been used extensively throughout the South to maintain civil order, to enforce the policies of the reconstruction era, and to ensure that any lingering sentiments of rebellion were crushed. However, in reaching those goals the Army necessarily became involved in traditional police roles and in enforcing politically volatile reconstruction era policies. The stationing of federal troops at political events and polling places under the justification of maintaining domestic order became of increasing concern to Congress, which felt that the Army was becoming politicized and straying from its original national defense mission. The Posse Comitatus Act was passed to remove the Army from civilian law enforcement and to return it to its role of defending the borders of the United States.

APPLICATION OF THE ACT

     In order to understand the extent to which the Act has relevance today, it is important to understand to whom the Act applies and under what circumstances. The statutory language of the Act does not apply to all U.S. military forces.[2] While the Act has applicability to the Army, Air Force, Navy, and Marines, including their reserve components, it does not have any applicability to the Coast Guard, nor to the huge military manpower resources of the National Guard.[3] The National Guard, when it is operating in its state status pursuant to Title 13 of the U.S. Code is not subject to the prohibitions on civilian law enforcement. (Federal military forces operate pursuant to Title 10 of the U.S. Code.) In fact one of the express missions of the Guard is to preserve the laws of the state during times of emergency when regular law enforcement assets prove inadequate. It is only when federalized pursuant to an exercise of Presidential authority that the Guard becomes subject to the limitations of the Posse Comitatus Act.

     The intent of the Act is to prevent the military forces of the U.S. from becoming a national police force or guardia civil. Accordingly, the act prohibits the use of the military to "execute the laws".[4],[5] Execution of the laws is perceived to be a civilian police function, which includes the arrest and detention of criminal suspects, search and seizure activities, restriction of civilian movement through the use of blockades or checkpoints, gathering evidence for use in court, and the use of undercover personnel in civilian drug enforcement activities.[6]

     The federal courts have had several opportunities to define what behavior by military personnel in support of civilian law enforcement is permissible under the Act. The test applied by the courts has been to determine whether the role of military personnel in the law enforcement operation was "passive" or "active". Active participation in civilian law enforcement, such as making arrests, is deemed to be a violation of the Act, while taking a "passive" supporting role is not.[7] Passive support has often taken the form of logistical support to civilian police agencies. Recognizing that the military possesses unique equipment and uniquely trained personnel, the courts have held that providing supplies, equipment, training, facilities, and certain types of intelligence information does not violate the Act. Military personnel may also be involved in the planning of law enforcement operations, as long as the actual arrest of suspects and seizure of evidence is carried out by civilian law enforcement personnel.[8]

     The Posse Comitatus act was passed in the Nineteenth Century, when the distinction between criminal law enforcement and defense of the national borders was clearer. Today, with the advent of technology that permits weapons of mass destruction to be transported by a single person, the line between police functions and national security concerns has blurred.[9] As a matter of policy Western nations have labeled terrorists as "criminals" to be prosecuted under domestic criminal laws. Consistent with this, the Department of Justice has been charged as the lead U.S. agency for combating terrorism. However, all terrorist acts are not planned and executed by non-state actors. Terrorism refers to illegal attacks on civilians and other non-military targets by either state or non-state actors. This new type of threat requires a reassessment of traditional military roles and missions along with an examination of the relevance and benefit of the Posse Comitatus Act.

EROSION OF THE ACT

     While the Act appears to prohibit active participation in law enforcement by the military, the reality in application has become quite different. The Act is a statutory creation, not a constitutional prohibition. Accordingly, the Act can and has been repeatedly circumvented by subsequent legislation. Since 1980, the Congress and President have significantly eroded the prohibitions of the Act in order to meet a variety of law enforcement challenges.

     One of the most controversial uses of the military during the past twenty years has been to involve the Navy and Air Force in the "war on drugs." Recognizing the inability of civilian law enforcement agencies to interdict the smuggling of drugs into the US by air and sea, the Reagan Administration directed the Department of Defense to utilize naval and air assets to reach out beyond the borders of the US to preempt drug smuggling. This use of the military in anti-drug law enforcement was approved by Congress in 10 USC sections 371-381. This same legislation permitted the use of military forces in other traditional civilian areas - immigration control and tariff enforcement.

     The use of the military in opposing drug smuggling and illegal immigration was a significant step away from the Act's central tenet that there was no proper role for the military in the direct enforcement of the laws. The legislative history explains that this new policy is consistent with the Posse Comitatus Act, by explaining that this involvement still amounted to an indirect and logistical support of civilian law enforcement and not a direct enforcement role.[10]

     The weakness of the passive versus direct involvement analysis in law enforcement was most graphically demonstrated in the tragic 1999 shooting of a shepherd by marines who had been assigned a smuggling/illegal immigration border interdiction mission in the remote Southwest. An investigation revealed that for some inexplicable reason the 16 year old shepherd fired his weapon in the direction of the marines. Return fire then killed the boy. This tragedy demonstrates that when armed troops are placed in a position where they are being asked to counter potential criminal activity that it is a mere semantic exercise to argue that the military is being used in a passive support role. The fact that armed military troops were being placed into a position with the mere possibility that they would have to use force to subdue civilian criminal activity reflects a significant policy shift by the executive branch away from the Posse Comitatus doctrine.

     Congress has also approved the use of the military in civilian law enforcement matters through the Civil Disturbance Statutes. 10 U.S.C. sections 331-334. These provisions permit the President to use military personnel to enforce civilian laws where the State has requested assistance or is unable to protect civil rights and property. In case of civil disturbance the President must first give an order for the offenders to disperse. If the order is not obeyed, the President may then authorize military forces to make arrests and restore order. The scope of the Civil Disturbance Statutes is sufficiently broad to encompass civil disturbance resulting from terrorist or other criminal activity. It was these provisions that were relied upon to restore order using active duty Army personnel following the Los Angeles "race riots" of the early 1990s.

     Federal military personnel may also be used pursuant to the Stafford Act, 42 USC section 5121 in times of natural disaster upon request from a state Governor. In such an instance the Stafford Act permits the President to declare a major disaster and send in military forces on an emergency basis for up to ten days to preserve life and property. While the Stafford Act authority is still subject to the active versus passive analysis noted above, it still represents a significant exception to the Posse Comitatus Act's underlying principle that the military is not a domestic police force auxiliary.

     An infrequently cited constitutional power of the President provides an even broader basis for the President to use military forces in the context of homeland defense. This is the President's inherent right and duty to preserve federal functions. In the past this has been recognized to authorize the President to preserve the freedom of navigable waterways and to put down armed insurrection. However, with the expansion of federal government authority during this century into many areas formerly reserved to the States (transportation, commerce, education, civil rights) there is likewise an argument that the President's power to preserve these "federal" functions has expanded as well. The use of federal troops in the South during the 1960s to preserve access to educational institutions for blacks was an exercise of this constitutional Presidential authority.

     In the past five years the erosion of the Posse Comitatus Act has continued with the increasingly common use of military forces as security for essentially civilian events. During the 1996 Olympics in Atlanta over ten thousand US troops were deployed under the partial rationale that they were present to deter terrorism. The use of active duty military forces in a traditional police security role did not raise any serious questions under the Act, even though these troops would clearly have been in the middle of a massive law enforcement emergency had a large-scale terrorist incident occurred. The only questions of propriety arose when many of these troops were then employed as bus drivers or to maintain playing fields. This led to a momentary, but passing expression of displeasure from Congress.[11]

HOMELAND DEFENSE

     The Posse Comitatus act was passed in an era when the threat to national security came primarily from the standing armies and navies of foreign powers. Today the equation for national defense and security has changed significantly. With the fall of the Soviet Union our attention has been diverted from the threat of aggression by massed armies crossing the plains of Europe to the security of our own soil against biological/chemical terrorism. Rather than focusing upon the threat of massed Russian ICBMs as our most imminent threat, we are increasingly more aware of the destructive potential of new forms of asymmetric warfare. For instance, the U.S. Office of Technology Assessment states that 100 kilograms of dry powdered anthrax released under ideal meteorological conditions could kill up to three million people in a city the size of Washington DC.[12] The chemical warfare attacks carried out by Japanese terrorists in the subways of Tokyo during the 90s heightened our sense of vulnerability. The Oklahoma City bombing and the unsuccessful attempt to topple the World Trade Center have our domestic security planners looking inward for threats against the soil of the United States from small, but technologically advanced threats of highly motivated terrorists. What legal bar does the Posse Comitatus Act present today to using the military to prevent and/or respond to a biological or chemical attack upon the soil of the United States? In view of the erosion of the Posse Comitatus Act in the past twenty years, the answer is "not much."

     The erosion of the Posse Comitatus Act through Congressional legislation and Executive policy has left a hollow shell in place of a law that formerly was a real limitation on the military's role in civilian law enforcement and security issues. The plethora of constitutional and statutory exceptions to the Act provides the executive branch with a menu of options under which they can justify the use of military forces to combat domestic terrorism. Whether an act of terrorism is classified as a civil disturbance under 10 USC 331-334 or whether the President relies upon his constitutional power to preserve federal functions, it is difficult to think of a domestic terrorism scenario of sizable scale under which the use of the military could not be lawfully justified in view of the Act's erosion. The Act is no longer a realistic bar to direct military involvement in counter-terrorism planning and operations. It is low legal hurdle that can be easily cleared through invocation of the appropriate legal justification, either before or after the fact.[13]

CONCLUSION

     Is the Posse Comitatus Act totally without meaning today? No, it remains a deterrent to prevent the unauthorized deployment of troops at the local level in response to what is purely a civilian law enforcement matter. Although no person has ever been successfully prosecuted under the Act, it is available in criminal or administrative proceedings to punish a lower level commander who utilizes military forces to pursue a common felon or to conduct sobriety checkpoints off of a federal military post. Officers have had their careers abruptly brought to a close by misusing federal military assets to support a purely civilian criminal matter.

     But does the Act present a major barrier at the National Command Authority level to use military forces in the battle against terrorism? The numerous exceptions and policy shifts carried out over the past twenty years strongly indicate it does not. Could anyone seriously suggest that it is appropriate to use the military to interdict drugs and illegal aliens, but preclude the military from countering terrorist threats employing weapons of mass destruction? For two decades the military has been increasingly used as an auxiliary to civilian law enforcement when the capabilities of the police have been exceeded. Under both the statutory and Constitutional exceptions that have permitted the use of the military in law enforcement since 1980, the President has ample authority to employ the military in homeland defense against the threat of WMD in terrorist hands.
100  The War Room / 9/11 Material & Research / Re: ANSER Institute for Homeland Security post-911 plans before 911 happened EXPOSED on: December 02, 2010, 03:29:23 am
WOW!

This article is shocking!

Retrieved from:
http://web.archive.org/web/20010820153110/www.homelandsecurity.org/journal/Articles/article.cfm?article=2

FULL TEXT:


American Deterrence Theory and Homeland Defense

Dr. George H. Quester
University of Maryland
October 2000

George H. Quester is a Professor of Government and Politics at the University of Maryland, where he teaches courses on International relations, U.S. Foreign Policy, and International Military Security. He has taught previously at Cornell and Harvard universities, at UCLA, and at the United States Naval Academy and the National War College. Dr. Quester is the author of a number of books and articles on international security issues, and on broader questions of international relations, and he is a member of the International Institute for Strategic Studies and the Council on Foreign Relations.

Most Americans have come to terms with the fact that their homeland has not been physically secure since World War II. The introduction of nuclear weapons, with the airplanes and missiles to deliver them, has meant that our homes and lives could be destroyed within less than an hour of Moscow's decision to attack.

     Only a few of such Americans have bad dreams each night about a nuclear holocaust, or still flinch each time they see a bright flash of light, wondering whether they should dive under the nearest desktop.[1]

     A few others may be unaware of such nuclear threats,[2] or may instead be convinced that we must have erected and maintained anti-missile and anti-bomber air defense systems to preclude this destruction.

     For a larger number of people, the coping with this basic threat to the homeland has instead involved some rough-and-ready internalization of the basics of mutual deterrence, whether or not they have been walked through this by the basic "guns and rockets" courses on "International Military Security" that are now offered on the curriculum of virtually every American university.

     If any foreign country would destroy our cities, we would get even by destroying their cities. And thus such a foreign power is very unlikely to initiate such a destructive exchange, and we can turn our attention to other things. So goes a logic that relatively fewer Americans can present very explicitly, but which most probably carry around in their heads intuitively, making it possible for all of us to visit the "ground-zeros" of potential nuclear attacks without dwelling on the risk.[3]

Learning About Deterrence

     It took a while for this logic and its calming effect to sink in with most Americans, and some would argue that it is a far-from-perfect kind of reassurance. Many of us can remember the civil defense drills that were part of a public school education in the 1950s. After the first detection of a Soviet nuclear weapons test in 1949, popular magazines in the United States produced a spate of articles on what such atomic bombs might do to New York or Washington. And the aftermath of the first hydrogen-bomb tests in the mid-1950s produced even grimmer analyses on how the width of the crater at Eniwetok compared with the length of Manhattan.[4]

     The exposure of the American homeland to foreign attack made it much easier for the newly independent U.S. Air Force to get Americans to consider threat from across the top of the globe and not just across the ocean. A look at a polar-projection map of the Northern Hemisphere, rather than the traditional Mercator projection map (which had always made the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans seem like such an insurmountable moat protecting us) showed how easy it would be for a foreign enemy to strike Kansas, and not just at New York or California.

     If the Air Force could enlist this new geographical awareness of vulnerability to win support for some attempts at homeland defense, in the investment in NORAD, the reassurance to the American people in the end came with SAC, in the ability to hit back at the USSR crossing the same polar icecaps, and thus to protect the homeland by deterrence.

"A New Idea"?

     If deterrence was the antidote to homeland vulnerability in the 1950s and 1960s, how new an idea was deterrence, and how new a problem was homeland vulnerability? There have been theorists of deterrence who would have assumed that the entire phenomenon was the product of aviation's having opened up the third-dimension for warfare, as airplanes could deliver bombs to hit an adversary's homeland cities, even if no victory had yet been won on the ground battlefields to open such cities up to punishment, indeed even if the adversary's forces were winning the ground battle. This kind of third-dimension warfare was of course reinforced by missiles, and by submarines slipping under an adversary's dominance of surface naval warfare, and it was most powerfully reinforced by the introduction of nuclear weapons.

     Yet one already finds many discussions of homeland vulnerability, and of mutual deterrence, in the analyses of future aerial warfare put forward at the end of World War I.[5] British and other analysts (Douhet is far from alone in such analysis, and is not the most profound example) put forward projections of future aerial bombing campaigns that look more like World War III than like World War II, with assumptions that poison gas would be used in the air attacks on cities, thus forecasting a much greater devastation than London was to suffer in 1940. (We will say more a little later about the advantages of having prepared a home population for a worse attack than actually materializes.) And, for a number of such inter-war analysts, the solution, the way to handling the prospect of such great misery, was mutual deterrence. Each side could hit the other's homeland, and thus each might hold back as long as the other held back.[6]

     American writers on air warfare entered somewhat into this discussion of future bombing scenarios. After Charles Lindbergh demonstrated that one could fly across the Atlantic Ocean, the threat became somewhat more real: that what London had experienced in the bombings of 1914 to 1918 (very mild compared to World War II, but indeed causing much more panic among Londoners) might befall New York or Chicago in the next war.[7]

     Yet one can go back even a little further to look for American experience with homeland vulnerability, and for any enunciations of the concept of "deterrence". The American coastline was all along vulnerable to the British Navy or any other hostile navy, and so was American commerce.[8] Americans have always been a commercial people, and the sinking of American merchant ships has always hit Americans "at home". The National Anthem of the United States commemorates the defense of Baltimore against British attack, in the immediate aftermath of the British amphibious invasion, that had destroyed Washington.

     Sir Julian Corbett argued at the end of the nineteenth century that this British ability to harass the merchant commerce of adversaries, as well as their coastlines, should not in any way be renounced, by the treaties being proposed by the United States and other countries, because this would give up Britain's "great deterrent".[9] Thus, even before airplanes and missiles and nuclear weapons, the world's homelands had become vulnerable to the counter-value attack of an adversary; and the strategic calculation had loomed that the mere prospect of such an attack could deter, could influence.
World War I

     Commerce on the high seas has made Americans feel vulnerable at home, and so has the concomitants of such trade, allowing foreign nationals to come to our country and reside in it for long periods, ostensibly as they are buying our goods. Americans in 1914 might have felt like celebrating the 100th anniversary of the last foreign invasion of their homeland, but, as World War I began, they started to feel two kinds of new homeland vulnerability.

     First, the Great War saw Britain interfering with American ships trying to sail to Germany, and then saw Germany relying on submarines to attack similar ships going to Britain. The latter kind of attack was much more dangerous to human life and property, of course, but both interferences with American "freedom of the seas" produced indignation in the United States, and a frustrated debate about how to respond.

     As American munitions factories found a major market in Britain and France, and were unable to deliver similar goods to Germany because of the British control of the ocean surface, one then also began to see sabotage of such factories, exemplified most vividly by the "Black Tom" explosion at a New Jersey dock just opposite Manhattan, shaking the Brooklyn Bridge and breaking windows all over New York City. As a forerunner of what we have to fear today, German agents even experimented with a primitive form of biological warfare. They attempted to inflict the horses procured in America for the British or French cavalry with a disease called "glanders".[10]

     Illustrating what may be a major problem for future homeland defense, where "deterrence" may not be a satisfactory answer, the 1914-1917 vulnerability raised problems of who was accountable for the attacks (the German Embassy always disclaimed responsibility). Were the "terrorists", who were bringing the explosions and destruction of World War I right into the United States itself, definitely German agents? Or were they instead Irish opponents of British Imperial rule, or Bolshevik revolutionaries, in which case it would be much more difficult for Americans to know against whom to retaliate?

     The sabotage within the United States ended when World War I ended, and when American munitions makers no longer had customers to supply in Britain and France. It indeed ended earlier, as the police system of the United States was able to corral the agents hired by the German government, and the German Embassy itself was closed down before the American entry into the war.

     Some of the lawsuits, criminal and civil, on alleged German responsibility for sabotage were to be carried forward as late as the 1930s, as the American legal system dictated that justice be done, that guilt or innocence be established.[11] This experience thus supports a first important lesson for the future of homeland defense: it will remain very important that great efforts be made to uncover the perpetrators of such attacks, and to punish them, perhaps even after international wars have ended.

     As one worries about attacks on the homeland in the next century, one of our major concerns is thus indeed that such attacks can come in a form where it was not clear who had launched the attack, i.e. it will not be clear against whom retaliation should be launched. Americans knew who to strike back at, after the attack at Pearl Harbor, and they became fairly certain of whom to get angry at, and ultimately to strike back at (by entering the war), after the attacks on the Black Tom dock or the Lusitania. But they were somewhat less sure at first of who had launched the attacks on the World Trade Center or the Oklahoma City Federal Office Building, or on the American Embassies in Nairobi and Dar Es-Salaam.

     One immediate policy conclusion would thus seem to come to mind, that substantial investments need to be made in increasing our detective capacities for establishing who was to blame for any future attacks on the American homeland, not merely because of our sense of justice, but because deterrence requires that the prospective attacker face a great risk that his identity will be established, and that he will suffer punishment in retaliation.[12]


     Yet it is easier to spot the generic nature of a "solution" to the problem here, and less easy to be sure that such advances in detective capabilities will be achievable, even if substantial amounts of money are spent. The bad consequence of a widespread proliferation of the technologies for weapons of mass destruction is not just that possibly crazy political actors may get at the triggers of such weapons, but also that, when such a weapon is used, there will be a larger array of possible suspects.

The Evolution into the Cold War

     Some new German sabotage occurred at the outset of World War II, but on a smaller scale, and with less shock and outrage for an American public at seeing its homeland violated. No German air raids were launched on the North American homeland during World War II, and no serious Japanese air raids.

     The next serious wave of concern about the safety of North America loomed up nonetheless in the closing of World War II, as the nuclear destruction of Hiroshima and Nagasaki offered a tangible illustration of what could befall any American city, once someone else acquired nuclear weapons, with this culminating in the discovery in 1949 that the Soviet Union had test-detonated such a weapon. And it was then in the wake of these nuclear events that the full-blown theory of mutual deterrence emerged, a theory that can only partially relieve the concerns of all of us who are no so vulnerable.

     If one combines the two historical experiences noted above, that of "Black Tom" and that of Hiroshima, one sets the stage for relating deterrence to homeland defense in the new century. If the Soviets inflicted the fate of Hiroshima on an American city, one would know against whom to retaliate, and the prospect of such retaliation thus might keep the disaster from ever happening. If one was in doubt about who had caused a dock to blow up across the Hudson River from Manhattan, Americans would be in more of quandary about who to punish, but the damage to the homeland, however frightening and unnerving, was not yet a disaster.

     But what if a rudimentary atomic bomb, or a comparably deadly chemical or biological weapon, is used against Manhattan, without the launcher of the attack being clear and obvious? What deters such an attack, what reassures us that the attack will not happen, when the launcher of the attack might not be identifiable, might not even be a state with territory of its own?
Two Other Important Lessons

     Aside from the need to enhance the identifiability of the attacker, two other lessons suggest themselves from these rounds of historical experience. As illustrated in the pluck of Londoners in 1940, who were much more exposed to attack than in 1914, but who flinched far less, much depends on conditioning a public in advance to how bad an attack might be, and thus toughening the public against that attack.[13] Almost all the forecasts of aerial bombardment printed before World War II exaggerated how bad it would be; the resilience of populations to such attacks might well have been the product of these excessive warnings.

     And much will depend on advertising to the outside world the toughness and resolve of one's homeland. An adversary who knows that Americans are unlikely to flinch, unlikely to make concessions in a contest of resolve, will be less likely to launch such homeland attacks in the first place.

     One of the big questions we will face in the next century entails predicting what the American reaction indeed will be if attacks are conducted against the American homeland, attacks that may kill many thousands of people.

     As a forerunner of the next century's threat to the homeland, which will most probably be heavily counter-value, heavily directed against homes and civilians, we have already mentioned the American shock at such attacks during our period of neutrality in World War I.

     To note an important distinction, someone defending the German sabotage programs of 1914 to 1917 could still have labeled them as overwhelmingly counterforce, as intended to deprive the British and French of the ammunition being assembled in the factories and docks where the bombs were being left. If windows were broken in Manhattan in the process, or American civilians were killed or wounded in the factories hit, these could be brushed off as collateral and inadvertent and unintended. Yet someone in Berlin and in the German Embassy might also have calculated that this civilian suffering might reduce American willingness to get into the war. "Bringing the war home" to the Americans might help in preventing "bringing America into the war".[14]

     Similarly, the sinking of ships in U-boat attacks was labeled as counterforce in all the German explanations for such attacks. Most shocking in particular to American feelings was the sinking of the Lusitania, with a great number of passengers being drowned as this British ocean liner went down, including some 128 American citizens. The German claim, at the time and ever since, was that the Lusitania carried munitions, thus accounting for the magnitude of the explosion when the German torpedo hit, and the rapidity of the ship's sinking thereafter.[15]

     Perhaps German planners were hoping to discourage American entry into the war by hitting the civilians, including American civilians, who felt at home on such a ship. But this would have been a terribly wrong-headed calculation, for the loss of the Lusitania played a major role in getting Americans ready to enter the war.

     More probably the German U-boat campaign was premised on the calculation that the sinking of merchant ships, and the denial of food imports to Britain, would inflict enough suffering on the British homeland to get London to negotiate a peace.

Good News: The Future Like the Past?

     A total of 128 Americans died on the Lusitania. What will be the American response if thousands die in a future nuclear, chemical, biological or even conventional attack on the American homeland?

     With the experiences of World War I and World War II, and of other wars, behind us, several generalizations can be offered.

     To begin, any foreign government, and any non-government foreign terrorist group, must be warned that it is easy to underrate the willingness of Americans to pursue these contests of endurance to a successful conclusion. Public opinion polls are notoriously misleading on whether Americans are ready to defend anything in the world. Such polling began only in the late 1930s, with the earliest sampling showing that most Americans felt it was a mistake to enter World War I, and that almost nothing was worth dispatching American forces for defense, with barely a majority even endorsing the defense of Hawaii![16]

     When the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor, they were betting that Americans would not want to persist in a war to recover the Philippines and the other islands that Japan was seizing in the western Pacific, but would rather prefer to negotiate a peace based on the new status quo that the Japanese surprise attack had so suddenly created. This bet had been questioned by Admiral Yamamoto, the planner of the Pearl Harbor attack, who knew the United States well from having spent four years there, and who argued that the Americans would never surrender just because of the pain and suffering of persisting in the conflict, but would instead have to be totally militarily defeated, with "Yamamoto dictating peace terms in the White House". Since Yamamoto and all the other Japanese planners knew that such a Japanese military defeat of the United States was not possible, Yamamoto argued that the entire Japanese decision to launch the war was a mistake.[17]

     Stalin similarly had underestimated the American willingness to bear the burden of defending South Korea, and Saddam Hussein misread American willingness to pay the burdens of defending and liberating Kuwait. One might cite these examples to Communist leaders in Beijing, lest they underestimate American willingness to defend Taiwan.

     One prediction might thus be that a foreign attack on the American homeland will not frighten Americans into withdrawing from commitments abroad, but will lead to a substantial American response to punish the perpetrators, to defend our friends and interests abroad. If public opinion polls do not reinforce deterrence, one should remind all foreign governments and others that such polls are misleading. If everyone knows that an attack on the American homeland will not cause Americans to flinch, but will lead to a very punishing response, these attacks on the American homeland may well again be deterred, may never happen.

     The December, 1941 Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor might be cited as the last foreign attack on the "American homeland", although Hawaii was not yet a state at the time, and (as noted) some American public opinion polls even showed a hesitation about defending Hawaii. To be sure, the Japanese attack had to be rated as relatively purely counterforce, as the American fleet was the target, and no bombs were to be wasted on Honolulu.

     Yet the Japanese logic in initiating war with the United States was very parallel to what would be in the mind of someone attacking the American homeland in the coming century, namely a bet that Americans could be tired out by the prospect of pain and suffering, and dissuaded from opposing Japanese interests.

     The Japanese government planned on seizing a secure enough position in a quick attack in 1941 and 1942, so that the American people and their government would regard the burden of reversing this as too great a price to be paid, with Japan then being free to have its way in China.[18] Someone delivering weapons of mass destruction to an American city in some future crisis might be very similarly intent on impressing the United States that the price of getting in the aggressor's way in some corner of the world would be too high.

     The Pearl Harbor attack is indeed analogous to our problem of how to deter an attack on the American homeland. To repeat, it offers a cautionary lesson to those who think that Americans will not retaliate. If the Japanese had understood the Americans better, they would have been deterred from attacking Pearl Harbor, and they would have been deterred from continuing their attack on China, or compelled to withdraw from China.
Bad News: The Future Unlike the Past?

     Yet a pessimistic counter-prediction could be advanced that the future threat to the homeland we are discussing here is significantly different, enough so to make Americans much more likely to shrink back than to respond, and hence to make this come out much more an example of appeasement and surrender, rather than successful deterrence.

    To begin with the most obvious point, the destruction inflicted on the American homeland would be much greater than anything experienced in 1916, or anything anticipated before 1945, with the prospect that the nuclear, chemical or biological attack that had just been inflicted on an American city would be inflicted again, if the United States did not make the concession demanded, did not withdraw its forces from some area.

     It may be dangerous to underestimate American resolve, as our response to the Pearl Harbor attack showed. Yet it would be unrealistic to impute unlimited resolve to the same Americans, assuming that they were ready "to pay any price..." as John F. Kennedy's inaugural speech had phrased it; the reaction to the casualties imposed in Vietnam, or indeed in Somalia, suggests something different.

     And to return to the first lesson we noted, Americans will be frustrated by uncertainties as to who launched these attacks, uncertainties about whom to hit back against.

Policies for Toughening Up

     As to what can be done to stiffen the prospect of resolve (the prospect that such retaliation would indeed be inflicted when the adversary had been identified, that Americans would not instead flinch in the face of further attacks), the policy suggestions might again be obvious, but with the feasibility also again being under some doubt.

     If there are some elementary population-defense precautions that can be taken to reduce the death and suffering after an WMD attack, these grow in priority in face of the new threats that are looming; this is because of our elementary humane concern for protecting our innocent citizens, and because such precautions will increase the prospect that deterrence would work, the prospect that Americans would hit back at the perpetrator of such an attack, rather than give in to his demands.

     The homeland attacks we have to fear will be part of a contest of endurance, a game of "chicken", where the other side is guessing that he can win by imposing pain on Americans. As with the contests of guerrilla war or conventional war in the past, or the more minor terrorist attacks we have experienced to date, Americans stand a better chance of winning such contests, and indeed of keeping such contests from even beginnig in the first place, if they show signs of having protected themselves somewhat, of having reduced the suffering that we would undergo in the process.

American Resolve in the Future?

     Rather than retreating and conceding all the political issues at stake after a major counter value attack on the United States homeland (or after such an attack on an overseas base of the United States), it is also still very possible that Americans would thereafter feel inclined to go to the other extreme, to impose a maximum of punishment on the perpetrator of the original attack.

     Such punishment could come, of course, in a simple matching of attacks on homeland, once the guilty party is identified, as the United States is still a long way from divesting itself of its nuclear warheads or the means of delivering them.

     Alternatively, and morally more appropriate where the decision to attack the American homeland was not made by the people of another country, but by some leader who may never have been freely elected, the American response might indeed be to go to the maximum effort of deposing and arresting those leaders, just as we went to such an effort against the Japanese and German leaders in World War II.

    The United States and its allies did not go to Baghdad to arrest and punish Saddam Hussein, and no Iraqi leaders were put on trial for war crimes. But it is a reasonable guess that this would indeed have been the response if Iraq had launched a chemical or biological attack on an American city, or indeed had launched any such WMD attack anywhere in the world, even in the immediate combat zone.[19] The prospect of such a total pursuit of unconditional surrender might still be one of the most effective ways of establishing a deterrence barrier to attacks on the American homeland.

     The only major problem with this kind of deterrent is that we might need to couple this threat to other possible actions by a rogue-state adversary. Is an attack on an American city the only transgression for which Saddam Hussein might have to be punished by his arrest and the total deposition of his regime? Most probably not, for the same might have to be the response if Iraqi forces launched another major conventional invasion of Kuwait or Saudi Arabia, or if Saddam broke chemical or biological weapons out for use against a neighbor, or perhaps if he merely insisted on acquiring nuclear weapons. If the major punishment is to be applied for such lesser offenses, however, what is the deterrent being held in reserve, to keep Saddam Hussein or any similar political actor from attacking the American homeland?

Some General Conclusions

     Deterrence has been successful against the prospect of a nuclear attack by the Soviet Union and by the other states possessing such weapons. It has been a "success" in that the attacks have not occurred, and also in that Americans have not had to brood about the prospect of such attacks. Looking at the longer history of the deterrence concept, and the longer history of threats to the American homeland, our question has been how such a deterrence success can be achieved now that the threats have changed.

     The three "lessons" noted above all address the logical prerequisites of deterrence. One has to enable oneself to identify the guilty party, the perpetrator of the attack. One has to toughen up one's population so that we are all ready to persist in a contest of wills. And one has to make one's own resolve clear, lest the potential attacker under-rate American willingness to retaliate.

     The logic of deterrence is clear enough to make these lessons relatively easy to identify. Implementing these lessons, however, may be much more difficult.
101  The War Room / 9/11 Material & Research / ANSER Institute for Homeland Security post-911 plans before 911 happened EXPOSED on: December 02, 2010, 03:27:55 am
Covered in cyberdust, found with the Wayback Machine:
http://web.archive.org/web/20010820154757/www.homelandsecurity.org/journal/Articles/article.cfm?article=6







FULL TEXT REPOST:


The Best Homeland Defense is a Good Counterterrorism Offense
Ambassador Michael A. Sheehan
Coordinator for Counterterrorism
U.S. Department of State
October 2000





Michael Sheehan has served as Coordinator for Counterterrorism at the Department of State since December 1998. His office has primary responsibility for developing, coordinating, and implementing U.S. counterterrorism policy. The office chairs the Interagency Working Group for Counterterrorism and the Department of State's task force that responds to international terrorist incidents. Previously Sheehan was a Deputy Assistant Secretary in the Bureau of International Organization Affairs where he worked on UN reform and peacekeeping policy in the former Yugoslavia. From 1995 to 1997, he also served in the White House on the National Security Council staff as Director of International Organizations and Peacekeeping. From 1993 to 1995, he was Director of Political Military Affairs and Special Counselor to Ambassador Madeleine Albright at the U.S. Mission to the UN in New York.

The United States is among the world's leaders in homeland defense; our efforts to strengthen our security continue unabated every day. However, as we continue to bolster our defenses, we need to continue to monitor and counter the changing threat of international terrorism, which is forcing us to expand the scope of our homeland defense. With the rapid changes occurring in the domestic and international environment, we must develop an "active defense" outside the United States, to guard against threats emanating from overseas and to protect American citizens and assets abroad. Without this expansion in scope, even the best domestic homeland defense-a "Fortress America"-leaves the United States and its citizens vulnerable.

     There are several trends that have redefined the playing field for those involved in homeland defense. First, American citizens, assets, and interests are increasingly found outside of the United States, thus forcing us to protect ourselves on non-American soil, as well as in the U.S. With the expansion of American companies and NGOs in the international realm, U.S. engagement in humanitarian and military operations abroad, and the growth of international tourism and education - to name a few trends - Americans can be found in almost every country in the world at any given time. Very few international flights fly without an American aboard. Thus, it was no surprise when we learned that an American citizen was among the hostages taken aboard the Air India flight that was hijacked on December 24, 1999. This was not a flight to or from the U.S., but rather a quick hop between Nepal and India, yet an American citizen was on board. We must look to safeguard our interests abroad, just as we have defended those on American soil.

     Second, the threat to Americans-whether residing within the country or abroad-is often planned and perpetrated from outside the U.S. A disproportionate number of threats come from individuals who have never seen and may never see the shores of the United States. This is made easier by today's highly developed communication and transportation systems. We must look to fight, disrupt, and intercept these threats from their origins or while they are in transit to a target, not wait for them to reach their objective.

     The front line has moved from the shores of the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans to the city centers of Khandahar and Tehran. We must think of our homeland defense to include these areas, as well as our own shore and territories. Soccer offers us a useful illustration of how we should design an effective defense. If a soccer team starts defending first when the attacker is just feet away from the goal, the team has already lost. Only through a constant comprehensive press at every corner of the field can a team expect to fully defend against an attack. Likewise, we must fight against terrorism on every front-whether in the Middle East, South Asia, or Latin America-rather than just on our shores.

     A review of two recent terrorist incidents-one successful and one aborted-illustrates this shifting front line, and provides us with important lessons on how to expand our homeland defense.

     The bombings of our embassies in East Africa show how networks of terrorists have formed a nexus of support for attacks thousands of miles away.

     The plot for the 1998 attack on the American Embassy in Nairobi was actually hatched five years earlier. Initial reconnaissance of our embassy began in 1994, further planning continued in 1996.

     The strategic direction of this attack came from South Asia, more specifically from Usama bin Ladin who was based in Afghanistan. Operational control and other support worked its way through at least two other countries in Europe and Africa and spanned thousands of miles over vast oceans and deserts. In addition, this attack was conducted simultaneously with a similar embassy bombing in Dar es Salaam, over 500 miles to the south of Nairobi. The coordination of these two attacks shows a high level of planning and an enormous global reach.

     The recent arrests over the millennium tell a similar story, and bring the situation closer to home. On December 14, 1999, Algerian Ahmed Ressam was arrested by U.S. Customs agents as he attempted to transport illegal explosive materials across the Canadian border at Port Angeles, Washington. Just weeks later, Jordanian officials arrested a handful of operatives planning an attack on a tourist site and hotel in Israel during the millennium celebrations. In both cases, an international web of links unfolded through the investigation. In both cases, American citizens were directly targeted.

     Although the planning and targeting of these terrorist incidents took place years and miles apart, they show how today's terrorists can come from the farthest reaches of the world to threaten our citizens, whether they are in Washington State, the Middle East, Africa, or elsewhere.

     In addition to this web of international terrorists, there are numerous threats emanating from other corners of the world. The deaths of five Americans in 1999 show the vulnerability of Americans in other corners of the world. In March, 1999 the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) kidnapped three U.S. Indian rights activists, took them to Venezuela, and brutally murdered them. In Bwindi National Forest in Uganda two American tourists were killed by Rwandan Hutu rebels who raided three tourist's camps in the same month. In all of 1999, the only Americans killed at the hands of terrorists were neither diplomats or soldiers, nor employees working in government buildings, but rather civilians caught up in local events who were murdered because of their nationality.

     So how do we defend against this seemingly limitless threat on a seemingly limitless set of targets? Build 20-foot walls around multinational firms? Turn our embassies into bunkered fortresses? Turn our back on allies that need our military or humanitarian engagement abroad? Tell Americans to stay home?

     None of the above.

     Isolating ourselves against a world with whom we must engage is a mistake. Rather than turning inward and isolating ourselves, we must develop a proactive offense to fight the threat where it originates and where we are threatened. This means cracking down on countries that house terrorists who threaten us, putting the squeeze on terrorists as they travel around the world, and hardening potential targets. We cannot do this alone; fortunately, we don't have to. Many countries share our condemnation of terrorism and are similarly threatened. Therefore creating a community of allies that are intolerant of terrorism and threats is essential to developing a long-term sustainable international strategy to defend our homeland. Just as many Americans in cities across the U.S. have taken a stance on crime, creating communities that will not tolerate criminal violence in their communities, we should seek to create a similar "community" of zero tolerance for terrorism.

     In order to develop a comprehensive international homeland defense, we must understand the latest threats to the United States and its interests and engage with our international partners in a coordinated effort to disrupt terrorist activity, deny terrorists sanctuary, bolster the counterterrorist capability of those states willing to fight terrorists (but unable to do so effectively) and isolate those states that refuse to vigorously fight terrorism.

     Terrorism has changed since the 1970's and 1980's, when most Americans first became aware of the threat. Then we witnessed numerous airline hijackings, kidnappings, hostage situations, and ruthless bombings of civilian targets such as the international airports in Rome, Vienna, and Athens. The primary motivation of terrorists in the 70s and 80s was political. We fought leftist groups, separatists, and other politically motivated actors. Latin America, the Middle East and Asia were swarming with groups fighting for changes in existing political structures, borders, and leadership. Another common feature of those decades was the prominent role that states played in supporting terrorist activities. Some state sponsors routinely used terror as an instrument of state policy to attack their opponents, both foreign and domestic.

     Today, the threat is different. State sponsorship has declined significantly in the past ten years. Today's terrorist threat comes primarily from non-state actors with less direct ties to governments, such as Usama bin Laden and the al-Qaida terrorist network associated with him. Terrorists are acting on their own and are resorting to car bombs, suicide bombings, and attacks on civilian buildings and diplomatic posts.

     They have their own funding networks-through narcotrafficing, fund-raising fronts, private businesses, independent wealth, and local financial support. They are individually recruiting new members. In many states where the government is weak in providing basic public services, these groups create parallel public institutions, such as schools, health services, and social networks. Through this outreach, independent terrorist networks are able to make inroads into communities and recruit new members-which in turn provide them operational security for their activities. They are also exploiting volatile areas, such as Chechnya and Dagestan. Their infusion of resources and training into conflict-ripe areas makes for a very deadly mix.

     Today, the principal motivations behind most terrorist movements are primarily religious and cultural, such as "ending western influence," are not bound to a particular territory, and are not primarily focused on a specific political objective. Cultural and/or religious ideology forms the basis for their activities and provides a platform for rallying support among the general population. In general, these non-state actors exhibit less restraint than state actors and other groups did in past decades. They are less concerned about killing random civilians, whether the civilians are standing at an Israeli bus stop, worshipping in a church in Colombia, or walking in front of an American Embassy in Africa. Their choice of victim is no longer a specific political target, but rather anyone who they consider opposed to their ideology, often with little concern for innocent bystanders.

     Rather than focusing on different, distinct target groups, or issues, like-minded terrorists have formed an international network linked by common ideology and enmity for the West, particularly for the United States. As the remaining superpower, the U.S. is often blamed for many of today's troubles and therefore is the target of choice for retaliation. This loose network can be engaged through informal connections and mobilized to conduct acts throughout the world.

     Terrorists are also expanding their choice of targets. Rather than attacking Washington or other capitals, terrorists often target "softer" official targets, such as remote consulates or military bases, or even unofficial targets, such as American business or cultural interests. Usama bin Ladin's recent attacks and plans prove this point. Rather than attacking the United States homeland, he picked weakly protected American Embassies in Africa, where he knew his operatives could move and operate more freely. During the millennium, his operatives focused on tourist sites and hotels in the Middle East.

     Terrorists are taking advantage of technological advances in communications, transportation, and money transfer to plan and implement international operations. The Internet is used by many to share messages and recruit new members, while electronic mail and other newer technologies are used to communicate from Afghanistan to Kenya to Yemen and around the world. Today, a planner can sit in Afghanistan, order the movement of men, money and materials through several other countries, and attack in another country half way around the world. That is how the attacks in Kenya and Tanzania occurred.

     It is not only who is striking and where they are striking, but also how they are striking that should concern those working in homeland defense. Technological advances have expanded the terrorists "toolbox." Terrorists are increasingly using the Internet and computers as a means of communication, command and control, and propaganda dissemination. They are actively pursuing chemical and biological capabilities, and some-like Aum Shinrikyo-have actually used such weapons against innocent civilians.

     The good news on this front is that chemical and biological materials are hard to weaponize, and therefore, remain out of reach of many terrorists. Once again, the key is to limit the freedom of movement and resources of terrorists and to deny them sanctuary to research and pursue WMD capabilities. This type of offensive action-limiting or stopping a terrorist well before an attack has happened-is essential to our security.

     In summary, these international threats to our homeland are complex and multifaceted, and need a sophisticated, multidimensional response. First, we must continue to pressure those states that support terrorism or provide sanctuary to terrorists. Afghanistan and Iran are the two biggest current terrorist supporting threats to the United States. Our terrorism-related sanctions against the Taliban and the current Iranian government should remain intact until they change their policies. Sanctions have worked to minimize Libyan and other states' support for terrorism, and will work with these two countries, if we stay the course.

     Likewise, we must urge those governments that allow terrorists to use their countries as transit points, material procurement sites, or temporary rest stops, to block their activities. Limiting terrorists' movement or access to material will disrupt their planning and operations. In addition, we need to shore up those places that are potential targets. This means bolstering local capabilities to monitor airports, patrol streets, and investigate activity. For foreign-based U.S. officials, business people, and tourists, foreign security officials are the first line of defense against a terrorist threat abroad.

     All of these activities require strong engagement with other countries, both our allies and our adversaries. The full cooperation of our allies and the change of behavior of our adversaries are imperatives to reducing the terrorist threat to Americans.

     While we tend to focus our homeland defense efforts on domestic threats to America- based citizens, we must now look outside our borders for the threats and the threatened. Equally important, we must look even more widely beyond our borders for solutions and partners.





Do your own research:
http://web.archive.org/web/*/http://www.homelandsecurity.org

ANSER Homeland Security is the precursor to the post-9/11 public DHS we are all familiar with now.  Please do me and the rest of the Patriot Community a favor and comb through all of these old school articles within their site, and analyze them.
102  General / General Discussion / Re: "Sometimes we do it to ourselves" NIST bluntly admits cyber false flags! on: December 02, 2010, 03:23:22 am



Satire image by Scootle of the Prison Planet Forum
103  General / General Discussion / Re: "Sometimes we do it to ourselves" NIST bluntly admits cyber false flags! on: December 02, 2010, 03:22:18 am


NIST Computer Scientist and Researcher Dr. Ron Ross Discusses Cybersecurity During Latest SGL

Article By: Amanda D. Stein

National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) senior computer scientist and information security researcher Dr. Ron Ross presented a lecture to students, staff and faculty on the new challenges in cybersecurity, and where the needs will be in the future. Ross received both his Master’s and Ph.D. degrees from NPS in Computer Science and leads the Federal Information Security Management Act (FISMA) Implementation Project. He touched on some of the key areas of concern in cybersecurity, and the kinds of partnerships that will be critical to preparing the DoD networks for inevitable attacks.

“It is so critically important today to every one of us, whether in the warfighter side, the intelligence community, the civil part of government or the private sector,” said Ross. “Cybersecurity is one of these things that cuts across disciplines. Information technology is at the heart of everything we do. Computer systems are fueling our ability to achieve mission success. And in order for us to be successful and carry out those missions, the technology that we deploy today must be dependable. And in order for that technology to be dependable, we have to make sure that it is properly secure.”

Ross spoke about the importance of ensuring government systems are protected from even the most accidental security breaches. He gave the example of an employee of the Department of Veterans Affairs who took a laptop home to get caught up on work. The laptop was stolen from the employee’s home, and on it were over 26 million veterans records with personally identifiable information. Setting off a scramble to notify the veterans of the incident, the stolen laptop was later recovered and forensics revealed that the sensitive information had not been compromised. The incident served as a startling reminder of how imperative it is to have the proper security measures on all government computers and devices.

“The ultimate solution to that problem is very simple,” explained Ross. “It’s called full disk encryption. What happened after this incident is that now our portable and mobile devices such as laptop computers are being outfitted with full disk encryption capability and we have a very low cost solution that makes that problem go away. So a lot of these measures are based on awareness.”

Additional security measures have also have been established in response to various other threats and attacks, and have propelled cybersecurity into the spotlight lately within the DoD. Deputy Secretary of Defense William Lynn recently called cyber the ‘fourth domain’, making it a focus alongside air, sea and land. At a Security Defense Alliance in Belgium on September 15, Lynn expressed the importance of creating a strategy for the future in dealing with cyber threats.

“Cyber is an especially asymmetric technology. The low cost of computing devices means that our adversaries do not have to build expensive weapons, like stealth fighters and aircraft carriers, to pose a significant threat to our military capabilities,” explained Lynn. “Cyber is also offense dominant. The Internet was designed to be open and interoperable. Security and identification management were lower priorities in system design. Structurally, our ability to defend networks always lags behind intruders. Defenders must defend everything; adversaries only need a single failure to exploit.”

Lynn is just one of the many DoD supporters promoting training, education and awareness within the field of information security. Ross noted that training the future cybersecurity personnel within the DoD will be a critical step to ensuring the future challenges in the field of cybersecurity are being met. On June 23, U.S. Defense Secretary Robert Gates signed a memorandum establishing the U.S. Cyber Command (CYBERCOM) to be lead by General Keith Alexander.

“CYBERCOM is a great example of how we are unifying our forces,” explained Ross. “This is a great opportunity now to grow the next generation – the kinds of folks that are going to be critical to keeping our missions operational. Things we didn’t consider previously, we now have to consider routinely. We need the cyber warriors to be able to understand what the problems are. We are about 35,000 people short at the federal level with cybersecurity skills. Many of those skills are being developed right here at the Naval Postgraduate School. There are invaluable programs here training and educating the next generation of cyber warriors. And we can’t get them to the field fast enough.”

As the threats continue to grow, and the adversaries’ tactics continue to evolve, there will always be a need for qualified men and women to serve in defending our critical information systems. Ross explained that the enemy is determined and can operate from anywhere in the world, and that requires the DoD to remain vigilant in cyber defense. From amateur hackers working out of their basement to terrorists with a specific target in mind, there is a continuous cyber threat. The important part, Ross noted, is being able to continue to carry out a mission, even when facing an attack.

“The threat is always out there. The adversaries never rest,” said Ross. “Therefore we have to make sure that we keep on going every step of the way just like they are. Even deploying the best of everything that we have, we can only hope to stop about 90-95 percent. There will be a small percentage that will get through. We call those the advanced persistent threat. And we have to be able to deal with those.”

Source:
http://www.nps.edu/About/News/NIST-Computer-Scientist-and-Researcher-Dr.-Ron-Ross-Discusses-Cybersecurity-During-Latest-SGL.html
104  General / General Discussion / "Sometimes we do it to ourselves" NIST bluntly admits cyber false flags! on: December 02, 2010, 03:21:42 am


The above image is a Slide, taken from this PowerPoint Presentation (converted to PDF):

Defending the United States in the Digital Age
Information Security Transformation for the Federal Government
NIST ICS Security Workshop
September 24, 2010
Dr. Ron Ross
Computer Security Division
Information Technology Laboratory

Read the full presentation here:
http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/SMA/fisma/ics/documents/Sept2010-Workshop/NIST-ICS-INTRO-09-24-2010.pdf




Dr. Ron Ross, the author of this presentation, has a very interesting biography:
(Bio Retrieved from: http://csrc.nist.gov/staff/Ross/biography-ross-06-27-2010.pdf)




105  The War Room / 9/11 Material & Research / Re: CSIS rolled out NWO agenda on 9/12/2001 on: December 02, 2010, 03:20:15 am


Shireen Hunter was the director of the Islam Program at CSIS. She previously served as director of the Mediterranean Studies program with the Centre for European Policy Studies in Brussels (1994-1998), deputy director of the Middle East Program CSIS (1983-1993), as a guest scholar at the Brookings Institution, and research fellow at the Harvard Center for International Affairs. Hunter is the author of many books, including Islam in Russia: The Politics of Identity and Security, with Jeffrey Thomas and Alexander Melikishvili (M.E. Sharpe, 2004), Islam: Europe’s Second Religion, ed. (Praeger, 2002), The Future of Islam and the West: Clash of Civilizations or Peaceful Coexistence? (Praeger/CSIS, 1998), Central Asia Since Independence (Praeger/CSIS, 1996), The Transcaucasus in Transition: Nation-Building and Conflict (CSIS, 1994), Iran After Khomeini (CSIS, 1992), Iran and the World: Continuity in a Revolutionary Decade (Indiana University Press, 1990), and The Politics of Revivalism  (Indiana University Press, 1988), as well as numerous chapters in edited volumes. Her articles have appeared in leading journals such as Foreign Affairs, Foreign Policy, Current History, the Middle East Journal, Security Dialogue, the International Spectator, Relazioni Internazionali, the Third World Quarterly, Current History, the Washington Quarterly, the Oxford Journal of Islamic Studies, and SAIS Review, as well as prominent newspapers, including the Los Angeles Times and the Christian Science Monitor. She holds a Ph.D. in political science from the Institut Universitaire des Hautes Études Internationales in Geneva and an M.A. from the London School of Economics and Political Science. She speaks French, Persian, and Azeri Turkish.




Retrieved from:
http://web.archive.org/web/20010914221333/www.csis.org/features/nyterror_hunter.htm


Dr. Shireen Hunter
Director
CSIS Islam Program

New trends in Islamic Extremism

September 12, 2001

The tragic events of September 11, 2001, point to a disturbing trend in the evolution of Islamic extremism and its regional and international networks.

First, the new brand of extremists is both ideologically less sophisticated, more inflexible and more dogmatic. The core of their ideology is a distorted version of the concept of Jihad (Holy War), hence their identification as Jihadists.

Second, this particular brand of Islamic extremists has its roots in the Afghan conflicts, the Russo-Afghan War and the Afghan Civil War. In addition, many members and/or sympathizers of this brand have been hardened by doing battle elsewhere, including recent conflicts such as Bosnia, Chechnya and in the Tajik Civil War (1992-1997).

This type of engagement in warlike situations has provided the new breed of extremists with military training skills, hitherto unavailable to them, including flying sophisticated aircraft.

Third, the Afghan War and other conflicts, notably those in Bosnia and Chechnya, have given rise to a geographically widespread network of extremists who have common experiences.

Fourth, the "Jihadist" trend has found sympathizers among Muslims who have not had direct involvement in any of the above-mentioned conflicts, including a very small section of the Muslim Diaspora in Europe and the United States. Such sympathizers could potentially be very important links in the chain of extremist networks and their ability to perpetrate terrorists acts.

Policy Implications

Dealing with the new breed of extremists and the network they have created requires new policies on the part of the United States beyond the immediate retaliatory measures against the perpetrators once they have been identified. The following components of a long-term strategy especially stand out:

   1. Building a more cohesive multilateral strategy to deal with international terrorism - especially involving U.S. allies but also other countries who face problems of terrorism;
   2. A more active policy of peace-making in trouble spots, notably Afghanistan;
   3. A more stringent policy vis-à-vis countries who in one form or another help terrorist groups, including countries, such as Pakistan, which do not have an openly hostile attitude towards the United States;
   4. Insistence that countries - including some U.S. allies - who help Diaspora organizations with Jihadist tendencies stop such assistance and dissuade their private citizens and/or organizations from doing so;
   5. Discouraging Muslim and other governments from using extremists groups - even if they are not exactly part of terrorist networks - from the advancement of their immediate goals without concern for long-term consequence. Afghanistan should serve as a sobering example of such an approach.
106  The War Room / 9/11 Material & Research / Re: CSIS rolled out NWO agenda on 9/12/2001 on: December 02, 2010, 03:19:49 am


Michèle Flournoy was confirmed by the U.S. Senate as the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy on February 9, 2009.  She serves as the principal staff assistant and advisor to the Secretary of Defense and the Deputy Secretary of Defense for all matters on the formulation of national security and defense policy and the integration and oversight of DoD policy and plans to achieve national security objectives.
Prior to her confirmation, Ms. Flournoy was appointed President of the Center for a New American Security (CNAS) in January 2007.  Before co-founding CNAS, she was a senior adviser at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, where she worked on a broad range of defense policy and international security issues.
Ms. Flournoy previously served as a distinguished research professor at the Institute for National Strategic Studies at the National Defense University (NDU), where she founded and led the university’s Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) working group, which was chartered by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to develop intellectual capital in preparation for the Department of Defense’s 2001 QDR.
Prior to joining NDU, Ms. Flournoy was dual-hatted as Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy and Threat Reduction and Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy.  In that capacity, she oversaw three Policy offices in the Office of the Secretary of Defense: Strategy; Requirements, Plans and Counterproliferation; and Russia, Ukraine and Eurasian Affairs.
Ms. Flournoy was awarded the Secretary of Defense Medal for Outstanding Public Service in 1996, the Department of Defense Medal for Distinguished Public Service in 1998 and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff’s Joint Distinguished Civilian Service Award in 2000.  She is a former member of the Defense Policy Board and the Defense Science Board Task Force on Transformation.
Ms. Flournoy earned a bachelor’s degree in social studies from Harvard University and a master’s degree in international relations from Balliol College, Oxford University, where she was a Newton-Tatum scholar.

biography retrieved from:
http://www.defense.gov/bios/biographydetail.aspx?biographyid=172




http://web.archive.org/web/20010914205137/www.csis.org/features/nyterror_flournoy.htm


 Ms. Michèle Flournoy
Senior Fellow
CSIS International Security Program

U.S. Security Implications

September 12, 2001

In the wake of this heinous terrorist attack, the U.S. government needs to take action on several fronts: (1) determining who is responsible for the attack, (2) developing options for an effective response (this should draw on the full range of military and non-military means at our disposal), (3) building an international coalition and strategy to fight terrorism over the long haul, and (4) making it crystal clear that acts of terrorism against the United States will fail to meet their ultimate objective - the United States will not be intimidated into disengaging from the world or shirking its leadership responsibilities. It is also imperative that this administration take the time it needs to develop the most effective retaliatory response possible - one that not only responds decisively to this particular act of terrorism, but that also advances our longer-term strategy to combat international terrorism writ large.

Yesterday, our national security paradigm changed. We no longer have the luxury of thinking about U.S. national security primarily in terms of protecting American allies and interests abroad; we need to give far more serious attention to protecting the U.S. homeland against a range of asymmetric threats, including terrorism. In the weeks and months ahead, it is critical that we conduct a comprehensive interagency assessment of our homeland security requirements. President Bush should direct that this assessment be undertaken; if he does not, Congress will likely demand it. Such an assessment should identify and prioritize shortfalls across the board and should produce a comprehensive plan to address these shortfalls in the upcoming budget cycle. This will mean broadening the discussion of homeland defense beyond missile defense to include everything from airport security, to enhancing our intelligence capabilities, to critical infrastructure protection, to defense against biological and chemical weapons, and more.

As the meaning of this paradigm shift sinks in, the American public may be willing to trade some civil liberties for enhanced security. They may, for example, be more willing to put up with more extensive and intrusive security checks at airports in exchange for a greater degree of safety. For the U.S. government, this shift should force us to break out of the organizational stovepipes that have constrained our ability to address threats like terrorism in the past. We must have a new level of interagency cooperation and a new way of doing business.
107  The War Room / 9/11 Material & Research / Re: CSIS rolled out NWO agenda on 9/12/2001 on: December 02, 2010, 03:19:17 am


Anthony H. Cordesman holds the Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy at CSIS and also acts as a national security analyst for ABC News. He is a recipient of the Department of Defense Distinguished Service Medal. During his time at CSIS, he has completed a wide variety of studies on energy, U.S. strategy and defense plans, defense programming and budgeting, NATO modernization, Chinese military power, the lessons of modern warfare, proliferation, counterterrorism, armed nation building, the security of the Middle East, and the Afghan and Iraq conflicts. Many of these studies can be downloaded from the Burke Chair section of the CSIS Web site at http://www.csis.org/program/burke-chair-strategy. At CSIS, Cordesman has been director of the Gulf Net Assessment Project, the Gulf in Transition study, and principle investigator of the Homeland Defense Project. He directed the Middle East Net Assessment Project, acted as codirector of the Strategic Energy Initiative, and directed the project on Saudi Arabia in the 21st century.

Professor Cordesman has served as director of intelligence assessment in the Office of the Secretary of Defense and as civilian assistant to the deputy secretary of defense. He directed the analysis of the lessons of the October War for the secretary of defense in 1974, coordinating the U.S. military, intelligence, and civilian analysis of the conflict. He has also served in numerous other government positions, including in the State Department and on NATO International Staff. In addition, he served as director of policy and planning for resource applications in the Department of Energy and as national security assistant to Senator John McCain. He has had numerous foreign assignments, including posts in the United Kingdom, Lebanon, Egypt, and Iran, as well as with NATO in Brussels and Paris. He has worked extensively in Saudi Arabia and the Gulf. He is the author of a wide range of studies on energy policy, national security, and the Middle East, and his most recent publications include Saudi Arabia: National Security in a Troubled Region (Praeger, 2009), Iranian Weapons of Mass Destruction: The Birth of a Regional Nuclear Arms Race? (Praeger, 2009), Withdrawal from Iraq: Assessing the Readiness of Iraqi Security Forces (CSIS, 2009), Winning in Afghanistan: Creating Effective Afghan Security Forces (CSIS, 2009), and The North African Military Balance: Force Developments in the Maghreb (CSIS, 2009).


This was one of the very few CSIS guys who was level-headed.

Retrieved from:
http://web.archive.org/web/20010914221700/www.csis.org/features/nyterror_cordesman.htm



Dr. Anthony Cordesman
CSIS Burke Chair in Strategy

U.S. Response

September 12, 2001

We are now in a period where there is a real risk that we can overreact and use the wrong words. We face a new level of terrorism, an attack on our homeland tantamount to war. We need to act decisively. But we also need to fully understand who is responsible and not simply blame Osama bin Laden or Iraq or whoever else is convenient.

We need to prepare. We cannot achieve anything in terms of deterrence if we simply strike at low-level perpetrators. If we are to succeed, we must attack and kill the leaders of the movements responsible. At the same time, we must know that full chain of responsibility, whether governments are really involved and who in those governments is involved.

We cannot simply lash out at another country like Afghanistan. We have to strike precisely. This means we have to rethink retaliation in our military operations and do so calmly and objectively.

Similarly, we cannot throw money at homeland defense or counterterrorism or simply try to defend against one type of attack. We need to have a comprehensive reassessment of how we budget and plan for homeland defense. We obviously need to change our priorities, but to do so, we need careful planning, and we need to be very, very sure that what we do is effective and is worth the cost both in dollars and out civil liberties. It is this need for careful evolution, which should be our response, not seeking some sudden fix or finding a scapegoat and attacking the wrong target.
108  The War Room / 9/11 Material & Research / Re: CSIS rolled out NWO agenda on 9/12/2001 on: December 02, 2010, 03:17:49 am

Simon Serfaty is the first holder of the Zbigniew Brzezinski Chair in Global Security and Geostrategy at CSIS. He was the director of the CSIS Europe Program for more than 10 years and remains a senior adviser to the program. Dr. Serfaty is also a senior professor of U.S. foreign policy with the Graduate Programs in International Studies at Old Dominion University in Norfolk, Virginia. From 1972 to 1993, he was a research professor at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies in Washington, D.C., serving as director of the Johns Hopkins Center of European Studies in Bologna, Italy (1972–1976), director of the Washington Center of Foreign Policy Research (1978–1980), and executive director of the Johns Hopkins Foreign Policy Institute (1984–1991).

      Dr. Serfaty is the author of many books, including Architects of Delusion: Europe, America, and the Iraq War (2007), The Vital Partnership: Power and Order (2005), La tentation impériale (2004), Memories of Europe’s Future: Farewell to Yesteryear (1999), Stay the Course: European Unity and Atlantic Solidarity (1997), and Taking Europe Seriously (1992). Books edited by Dr. Serfaty include A Recast Partnership? Institutional Dimensions of Transatlantic Relations (2008), Visions of the Atlantic Alliance (2005), Visions of America and Europe (2004), The European Finality Debate and its National Dimensions (2003), and The Media and Foreign Policy (1990). Dr. Serfaty’s articles have appeared in most leading professional journals in the United States and Europe, and he has been a guest lecturer in over 40 different countries in Europe, Africa, and Asia. He has been a frequent expert witness for the U.S. Congress and an occasional witness for other national legislatures in Europe. A naturalized U.S. citizen since 1965, Dr. Serfaty holds a Ph.D. in political science from the Johns Hopkins University. In May 2001, Old Dominion University designated him as eminent scholar of the university. Dr. Serfaty was made a Chevalier de la Légion d'Honneur (Knight of the French Legion of Honor) in July 2008.




This scumbag calls for a NEW WORLD ORDER AFTER 9/11!

Read this garbage here:
http://web.archive.org/web/20010914221404/www.csis.org/features/nyterror_serfaty.htm



Dr. Simon Serfaty
Director
CSIS Europe Program

On the Terrorist Attack of the World Trade Center
and the Pentagon on September 11, 2001

September 12, 2001

Following yesterday's brutal attack, the solidarity shown by allies and friends, as well as some adversaries has been widespread. It provides an opportunity for rebuilding the Grand Coalition that, 10 years ago, was to shape a new world order.

In Europe, the allies understand that the feasibility of such an attack on the United States reveals their own exposure as well. That is why the NATO members have hardly objected to stating their solidarity in the context of the alliance's Article 5. In Russia, Vladimir Putin sees this as an opportunity to bare the soul the president gave him, as well as to get some credit for the internal problems he may fear in and beyond Chechnya. In the Middle East, the Arab states are growing increasingly concerned over a conflict that is getting out of hand, first between Israelis and Palestinians in the streets, and now between Islamist radicals and America (and others). Even under enormous time pressure - with retaliation possible sooner rather than later - allied support for U.S. military action should be sought and can, in fact, be expected.

For this act of war to not be repeatable we must avoid treating it as an unrepeatable terrorist action. Under conditions of urban terror, the alternative to deterrence is not defense (i.e., damage limitation) but preemption at the source. Few groups are able to launch such acts of war - know-how, capabilities, resources, network, etc. - and they must be hunted until they are so disrupted as to be no longer operational.

In the aftermath of this historically traumatic experience, however, an America that acts alone, or one whose (re)actions are questioned by allies and friends, would find it difficult to take allies and friends seriously. If it feels isolated in a mostly hostile world, America may act unilaterally - meaning, not alone, but on the basis of one alliance per crisis, one crisis per alliance. That would hardly create a new world order generally, and, no less significantly, it might not end or contain any specific disorder, either.

The events of September 11 also serve as a reminder that the Middle East conflict cannot be neglected for long without dangerous impact elsewhere. Accordingly, U.S. military retaliation, whatever its form, will be most effective, and allied support mostly likely, if it is accompanied, in its immediate aftermath, by a renewed U.S. engagement in the peace process, including the nomination of a high-level special envoy who would restore U.S. leadership in making peace after it has been established that its power can wage war. That, too, is, after all, what happened in the context of the Gulf War 10 years ago.


My commentary:
We truthers aren't f**king around when we talk about 9/11 and the "new world order".  There's the "new world order" mentioned TWICE on 9/12/2001 from a scumbag who sits in Zbig's old chair at CSIS.
109  The War Room / 9/11 Material & Research / Re: CSIS rolled out NWO agenda on 9/12/2001 on: December 02, 2010, 03:17:10 am


John Hamre was elected president and CEO of CSIS in January 2000. Before joining CSIS, he served as the 26th U.S. deputy secretary of defense. Prior to holding that position, he was under secretary of defense (comptroller) from 1993 to 1997. As comptroller, he was the principal assistant to the secretary of defense for the preparation, presentation, and execution of the defense budget and management improvement programs. Before serving in the Department of Defense, Dr. Hamre worked for 10 years as a professional staff member of the Senate Armed Services Committee. During that time, he was primarily responsible for the oversight and evaluation of procurement, research and development programs, defense budget issues, and relations with the Senate Appropriations Committee. From 1978 to 1984, he served in the Congressional Budget Office, where he became its deputy assistant director for national security and international affairs. In that position, he oversaw analysis and other support for committees in both the House of Representatives and the Senate. Dr. Hamre received his Ph.D., with distinction, in 1978 from the School of Advanced International Studies at the Johns Hopkins University, where his studies focused on international politics and economics and U.S. foreign policy. In 1972, he received a B.A., with high distinction, from Augustana College, emphasizing political science and economics. The following year he studied as a Rockefeller fellow at Harvard Divinity School.



STATEMENT ON 9/12:

http://web.archive.org/web/20010914203636/www.csis.org/features/nyterror_hamre.htm

 Dr. John J. Hamre
President and CEO
CSIS

Terrorist incidents in New York and Washington, D.C.

September 12, 2001


Tuesday, September 11, was a dark day for America, but not for America alone. It was a dark day for civilization as well. Frankly, America is lucky to have been spared tragedies that the rest of the world sees all too often. On September 11, however, terror came home. The physical tragedy is inescapable, and our hearts go out to the injured and to all those who lost their loved-ones. But there is another cost -- the potential loss of hope. Our innate hope in a larger good was shattered by an unexplainable evil.

We must now start to draw lessons about the broader meaning of these tragic events. My first hope is that this tragedy breaks the rhythm of the popular drumbeat around the world that "proud America" needs to be taken down a notch. Our grief is great, and we have all been enormously consoled by the flood of thoughtful messages from friends around the world. These words of encouragement demonstrate the depth of support that America can count on in a time of crisis. Our friends are standing with us and they are many.

I also hope that through this tragedy we can overcome the growing divide between America and the rest of the world about American "unilateralism." I do not personally believe that America has turned down a unilateralist path, although I hear the argument made often. What is clear from the events of September 11 is that, in a global age, national security depends on extensive collaboration with other countries. We have no hope of stopping terrorists in the United States if we try to manage the problem alone. In fact, these events prove we must have strong collaboration with other countries not just to knock down hateful extremists, but to tackle the range of problems that transcend the sovereign control of any one country.

This tragedy opens an opportunity for a new partnership in the world. The nature of our global age is such that we cannot solve problems in America that spring from causes in other countries without the partnership of those countries in the shared challenge. That is the nature of governance in the twenty-first century. We need two things to navigate safely and successfully the dangerous waters of globalization: strong and competent governments around the world and a shared consensus on problems and solutions. We cannot handle the dark side of globalization, or really benefit from its opportunities either, without both of these conditions.


It was this cooperative spirit that drove us to work with other countries fifty years ago to create the global institutions that so successfully managed the challenges that we have since faced. We need to rediscover this spirit at the start of this decade. I hope that this is the phoenix that rises from the terrible rubble in New York and Washington.

110  The War Room / 9/11 Material & Research / CSIS rolled out NWO agenda on 9/12/2001 on: December 02, 2010, 03:16:18 am
James Lewis was excited and got a "hard on" on 9/12!

While most Americans are grieving, CSIS scumbag James Lewis is ready to roll out the NWO agenda in no time!

Read this $h1t.

Retrieved from:
http://web.archive.org/web/20010914203646/www.csis.org/features/nyterror_lewis.htm


 Dr. James Lewis
Contact: jlewis@csis.org
Director
CSIS Technology Program

The Impact of the Terrorist Attack
on Cyber-Security & Technology

September 12, 2001

Yesterday's tragedy may shift the terms of the public debate for issues like privacy, internet surveillance and even the allocation of '3G' radio spectrum. Security, law enforcement and homeland defense will be a higher priority than in the past. Privacy advocates are concerned that the fear and anger generated by the tragedy will sweep away opposition to intrusive technologies, such as the FBI's 'Carnivore' Internet traffic monitoring system. Greater use of law enforcement monitoring tools need not be a cause for concern if the appropriate legal safeguards (warrant requirements, judicial oversight) remain in place.

Americans may now also tolerate other intrusive new technologies to improve security. Automatic face monitoring at airports for anti-terrorist purposes will seem like a much better idea. However, either the legislative process or the courts will need to sort through some of the knottier problems that will arise from the use of new automated scanning and identification technologies: what locations are appropriate for scanning; if public and private personal information databases can be linked, how long data collected at airports can be stored and under what safeguards, and what uses are appropriate for face monitoring data. Americans will support automatic face screening for terrorists at airports but they may be displeased if the screening is also used to identify those with outstanding parking tickets. Technology has shifted the dividing line between what is public and what is private and our laws have not kept up.

The emphasis given to cybersecurity in the past may deflate somewhat in light of yesterday's events. The "cyber-risk" has always been overstated - a digital Pearl Harbor is preferable to a real one, and terrorist groups like Al-Qaeda have emphasized that explosions are preferable to hacking. Critical Infrastructure Protection is necessary, but an adequate homeland defense must do more than protect infrastructure. Physical protection remains as important or more important than cybersecurity.

If there is a political shift among Americans toward greater support for domestic security, it may make it more difficult to reallocate radio spectrum from the government to the private sector. Industry and some in Congress have argued that valuable radio spectrum now used by the Department of Defense should be reallocated to the private sector for use in 3rd Generation wireless communications systems (3G). DOD opposes this move. One dilemma is how to decide which use of the radio spectrum is more valuable - 3G or national defense. The value of defense has gone up in the public estimation over the last 24 hours. Whether this will have a lasting effect on the spectrum debate will depend on what other countries do (some are already taking spectrum used by DOD for 3G services) and whether an adequate replacement and compensation scheme for DOD can be devised.
111  The Economy / Trade / Re: CSIS "The New Global Economy" 1997 plans to take Globalization to next level on: December 02, 2010, 03:06:24 am

NAFTA: What Comes Next?
Sidney Weintraub


"With so many titles available, one wonders if yet another book will have any effect on clarifying NAFTA's complexities. However, in this case, the answer is a resounding yes . . . .The book is highly recommended." - Business Information Alert

"Anyone trying to decipher the myriad claims about NAFTA would be well advised to read this book." - CHOICE

Washington Papers/Praeger 132 pp. 1994
ISBN 0-275-95119-7 (pb) $14.95
0-275-95118-9 (hb) $49.95

READ THAT REPORT HERE:
http://www.questia.com/PM.qst?action=openPageViewer&docId=15377503




SIDNEY WEINTRAUB
William E. Simon Chair in Political Economy

Expertise: International trade and finance; Canada; Mexico; Latin America. Sidney Weintraub, an economist, is also Dean Rusk professor at the Lyndon B. Johnson School of Public Affairs of the University of Texas at Austin, where he has been since 1976. A member of the U.S. Foreign Service from 1949 to 1975, Dr. Weintraub held the post of deputy assistant secretary of state for international finance and development from 1969 to 1974 and assistant administrator of the U.S. Agency for International Development in 1975. He was also a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution. His most recent book is NAFTA: What Comes Next? (CSIS Washington Papers, 1994). He was a coauthor of The NAFTA Debate: Grappling with Unconventional Trade Issues (Lynne Rienner, 1994). Among his books on Mexico are A Marriage of Convenience: Relations between Mexico and the United States (Oxford University Press for the Twentieth Century Fund, 1990) and Free Trade between Mexico and the U.S.? (1984). He has published numerous articles in newspapers and journals. Weintraub received his Ph.D. from The American University and speaks Spanish and French.
112  The Economy / Trade / Re: CSIS "The New Global Economy" 1997 plans to take Globalization to next level on: December 02, 2010, 03:05:45 am
Here are the maps mentioned in that report:


http://web.archive.org/web/19990221091704/www.csis.org/nge/trade/wldtrade.html



http://web.archive.org/web/19990221080003/www.csis.org/nge/trade/ustrade.html
113  The Economy / Trade / CSIS "The New Global Economy" 1997 plans to take Globalization to next level on: December 02, 2010, 03:05:13 am

http://web.archive.org/web/19970708140930/www.csis.org/nge/

The United States and the New Global Economy
A CSIS Initiative to Position the United States
for the 21st Century Global Economic and Financial System


Most analysts agree that the United States is now in the midst of one of the most significant, balanced, and prolonged economic expansions since the 1960s. The last four quarters have generated growth in excess of 4%, the last of which (1Q97) generated a remarkable 5.7% surge. Productivity growth has increased significantly. Unemployment is at its lowest levels in years. Inflation is negligible. The stock markets have been at historic highs both in terms of equity averages and market capitalization levels. And the national deficit--which only five years ago was characterized as a major problem in the global economy--has declined to less than one half of the deficit target the EU countries are now seeking to achieve in the lead-up to the single curre ncy. U.S. industries have taken the lead in many key sectors associated with the post-industrial knowledge economy and are well poised to compete internationally. Furthermore, there are no easily identifiable short-term imbalances that could interrupt the current seven-year expansion.

Despite the encouraging condition of the U.S. economy, however, there are longer-range issues that American leaders cannot afford to neglect. The United States is entering the new millennium facing an array of serious, structural economic and financial challenges. Large government deficits, a mounting stock of national debt, a tax system that favors disinvestment and dissavings, physical infrastructure deterioration, pressures on its human resource base (including underemployment and stagnant wages), l ooming financial dislocations brought about by an aging demographic bubble, and pronounced external economic imbalances are among the challenges that policymakers must confront in the years ahead. Three years ago, in testimony before the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, Gerald Corrigan described these challenges as follows:

    "n the face of myopic trade policies, efforts to regulate and control capital flows, or continued large-scale government dissavings in the form of budget deficits at the national level such as in the United States, the period ahead could prove to be extraordinarily difficult.... In the fullness of time, the marketplace will treat harshly even the largest of nations that fail to conduct their economic and financial affairs in a sound and prudent fashion."

As significant as these problems could be to the U. S. economy in the future, what is most noteworthy about the current political debate on domestic reform is the near complete absence of serious discussion about the world economy and its relationship to U.S. economic performance at home. When issues of international economic policy do arise, there are signs--across the political spectrum--of growing economic nationalism and parochialism. The Cochairman of the CSIS International Research Council and fo rmer Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers, Murray Weidenbaum, describes this as the paradox of the "simultaneous rise of the new spirit of isolationism amidst the increasing globalization of business and economic activity."

The fact remains, however, that to an increasing extent, the economic welfare of communities throughout the United States is contingent on events elsewhere in the world. Income and employment levels are no longer insulated from changes elsewhere in the global economy. With each passing day, every state, every district, and every community in the United States is increasingly affected by global interest rates, global capital flows, global trade trends, and shifts in the global labor market. Peter Druck er recently put it this way:

    "Too many economists, politicians and segments of the public treat the external economy as something separate and safely ignored. The world economy has become too important for a country not to have a world-economy policy. Managed trade i s a delusion of grandeur. Outright protectionism can only do harm, but simply trying to thwart protectionism is not enough. What is needed is a deliberate and active--indeed, aggressive--policy.... For the United States and a number of other countries, it means abandoning ways of thinking that have dominated American economics perhaps since 1933, and certainly since 1945."

This is precisely the goal of the Center's project on "The United States and the New Global Economy." We look to develop a policy blueprint for the country to prosper in a rapidly changing world economic landscape. This blueprint, furthermore, will rep resent a mix of high-level public- and private-sector deliberation. In this way, CSIS seeks to establish a bridge between government and business on these key policy issues, and to narrow the gaps in perception that currently exist.

Project Description

This 18-month project has two main goals:

    * The first is to "map" the new global economic topography over the next 10 years by identifying key new forces and their likely effects. The initiative will focus on five key forces driving the process of global economic and financial integration: finance, trade, labor, technology, and advanced emerging markets (AEMs).

      Together, these forces provide the outlines for the New Global Economy the United States must address to ensure prosperity for future generations. They also engender major policy challenges for leaders in both business and policy.

    * Second, the project will analyze the implications of the new global economic topography for the United States and generate concrete recommendations about how the United States can best position itself for the future. These recommendations will cove r the five forces examined in the first phase as well as other issues germane to the broader mandate of the project.

By analyzing the forces transforming the global economy and by making appropriate policy recommendations, CSIS hopes to elevate the quality of debate on the net effects of economic globalization, define explicit linkages between the U.S. domestic and int ernational economies, expand communication between the federal and state levels on the U.S. policy framework, and bridge the respective positions of the government and private-sector leaders.



The United States and the New Global Economy:
Steering Committee and International Advisory Board


Chairman:

    Robert Day, Chairman and CEO, Trust Company of the West

Steering Committee:

    J. Carter Beese, Vice Chairman, Alex Brown International, Alex Brown & Sons Inc.
    Reginald K. Brack, Jr., Chairman, Time Inc.
    L. Paul Bremer, Managing Director, Kissinger Associates, Inc.
    William Brock, Chairman, The Brock Group
    Richard R. Burt, Chairman, International Equity Partners
    William Clark, President, Japan Society
    E. Gerald Corrigan, Managing Director, Executive Administration, Goldman Sachs
    Robert C. Dinerstein, Senior Managing Director and General Counsel, UBS
    Richard J. Elkus, Jr., Director, Voyan Technology
    Geza Feketekuty, Director, Center for International Trade at the Monterey Institute of International Studies
    John G. Heimann, Chairman, Global Financial Institutions, Merrill Lynch & Co., Inc.
    Carla A. Hills, Chairman, Hills & Company
    Henrietta Holsman Fore, Chairman & Chief Executive Officer, Holsman International
    Thomas Friedman, Columnist, New York Times
    Francis Fukuyama, George Mason University
    Michael Galvin, President, Galvin Enterprises, Inc.
    David D. Hale, Chief Economist, Kemper Mutual Funds
    Gary C. Hufbauer, Reginald Jones Senior Fellow, Institute for International Economics
    Walter Kansteiner III, Senior Associate, Forum for International Policy Rosabeth Moss Kanter, Professor, Harvard University
    Julius Katz, President, Hills & Company
    Francine Lamoriello, Senior Director, International Business Strategy, Baker, Donaldson, Bearman & Caldwell
    Philip C. Lauinger, Jr., Chairman, Lauinger Publishing Company
    Jack Lavery, Senior Vice President and Director of Corporate Business and Research Strategy, Merrill Lynch, Inc.
    Diana MacArthur, CEO, Dynamac Corporation
    Theodore H. Moran, Karl F. Landegger Professor of International Business Diplomacy, School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University
    Michael H. Moskow, President, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
    Alan Murray, Washington Bureau Chief and Senior Economics Reporter, The Wall Street Journal
    Douglas T. Purvance, Booz-Allen & Hamilton, Inc.
    John J. Roberts, Vice Chairman, American International Group
    William D. Rogers, Partner, Arnold & Porter
    Michael A. Samuels, President, Samuels International Associates, Inc.
    Andy Sieg, Senior Vice President, Merrill Lynch
    Roy C. Smith, Professor of Finance and International Business, Leonard N. Stern School of Business, New York University
    Murray Weidenbaum, Chairman, Center for the Study of American Business, Washington University
    Gary C. Wendt, Chairman and Chief Executive Officer, General Electric Capital Corporation
    Marina v. N. Whitman, Distinguished Visiting Professor, University of Michigan
    John N. Yochelson, President, Council on Competitiveness

International Advisory Committee:

    Albert Bressand, Managing Director, Promethée
    Maria Livanos Cattaui, Secretary General, International Chamber of Commerce
    Kenneth S. Courtis, Strategist and Senior Economist, Deutsche Bank Capital Markets
    Paul A. Dimitruk, Chairman, Pareto Partners
    DeAnne Julius, Chief Economist, British Airways
    Ian Martin, Chief Executive Officer, Unigate plc
    William Rogers, Senior Partner, Arnold & Porter (London)

CSIS:

    Erik R. Peterson, Senior Vice President and Director of Studies; William A. Schreyer Chair in Global Analysis; former Director of Research, Kissinger Associates, Inc.
    Bradley Belt, Director, Capital Market Reform Project; Director, National Commission on Retirement Policy
    William Garrison, Director, International Communication Studies Program
    Ernest Preeg, William M. Scholl Chair in International Business
    Peter Watson, Senior Adviser and Director, International Economics and Business Program; former Chairman, International Trade Commission
    Sidney Weintraub, William E. Simon Chair in Political Economy



The Paradox of Simultaneous Globalization and Isolationism
Murray Weidenbaum on the challenges to American policymakers . . .


[Murray Weidenbaum, former chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers, is chairman of the Washington University Center for the Study of American Business. The following is excerpted from his recent comments before the CSIS International Research Council, which he cochairs with Walter Laqueur.]

How does one reconcile virulent isolationism with an increasingly global economy?

A large part of the blame for our current predicament goes to the foreign policy establishment, which looks on the economy as an adjunct to defense policy. Using our economic strength and boycotts to convince countries to change their policies is hardly a central role for economic policy. The problem for the foreign policy establishment--because it fails to understand or pay much attention to the economic system--is that it does not have the slightest idea of how to deal with the isolationist sentiment in this country--which is such a barrier to sensible foreign policy.

We know, of course, that by every economic measure the flow of commerce and economic activity in the United States is increasingly transnational. International trade accounts for a rising share of the U.S. GDP. Growing arrays of American companies invest a majority of their assets overseas, and these companies obtain most of their sales and profits from those foreign sources. Indeed, the notion of cross-border business alliances has moved from the classroom to the boardroom. Global and massive movements of money and information occur faster than the eye can blink.

Most Americans regularly participate in the world economy, whether they know it or not, especially as consumers of goods and services produced around the world. In fact, if they did not participate to the degree in which they do, there would be no need for protectionism in the first place.

Yet, simultaneously, substantial segments of our society are focusing their thoughts primarily on internal matters. This isolationist, internally-oriented attitude is reinforced by the view that foreign influences are essentially harmful.

Surely, there is no shortage of domestic problems that bedevil our society--crime, budget deficits, and what is described as a growing gap between richer and poorer. These serious domestic challenges are compounded by the adverse effects of foreign competition on important segments of our population that are truly hurting--especially middle-aged workers with obsolescent skills and above-market pay. Let's face it, those workers don't share the general enthusiasm for the developments in the dynamic, entrepreneurial economies of Southeast Asia. You and I may look upon the achievements of the "Bamboo Network" of family-oriented Asian businesses as the modern equivalent of Horatio Alger. But many of our citizens see only unfair, low-cost competition on a field that is anything but level.

There is no simple and effective answer to the paradox of the simultaneous growth of globalization and isolationism. But one thing I'm sure of: More lectures on the merits of free and open trade will not suffice. They will serve only to irritate the losers in the dynamic marketplace. Nor will the standard supply-side response of tax cuts--whether or not accompanied by easier monetary policy--do the trick, especially at a time when concern about inflation is rising. But neither is a do-nothing strategy appropriate.

What we need is not a quick fix, but a positive and durable response. Specifically, we need to identify a set of strategic reforms to the structure of the American economy that will make this country a more attractive place for doing business and employing people. Such action will both reduce the protectionist sentiment at its core and enhance the U.S. global position.

Here are some key ingredients. First, we need not tax cuts but tax reform, as a way of raising our abysmally low levels of savings and investment. The basic way to do this is to shift the basis of taxation from income to consumption. And we can realize this goal while maintaining the progressive nature of the tax system, if we want to do so.


Second, rather than preoccupying ourselves with total federal spending--and it should be closer to the level of available revenue--we need to shift the preponderance of government outlays away from consumption by entitlements to investment in training, education, and new technology.

Third, we need to eliminate the numerous and expensive federal subsidies that shield large portions of the economy from competition in the marketplace. These anti-economic expenditures often are simultaneously environmentally destructive. Ridding the budget of them would literally generate a "twofer."

Fourth, in the arcane area of governmental regulation, the traditional preoccupation with social benefits needs to be tempered by the offsetting economic costs. In particular, we need to focus on those regulatory requirements that cavalierly reduce the availability of jobs in the United States. If this discussion of regulation sounds trivial, just consider that monument to regulatory stupidity otherwise known as the Shoreham nuclear power plant on Long Island. A major portion of New York State is saddled, and for years will continue to be saddled, with very high-cost electricity that reduces the competitiveness of the industry in a key region of our country. This happened simply because the then-governor arbitrarily refused, at the tail end of the process, to let the company operate the plant even though it had met the multitude of requirements imposed by the intricate permit approval process. Since then, we have seen the exodus of manufacturing to lower-cost areas.

Regulatory, tax, and other structural reforms are needed to enhance the productivity and competitiveness of the U.S. economy. That's the positive response. Sadly, this is a subject that most foreign policy experts find too boring to command their attention. Nevertheless, we must persist in chipping away at these obstacles to economic progress.

A word of caution. The route I envision for the American economy will not be easy. Nor will it quickly yield dramatic results. But, in the most fundamental sense, these reforms will provide a constructive response to the isolationist sentiment that is now so strong. This is a response that is consistent with an increasingly global marketplace and, of greater importance, with the maintenance of a free society.

Finally, focusing economic policy on producing a stronger economy--rather than on using our economic strength to force other nations to change their policies--has a great advantage. It generates the resources for the substantial investments in defense and foreign policy initiatives needed to maintain America's position in an uncertain and dangerous world.



Regulating Global Electronic Commerce
The Administration's approach to growing cybercommerce. . .


"Governments can have a profound effect on the growth of commerce on the Internet. By their actions, they can facilitate trade on the Internet or inhibit it. Knowing when to act and, at least as important, when not to act will be crucial to the development of electronic commerce." These words, drawn from a draft inter-agency document under development by the Administration to address electronic commerce, reflect a non-regulatory, market-oriented approach that Washington will promote with other governments as electronic commerce takes off in global commerce. The stakes are high. Electronic commerce, with an estimated sales volume of $200 million two years ago, is expected to reach several billion dollars of sales by the turn of the century. By virtue of its developed cyber-infrastructure and technological comparative advantage, the United States is well positioned to exploit the upside of this revolution--but only if a harmonized and transparent environment for global cybercommerce can be achieved. That will be no small task. The threat exists that governments will inhibit growth by creating new levels of regulation, adding new bureaucratic layers, and/or imposing new taxes and tariffs.

The Administration's strategy to create a predictable legal and regulatory framework for the development of electronic commerce is nearly complete. This "roadmap" for international discussions and agreements is based on the following principles:

    * The private sector should take the lead in the electronic marketplace. Washington acknowledges that the rapid take-off of the Internet has been driven primarily by the private sector, and that the private sector must continue to lead for electronic commerce to flourish. The role of government, then, should be limited to creating a more predictable environment in terms of enforcement of contracts, liability, intellectual property protection, privacy, and security so that current uncertainties inhibiting higher levels of electronic commerce are reduced or even eliminated.

    * Governments should avoid undue restrictions on electronic commerce. This is the flipside to constructive government involvement. The Administration's position highlights the downside of "problematic regulation [including] taxes and duties, restrictions on the type of information transmitted, control over standards development, and public utility forms of regulation on services offered." It also warns that "signs of these kinds of commerce-inhibiting actions are already appearing in many nations . . . [and that] preempting these harmful actions before they take root is a strong motivation for the [government's] strategy."

      Specifically, the Administration will advocate that the WTO, the OECD, and other appropriate international organizations declare the Internet to be a duty-free area, and that only existing tax regimes should be applied to electronic commerce.

      With respect to electronic payments systems and the security of cybercommerce, the government is advocating case-by-case supervision of the new systems that are coming on-line. It is working with G-10 Central Bank Governors, the Basle Committee on Banking Supervision, and the Financial Action Task Force to monitor the effect of EPS technologies on international commerce and banking.

      Similarly, the U.S. government is supporting the development of a "uniform commercial code" for electronic commerce, similar to the Uniform Commercial Code adopted by the American states, and has endorsed a model law developed by the UN Commission on International Trade Law as a starting point.

      In the area of intellectual property protection, the U.S. government is also seeking to establish clear and effective copyright, patent and trademark protection through international agreements to deter piracy and fraud.

      The U.S. Patent and Trademark Office is leading the U.S. delegation at the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) to formulate such agreements on copyrights through that organization. In the area of patents, the government will continue its annual conferences with Europe and Japan. It also looks to establish a working group of the WIPO permanent committee on industrial property information. On the issue of trademarks, it intends to seek domestic and international agreement on uniform standards that address trademark infringement and priority of rights for trademarks used in cyberspace.

    * Where government involvement is needed, it should support a predictable, minimalist, consistent and simple environment. Specifically, Washington is advocating on the role of government in shielding consumers from fraudulent sales, protecting intellectual property, ensuring privacy, fostering competition, promoting disclosure, and creating "simple" means for the resolution of disputes.

      On the matter of security, the Administration will seek to liberalize export controls for "commercial encryption products" while at the same time protecting legitimate law enforcement and national security interests.

    * Governments should recognize the unique qualities of the Internet. The position paper suggests that governments across the world should recognize that "the Internet's unique structure poses significant logistical and technical challenges to current regulatory models, and should tailor their policies accordingly." It points to the decentralized nature and bottom-up governance of the Internet, and the need for industry self-regulation and close cooperation with the private sector.

    * Electronic commerce should be facilitated on an international basis. Here the Administration will face its most difficult test. Enumerating the principles for "free trade" in cyberspace is one thing, but lining up countries with vastly different political, social, religious and other perspectives is quite another. The challenges in achieving consensus on the foregoing points will likely be significant even with our closest trading partners, as the constellation of "physical" trade issues--ranging from market access to technical standards to local content--has demonstrated over recent years.

Forging a globalized approach to electronic commerce along these lines will require an intense and sustained effort by this administration and, no doubt, future administrations.

[The specifics of the position paper are available at http://www.nist.gov/eleccomm/glo_comm.htm]



The Challenge to Cities
Mayor Jerry E. Abramson of Louisville, Kentucky, on the global economy . . .


Today, no city--no matter how small, no matter where it is located--and no state--no matter whether it is agricultural or industrial--can divorce itself from the impact of the global economy. Whether it is Nebraska wheat, Washington timber, West Virginia coal, Iowa corn, or Kentucky thoroughbreds, the market for those products is as much overseas as it is domestic. States and cities are actively seeking foreign investments, and actively playing a role in opening foreign markets for their local products. Competition among states and cities is fierce for these investments and markets.

The last two decades show why. In the 1970s, American cities began to lose manufacturing jobs as corporations went global and began to locate plants abroad. The early 1980s were the coup de grace. When I became mayor of Louisville in 1986, our city was reeling from the impact of the 1981-82 recession, when we lost 30,000 manufacturing jobs. My first priority was to restore jobs and a vibrant economy to our metropolitan area. We needed to become competitive, and quickly. We had to recognize the new reality of the global economy, seek investment, and expand markets abroad for our businesses.

To accomplish this, a strong, locally based, grass roots-oriented effort at commercial diplomacy was necessary. I launched my first trade mission to England, Germany, and Belgium within six months of my inauguration. Since that first trip, I have led trade and tourism missions almost every year of the 12 years of my administration, making sales presentations to foreign corporations and seeking to secure tourism contracts.

Mayors are working with governors to increase the attractiveness of their states and cities to foreign investment. They are also working closely with Washington-based agencies and diplomatic contacts to advance international economic development objectives. While the departments and agencies have been helpful, I must say that for cities, Congress has been missing in action. In the 1980s and 1990s, federal help for cities--from revenue sharing to funding for housing, infrastructure, and human needs--has been slashed. We are the orphan child of the new federalism.

As the partnership between Congress and local government frayed, mayors turned to local corporations for help. In response to intense international competition, U.S. companies became lean and mean, downsized their workforces, and modernized their manufacturing processes and technology. But they also found state and local governments willing to help. Cities and states, seeking to replace lost jobs, began offering incentives, tax breaks, and other government services to both attract new business and keep old ones.

Local government and business also realized that working together was a logical solution to problems they faced. For example, Louisville is the home of UPS's international air hub. Packages shipped from Europe and the Far East come to Louisville to be sorted. But we needed to expand our airport and add additional runways not only to handle the UPS traffic, but also to increase the ability of airlines to serve our city because air travel is the highway of the global economy. Our local businesses were willing to fund start-up costs for our city's $400 million airport expansion.

UPS makes our airport the sixth largest in the world for cargo, handling more than 2.7 billion pounds of air cargo annually. Because of UPS's hub, foreign and domestic companies have flocked to our industrial parks to build distribution centers. Our local, government-owned Riverport International Park offers the advantages of being both an enterprise zone and a foreign trade zone, offers significant breaks on duties and tariffs as well as tax breaks. Overall, the Louisville metropolitan region now has 90 foreign-owned companies, with an investment total estimated at more than $3 billion. In fact, we were so successful that in 1991 Louisville was named by World Trade magazine as one of the 10 best cities for international companies in the United States.

Cities and states have assisted the international outreach effort to secure foreign investment and to find markets abroad in a number of ways. For instance, Kentucky's World Trade Center, the state-led outreach effort, moved its headquarters to Louisville in 1995. The center provides educational programs, foreign trade seminars, and advice for businesses interested in foreign markets and foreign companies interested in local investment.

Our city's Office of Economic Development and our local Sister Cities organization are now heavily oriented to trade and economic development. Through our Sister Cities relationship with Perm, Russia, we set up the first locally based joint Russian-U.S. capital fund in October 1995 to help Perm purchase high-tech medical equipment from our area. Twenty MBA candidates from our local Bellarmine College went to Perm to help Russian entrepreneurs open businesses there, while under the USIA Business for Russia program 30 Russian students came to our community. As a result, several of our Louisville businesses are now doing business in Russia. Similar exchanges are going forward with our other Sister Cities: Quito, Ecuador; Tamale, Ghana; La Plata, Argentina; Mainz, Germany; and Montpellier, France.

Yet, even though cities and states have formed partnerships with the private sector to promote the global economy, I must return to an earlier theme. There is a serious disconnect between our efforts and what is happening in Congress. Underlying our needs to compete locally are two fundamental requirements: (1) an educated workforce that can perform the jobs being created by the information age and the global economy, and (2) improved infrastructure--whether old-fashioned roads and bridges or the infrastructure necessary to improve the information highway. The president, governors, and mayors understand the need to improve education--from research at our local universities to job training for our disadvantaged population. Yet Congress seems to have no concept of how to invest to ensure our global competitiveness. Mesmerized by the deficit, caught up in ideology and social issues, this Congress is letting the opportunity to prepare our nation for the next century pass by.

We need a national strategy to continue our advances. But with Congress absent for the most part as a partner in the planning process, our ability to develop and enact such a national strategy is hampered. Should we reduce federal spending? Yes. But any company that only reduces costs without investing in new technology, training, equipment, and products is on the road to nowhere. Likewise, we must have national investment in research, education and job training, and infrastructure to back up the efforts of our private sector and local governments.

[Excerpted from comments delivered recently to the CSIS Advisory Board.]
114  The Economy / Financial Crisis Forum / Re: The Collapse of Detroit on: December 02, 2010, 03:00:14 am

(pic from detroiturbex.com)

This a picture of the textbook storage room at the now razed Joy Middle School.

At a primitive level, I think this is cool, because I really hate public schools; but at a higher level, it's a shame that all of these resources paid for by tax dollars get left to vandals and the elements.


Here is a slideshow done by Detroit Free Press:
http://www.freep.com/apps/pbcs.dll/gallery?Site=C4&Date=20080403&Category=NEWS&ArtNo=804030803&Ref=PH&Params=Itemnr=1
115  The Economy / Financial Crisis Forum / Re: The Collapse of Detroit on: December 02, 2010, 02:59:43 am


I'm surprised the Wall Street Journal did this article/video, but it's kids screwing around at the old Packard plant and they throw a dump truck out the window from the fourth story!

http://online.wsj.com/article/SB125745924791631907.html


This is when you know you live in a post-industrial world!
116  The Economy / Financial Crisis Forum / The Collapse of Detroit on: December 02, 2010, 02:59:17 am


This website was put together by "urban explorers" who take pictures of abandoned buildings in Detroit:

http://www.detroiturbex.com/

This is the "de-development" and de-industrialization" that Maurice Strong, John P Holdren, Paul Ehlrich, Ted Turner, and other globalists advocate.  A prosperous industrialized city reduced down to ruins and "urban prairies".  This is the New World Order's version of a successful city.

All of America will eventually look like this.

Then with all buildings left to scrappers, taggers, vandals, squatters and the elements, the bulldozer becomes the false solution, completing UNEP's re-wilding plans.

US cities may have to be bulldozed in order to survive
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/financetopics/financialcrisis/5516536/US-cities-may-have-to-be-bulldozed-in-order-to-survive.html

Can Farming Save Detroit?
http://money.cnn.com/2009/12/29/news/economy/farming_detroit.fortune/

Alex Jones crew visits Detroit:
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dWHdttx5UFI
117  The Economy / Financial Crisis Forum / Science Czar John P. Holdren: "free market" will be used to "de-develop" U.S. on: December 02, 2010, 02:57:00 am


Quote
CNSNews.com asked: “You wrote ‘a massive campaign must be launched to restore a high quality environment in North America and to de-develop the United States’ in your book Human Ecology. Could you explain what you meant by de-develop the United States?”

Holdren responded: “What we meant by that was stopping the kinds of activities that are destroying the environment and replacing them with activities that would produce both prosperity and environmental quality. Thanks a lot.”

CNSNews.com then asked: “And how do you plan on implementing that?”

“Through the free market economy,” Holdren said.

Read rest of article AND watch the video here:
http://www.cnsnews.com/news/article/75388
118  The Economy / Financial Crisis Forum / Old School BCCI news clips on: December 02, 2010, 02:53:07 am


NBC Nightly News w/ Tom Brokaw:
http://www.viddler.com/explore/bobmazur/videos/1/

Another clip of BBCI raid:
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ak9ug_9yD7g

Dan Rather: BCCI funded Pakistan's nuclear weapons programme
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kBnVhMAZ4rY

BCCI CIA connections:
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SVXroOSAqMU


119  Science & Technology / Big Brother / Police State Tech / Re: BoozAllenHamilton rolls out the "Geospatial Revolution" In your face tyranny! on: December 02, 2010, 02:50:40 am
Retrieved from:
http://www.boozallen.com/consulting/industries_article/42437208

Coming Soon: A Map for Every Idea

Booz Allen is supporting the Federal government in developing a national infrastructure for mapping data of all kinds.

Anne Hale MiglareseImagine an immense database that would allow government, business—and the public—to create maps for almost any subject imaginable, from health trends to loan foreclosures to the impact of climate change on the nation’s coastlines.

The federal government envisions such a database, to be known as the National Spatial Data Infrastructure, and Booz Allen Hamilton’s Anne Hale Miglarese is leading a committee that will recommend how the ambitious goal might be accomplished.

Miglarese, a principal at Booz Allen, chairs the National Geospatial Advisory Committee, which will report its recommendations to the secretary of the Department of the Interior. Members include representatives of both government, academia, tribal governments and industry, and Booz Allen provides Miglarese’s expertise to the committee pro bono.

An estimated 80 percent of all data has a geographic component —which means it can be mapped, says Miglarese, who is focused on growing Booz Allen’s geospatial services across the defense, intelligence and civil sectors. Data can be converted into maps that show an almost unlimited range of features, such as the best locations to generate wind and solar energy, the locations and importance of critical infrastructure across the US, and the spread of illnesses such as H1N1 flu.

“You can just let your imagination run wild of what you can map if you spatially enable the data,” says Miglarese.  In her role at Booz Allen, for example, she will soon be working on a project that will map the gross domestic product by county, census tract and even Congressional district.

The proposed national database  will take advantage of a wealth of data collected at the state and local level, and will enable federal agencies to share and integrate information across a broad range of missions. In addition, commercial business benefits tremendously from the value of this public domain geospatial data.  And, Google and Microsoft mapping portals rely on public data to a large extent to drive their local search products.

“The vision is to have as much data in the public domain as is possible and reasonable,” says Miglarese. However, there are security concerns that need to be addressed, she says. For example, a 3-D model of Washington with the schematic plans of buildings that show air intake vents, internal power plants and communication lines can be exceptionally valuable to police and fire professionals but could be misused by others. “There is a active debate about this,” says Miglarese. “We live in a democracy and open records law is a fundamental premise of our society. But geospatial technology allows us to understand, analyze and visualize the built and natural world in a way that was never possible before and the implications driven by the full release of this information must be carefully addressed and debated. It’s a fine line as a society that we need to walk.”

Despite such concerns, she says, the mapping that will be made possible by the database will fuel innovation and efficiency in the public, private and academic sectors, and will be of immense value to our Federal customers.


Excerpt from:
http://www.fgdc.gov/ngac

National Geospatial Advisory Committee

The National Geospatial Advisory Committee (NGAC) is a Federal Advisory Committee sponsored by the Department of the Interior under the Federal Advisory Committee Act. The NGAC reports to the Chair of the Federal Geographic Data Committee (Secretary of the Interior or designee). The scope and objectives of the NGAC are described in the NGAC Charter: “The Committee will provide advice and recommendations related to management of Federal and national geospatial programs, the development of the National Spatial Data Infrastructure, and the implementation of Office of Management and Budget Circular A-16 and Executive Order 12906. The Committee will review and comment upon geospatial policy and management issues and will provide a forum to convey views representative of non-federal stakeholders in the geospatial community.”






Their homepage here:
http://geospatialrevolution.psu.edu/




Geospatial Revolution Press Release
http://geospatialrevolution.psu.edu/assets/pdf/PennState_GSR_Project_Overview_050709.pdf



Read Executive Order 12906 here:
http://www.archives.gov/federal-register/executive-orders/pdf/12906.pdf




Geospatial "War-game"/"simulation" used by EPA:
http://www.epa.gov/OEI/symposium/2010/miglarese%20.pdf



The U.S. Federal Geographic Data
Committee (FGDC) Story:

http://www.gsdi.org/gsdiconf/gsdi11/slides/tues/1.1d.pdf




Changing Geospatial Landscape White Paper

http://www.fgdc.gov/ngac/NGAC%20Report%20-%20The%20Changing%20Geospatial%20Landscape.pdf









120  Science & Technology / Big Brother / Police State Tech / BoozAllenHamilton rolls out the "Geospatial Revolution" In your face tyranny! on: December 02, 2010, 02:50:05 am


Big Brother watching your every move, not only coming directly from the horse's mouth, but they are rubbing it in your face, neck deep into the s**t, to the point of you drowning in it.  Booz Allen turned off the smoke and mirrors, and are now going on a full frontal assault with an iron fist.

The following link, includes a 14 min **** propaganda embedded YouTube video!

http://www.boozallen.com/publications/leading-ideas/geospacerev-boozallen-pennstate?o42242052=


A quick Google Search for "geospatial" on site: boozallen.com turned up this PDF which is a 2 page overview of what Anti_Illuminati, Pilikia, Dig, Squarepusher,  I and others having been talking about ad nauseum.

http://www.boozallen.com/media/file/fostering-federal-partnerships-for-homeland-defense-and-security-cs.pdf


Pennsylvania seems to be a hotbed for **** NWO tyranny.  Penn State is teamed up with Booz Allen Hamilton on this 4th amendment-violating enslavement grid.
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